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THE DRIVE TOWARDS AMALGAMATION AND THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE : 1890 - 1946
CHAPTER 1
The Drive to the North
The inauguration of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953
was the result of the failure of all the parties involved in the
future of these territories to achieve their aims to a greater or
lesser extent. It marked the failure of the campaign of the
Rhodesian settlers for the amalgamation of the three territories
into a unitary state, a campaign conducted for over forty years
with fluctuating intensity. It marked the end of one powerful
tradition of Imperial policy which had been to use South Africa as
the guarantor of British interests in Africa south of the Congo.
Federation also marked the defeat of the heretofore successful
efforts of the Africans of the northern territories together with
their allies, notably the Scottish missionaries in Nyasaland, to
prevent any closer association of their territories with what they
considered to be the white South. Finally, 1953 marked a defeat
for South Africa's desire for expansion northwards. This drive to
the north predated the creation of the Union of South Africa and had
its roots in the Voortrekker determination to escape British control
as well as in the British Imperial determination to see southern
Africa as an exclusively British area of interest. The interweaving
of the conflict between these two forces is fundamental to the
history of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland: the struggle of the white
settlers to achieve amalgamation and the opposition to this on the
part of the Africans of the two northern territories, and their
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white allies, must be seen in this South African context.
From the time of the Great Trek the British authorities in the Cape
Colony as well as those in Westminster consistently worked to ensure
that the Afrikaner communities created by these Voortrekkers did not
threaten British hegemony in southern Africa. In the last quarter
of the nineteenth century it appeared to many that some form of
union or confederation of the British colonies of the Cape and Natal
with the independent Afrikaner states in the north was the only
satisfactory solution to this problem. The stumbling block was that
the Afrikaners showed no interest in any such movement and were
resistant equally to persuasion as to force.
In the early 1880s Cecil Rhodes began to work and scheme for a much
bigger prize - a British African territory stretching from the Cape
to Lake Tanganyika at least, if not further. The British Government
gave his schemes its tacit approval by granting to his British South
Africa Company a Charter in 1889. Westminster's aim was not the same
as that of Rhodes, they saw his expansionist aims as a means of
counteracting the threat posed to their interests by the stubborn
independence of the Afrikaner Republics, the Orange Free State and
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the South African Republic. This had become a threat of much
greater significance than heretofore because of the discovery of
massive gold deposits on the Witwatersrand which gave the Transvaal
power that it had not previously possessed. The threat posed by
the newly powerful Transvaal and its attempts to seek foreign support
became extremely dangerous at this time because the recently united
German Empire had become actively interested in Africa. The President
of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger, hoped to form an extended South
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African Republic which, with German help, would have access to
the sea for its enormous wealth and thus break its dependence on
the Cape seaports. This threat to British paramountcy in the area
and consequently to British control of the most important sea-route
to India and the Far East was one the British Government could not
ignore, yet it came at a time when British public opinion was still
very unhappy about large government expenditure on foreign adventures.
Rhodes and his Chartered Company therefore provided the opportunity
to economically protect British interests.
Rhodes' aim was to encircle the two Afrikaner Republics by expanding
in two areas. First, he hoped to extend Cape authority over what
is now Botswana, to cut the Afrikaner Republics off from the Germans
in their new colony of South West Africa and, secondly, to expand
the Chartered Company's rule over the lands to the north of the
Zambesi as far as Katanga and Lake Tanganyika. In addition Rhodes
aimed to gain as much as possible of the territory towards the east
coast claimed by Portugal. This latter strand of policy never
really got close to implementation, but claims to these territories
remained a factor in South African politics well into the twentieth
century.
In the north Rhodes had greater success. The Chartered Company,
using the control it had gained of certain mining concessions
granted by Lobengula of the Amandebele, occupied the lands of
Lobengula's Mashona 'vassals' in 1891, then, after a brisk military
campaign 'provoked' by the Amandebele, the Company occupied the rest
of Zimbabwe in 1893. Company agents were, meanwhile, making
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treaties with African chiefs, great and small, from the northern
shores of the Zambesi to the shores of Lake Malawi and Lake
Tanganyika as well as in Katanga. As a result all of what is now
Zambia, Malawi and the Zairean province of Katanga was claimed for
the Company.
At this time, Rhodes was the most powerful figure in southern Africa.
He controlled great wealth, he headed the Chartered Company with its
wide-reaching claims over Africa north of the Limpopo and from 1890
he was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. He was in a unigue
position which enabled him to implement the strategy of sgueezing
the Afrikaner Republics into closer co-operation with Britain through
a policy of encirclement. His initiative was essential because the
Government in London was gravely handicapped by the antipathy of
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British public opinion to public expenditure on 'foreign adventures'.
The failure of the attempt to crush the Transvaal military in Colley's
campaign of 1881 had forced Britain to find an alternative strategy
to maintain her hegemony in the area. This was necessary because it
was clear,almost immediately after Colley's failure, that the
Transvaal was intent on expansion, both for new land and also to
obtain access to the sea. In 1883, the satellite republic of
Stellaland was established in Botswana and the Portuguese granted
a concession to an American entrepreneur to build a railway from
Delagoa Bay into the Transvaal. Germany began a whirlwind campaign
of annexation of colonial territories in Africa by carving out a
new colony of South-West Africa (Namibia) in 1884, a further threat
to British hegemony. The British Government feared a link up
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between the Transvaal and the German territories, which fears were
greatly exacerbated in January 1885 by the signing of a treaty of
friendship between the Transvaal and Germany. When in February of
that year, Germany, in a move that was unmistakeably aimed at
British interest in Africa, annexed Tanganyika, Gladstone's Liberal
administration felt impelled to take action. In March 1885, the
British Government created the Protectorate of Bechuanaland, which
included the Afrikaner Republic of Stellaland, as a buffer between
the Transvaal and German territory. This complemented the action
they had taken in the previous November of annexing St Lucia Bay to
the colony of Natal which effectively ended any hope the Afrikaner
settlements in Zululand had of gaining access to the sea and so
opening a way for the Transvaalers.
The action came just in time, for in 1886 it became clear that the
massive gold deposits within the territory of the Transvaal had
started a rapid and profound change in the economic status of the
Republic and of the balance of economic power in southern Africa.
A comparatively poor agricultural state was rapidly transformed into
the richest territory in southern Africa. It was all the more
necessary, therefore, to isolate and, if possible, to neutralise this
threat to British hegemony in the area. So in 1887, Zululand was
annexed to the Empire and Lobengula of the Amandebele was persuaded,
in February 1888, to accept British protection, so making Zimbabwe
part of the British sphere of influence. It was then that Cecil
Rhodes' ambitions meshed very neatly with the aims of the British
Government. The massive territorial claims of the British South
Africa Company north of the Limpopo appeared to guarantee these
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northern lands to Britain at no cost to the Exchequer and leave the
Transvaal effectively hemmed into its existing borders.
Rhodes however began to run into difficulties in the north.
Although completely successful in gaining political control of
Zimbabwe, the expected rapid economic development did not take place
because the rumoured rich gold deposits were not to be found.
Rhodes' hopes of British Government support for his claims to large
areas of what is now Mozambique were frustrated when Westminster,
for its own wider diplomatic reasons, sought to conciliate Portugal
and so did not support Rhodes. This pattern was repeated when
Rhodes came into conflict with King Leopold's Congo Free State over
Katanga. Britain chose to gain Leopold's friendship rather than
lose it by supporting Rhodes. Even where there was no external power
competing with Rhodes for the support of the British Government his
plans were not entirely successful. In seeking to have Nyasaland
included as part of the Company's territories Rhodes ran into fierce
opposition. It was the Scottish missionary lobby and the evangelical
Glasgow business men who backed the African Lakes Corporation,
together with the Scots missionaries and African Lakes men in the
field who constituted the single most active opposition to Rhodes'
plans. Their opposition was based on the firm belief that Nyasaland
should be held in trust for the benefit of its African inhabitants
and that Imperial rule rather than Company rule was essential for
the achievement of that aim.
As early as 1882, the Free Church of Scotland and the African Lakes
Corporation had begun actively seeking a British Government presence
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in Nyasaland to end the slave trade and prevent a Portuguese take¬
over of at least part of the land.^ The African Lakes Corporation
(ALC) presented an alternative form of protection by seeking a
Charter to rule Nyasaland from the British Government. When this
attempt became known in 1885, it met with very strong opposition
from the Church of Scotland and its missionaries at Blantyre.
There was never any chance of Westminster granting such a charter
but there was considerable tension among the different Scottish
interests nonetheless. However these differences did not prevent
the Church of Scotland, the Free Church and the African Lakes
Corporation from co-operating with various anti-slavery lobbies in
Britain in a campaign during 1886 which culminated in a conference
in Glasgow calling for Imperial protection for Nyasaland from the
threat posed by the Portuguese. This pressure was maintained as
the threat to Nyasaland was intensified by the war with Zanzibari
slave-traders at Karonga in the north of the country, a situation
which became all the more threatening because of the Portuguese
confiscation of the ALC steamer on the Zambesi and their closing
the river, the lifeline of the Scots in Nyasaland, to international
traffic. The Scottish churches and the ALC arranged a meeting in
London of all the Scottish members of both Houses of Parliament in
the Spring of 1888 to lobby for Imperial intervention in Nyasaland.
This followed a number of interviews, granted by Lord Salisbury
4
to the Scottish pressure groups, which had achieved nothing at all.
Salisbury had given them little hope of help because he was still
trying to maintain the Portuguese as an ally in his diplomatic struggle
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with Germany. Rhodes' intervention, which changed the situation
in the Scots' favour even though ironically they would become his
bitter opponents before long, coincided with these discussions.
The future of Nyasaland was always a minor issue for Salisbury, and
for British Government policy in southern Africa. British Govern¬
ment priorities throughout this period remained focussed upon
establishing the area, now made up of Zimbabwe and Zambia, as British
to exclude any possible Afrikaner expansion northwards. Free navi¬
gation of the Zambesi and the exclusion of the Portuguese from
Nyasaland were also policy aims, but of a much lower order.
However, the discovery,by D J Rankin, of the Chinde mouth of the
Zambesi in January 1889, helped the situation enormously because
ships could now sail up the Zambesi directly from the sea, which
had previously been impossible. This seriously weakened, in inter¬
national law, Portugal's claims to control traffic on the river.
However, by this time it was the actions of Rhodes which were the
driving force in the affairs of southern Africa. From July 1890,
when he became Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, Cecil Rhodes was
able to devote himself completely to his dream of extending British
power to the north. Salisbury attempted to use this drive by Rhodes
and his Company as guarantors of British interests in central Africa.
Both he and Rhodes wanted to limit the independence of the Boer
Republic and, if possible, force them into some form of union loyal
to Britain. Rhodes paid the bills for the British administration
of Nyasaland as part of the price of co-operation from London, even
though, out of deference to the Scots, it was technically adminis¬
tered by the British Foreign Office and was not legally part of the
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Company area."' Thus the Portuguese and Zanzibar! threats were
deflected and the agitation in Scotland stilled. This was important
to Salisbury because many leading Scottish Conservatives had taken
part in this movement including Lord Balfour of Burleigh, who would
later become Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland.
The Scots missionaries in Nyasaland, particularly those of the
Church of Scotland based at Blantyre under the leadership of Dr
D C Scott, were not satisfied. They were not prepared to be
saved from the frying pan of Portuguese rule by being thrown into
the fire of Company rule. They viewed the dual role of H H Johnston,
as both Foreign Office official and Company agent, with extreme
disquiet. They strongly suspected that Rhodes still intended to
include Nyasaland in the Company area and that this possibility had
not been ruled out by London, so they continued to press for firm
assurances of continued Imperial control for Nyasaland. They were
well aware that Johnston had been willing, in 1890-91, for Nyasaland
to become part of the Chartered territory and suspected that he
continued to be so inclined. D C Scott and his assistant Alexander
Hetherwick were particularly vociferous about the threat of Company
rule which they opposed, arguing that a company exists to make
profits and this should not be the motivation of a government. They
also opposed the Company because they believed that it would bring
with it South African ideas of the supremacy of settler interest over
those of the indigenous people. What particularly annoyed Johnston
was that these ideas of the missionaries were communicated to
Africans through the medium of the Blantyre Mission magazine, Life
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and Work in British Central Africa.
The Blantyre missionaries stubbornly maintained their vigilant
stand against the possibility of a takeover by the British South
Africa Company. Their caution was justified because it was not
until 1894, with the breakdown in relations between Johnston and
Rhodes and the decision by the Government in London to assume
responsibility for the cost of the Protectorate when the period of
subsidy agreed to by Rhodes came to an end, that direct Imperial
rule seemed to be firmly established.
This little conflict was the first stage in a struggle that was to
continue up to 1953. In this early period, African participation
was minimal; it was primarily a Scottish campaign on their behalf.
Although the central issue of the campaign, opposition to any closer
association with southern territories and the continuation of
Imperial control as a guarantee of the primacy of African interests,
never altered, the role of the Nyasa people was to become more and
more prominent. The strength of the Scottish missionary lobby led
Salisbury to make his decision to exclude Nyasaland from Company
rule, provisionally at first in 1891 but definitively in 1894
when the British Government assumed financial responsibility for
the territory. This was a striking victory for the Scots since
the desire to avoid expense on the part of the Imperial Government
had been precisely what had created the opportunity for Rhodes'
initiatives. However, Nyasaland was a peripheral issue for
Westminster and Rhodes was left firmly in control of Southern and
Northern Rhodesia and avoidance of expenditure continued to be a
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prime consideration in Britain's policy for her African
colonies.
In the last twenty years of the nineteenth century British policy
in southern Africa was largely unaffected by changes of government
in the United Kingdom. In the Gladstone Ministry of August 1892 -
March 1894, however, there were indications of differences emerging
in the means, if not the ends, of Imperial policy. Britain's
acquiescence in the annexation of Swaziland by the Transvaal under
the terms of the Pretoria Convention of November 1893, represented
a tentative reconciliation with the Boer Republic. The Colonial
Secretary, Lord Ripon, and the rest of the Liberal Administration
were still committed to the containment of the Transvaal by denial
of any access to the sea unless Kruger and his government agreed
to enter a South African commercial union. Lord Ripon and his
colleagues were willing to settle for such a link hoping that it
would open the way for the Transvaal to be brought into a British
dominated political union.
The next year, in September, Britain annexed Pondoland and thus
closed the gap between the Cape Colony and Natal. This was still
part of their attempt to tempt rather than force the Transvaalers
into co-operation.^ The granting of self-government to Natal in
May of 1893 was another part of this policy of trusting more and
more authority to Colonies in the hope that this would ensure to
supremacy of British interests in the area and show the Afrikaners
that it might be possible to preserve their identity and some
autonomy while co-operating with the Empire.
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The Imperial Government's traditional attitude to the Boer
Republic was firmly re-established with the appointment of Joseph
Chamberlain as Secretary of State for the Colonies in Lord
Salisbury's Conservative/Liberal Unionist ministry, in June 1895.
In the same month Britain annexed Tongaland and Kosi Bay to block
the Transvaal's access to the coast. This measure prevented the
Transvaal attempting to expand to the eastern seaboard, but the
following month, July 1895, it achieved a direct, albeit vulnerable,
outlet to the coast with the opening of the Delagoa Bay railway.
Although the intentions of Rhodes and the Imperial Government
coincided closely over southern Africa and for all that the
Chartered Company had close connections with leading conservatives,
Rhodes and his company did not share the relative detachment with
which the British Government regarded the lack of progress in their
agreed strategy to end Boer independence. Whilst southern Africa
was, and remained, low down on the list of the British Government's
colonial priorities, it was all-important to Rhodes and his
associates. Frustration at this lack of progress, coupled with
disappointment at the failure of the Rhodesias to produce another
Rand, drove Rhodes and the Chartered Company's Administrator of the
Rhodesias, L Starr Jameson, to seek desperate remedies. The disaster
of Jameson's raid^ marked the failure of Rhodes' attempts to destroy
Afrikaner independence and forced his resignation from the Cape
Colony premiership on the 6 January 1896. Amongst the other
g
consequences of the raid were a crisis in Anglo-German relations
and, more importantly, the Boer Republic's decision to prepare for war.
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The lead up to war centered around the control of Delagoa Bay
which remained crucial to the continued survival of the Boer
Republics. In August 1898, a secret Anglo-German agreement on the
future of Portugal's African territories earmarked it for British
control. At that time it looked as if a virtually bankrupt
Portugal would have to forfeit at least part of her colonial
empire to survive. Portugal continued to manage without off-loading
her African territories and so deprived Britain of the opportunity
of placing an economic stranglehold on the South African Republics.
Encirclement and economic pressure having failed, the British
Government resorted once more to the military option and on 12
October 1899 the Boer War commenced.
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The initial attempt by the Conservatives after Vereeniging to
completely subjugate the Boers of the Orange Free State and the
Transvaal was checked by the Liberal election victory of January
11
1906. The main architect of this aborted policy was Alfred Milner,
but even before the resignation of Balfour, in December 1905, ended
Milner's strategy of the Anglicisation of South Africa, through
emigration and the suppression of all things Afrikaner, serious
doubts had been raised about the feasibility of his policy.
Joseph Chamberlain, who as Colonial Secretary had, in 1899, strongly
favoured the military solution to end continued Boer independence,
returned from a visit to South Africa in February 1903, convinced
of the impractibility of Milner's policy. Chamberlain advocated
reconciliation with the Boer as the only sensible way forward and
took his policy into opposition on resigning from Balfour's
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ministry over Imperial Preference in September 1903. The Liberal
Party's policy of appeasement of the Afrikaner, instigated by Lord
Elgin and Winston Churchill, from 1906 onwards, met with fierce
opposition from the arch-imperialists in the Conservative Party and
in south Africa, in particular from L S Jameson as Prime Minister
of the Cape Colony from 1904-1908.
The Liberal election victory produced a new policy of conciliation
towards those Afrikaners willing to co-operate, and an attempt to
create an atmosphere conducive to the creation of a united South
Africa guaranteeing British interests, while satisfying the majority
of Afrikaners. This Liberal policy was aimed at the Afrikaner
people only. Any moves towards an extension of the Cape franchise
would have destroyed this incipient British-Afrikaner co-operation.
The give-and-take involved in creating this reconciliation resulted
in South Africa's population being abandoned to local white rule and
the end of sixty years of non-racial development in the Cape. The
implementation of the Liberal Government's policy led to the forma¬
tion of the Union of South Africa in July 1909. It had been the
British imperialist elements in the Cape Parliament that had
rejected a similar scheme for a South African federation in June
1880. Twenty-nine years later they were forced to accept a less
favourable form of union.
Within the rivalry, conflict and compromise between the British
Government and Afrikanerdom, the threads of two separate policies
are clearly exposed. One policy, associated with Liberal govern¬
ments, tended towards the safeguarding of Imperial interests by
seeking to co-operate with moderate Afrikaner opinion. This
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conciliatory policy was most clearly pursued during Campbell-
Bannerman's ministry, but, as has already been shown, there were
indications of what was to come in Balfour's 1902-1905 administra¬
tion. Conservative governments, by contrast, constantly sought to
minimise Boer influence, by whatever means possible. Both parties,
when in office, sought to end Afrikaner independence, with its
threat to British dominance in South Africa, but by different means.
The Conservative Party attempted to achieve this result by force
of arms, whereas the Liberals sought the same solution in the
creation of the Union of South Africa. Although more blurred and
less clearly divided on party lines, there remained two separate
South African policies after the formation of the Union. They were,
by and large the continuation of the pre-1909 policies. One
favoured the encouragement of a British and moderate Afrikaner
establishment which would ensure the loyalty of South Africa to the
Empire. In this role South Africa would act as the British Govern¬
ment's proxy and would stand to gain benefits in territory and
influence as its reliability was made evident. This policy sought
to contain the more extreme independent Afrikaner elements in a
position of harmless perpetual, minority within the Union. Any gains
by extreme Boer opinion were recognised as a threat to this policy,
on which the Union of South Africa was established. The alternative
policy argued that the Union was inevitably unreliable due to the
extent of Afrikaner influence and that the only way to combat it was
by establishing an external counterweight, a greater Rhodesia, the
loyalty of whose white settler population would not be in doubt.
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Most of those who favoured an internal balance to Afrikaner
nationalism argued for the inclusion of Southern Rhodesia in the
Union to supplement its British population. However, such a move
would irrevocably deny the alternative option of creating an external
counterweight and so others, who supported the internal balance
policy, were reluctant to completely undermine the only alternative
strategy by incorporating Southern Rhodesia into the Union.
The policy which was in favour at any one time at Westminster
depended on the strength of the Imperial Government's belief that
the Government of South Africa was able and willing to support the
British Empire and her interests.
One of the features of British policy in southern Africa has been
the lack of hesitation in dismissing African interests to the lowest
level in the order of Imperial priorities. It would thus appear
that factors other than a concern for the welfare of the indigenous
people were instrumental in continuing the Imperial status of the
High Commission Territories after 1909.
Although the formation of the Union was the culmination of the Liberal
Government's policy, doubts remained about the level of co-operation
which could be expected from the Afrikaner community. Elgin in 1907
and Crewe in 1908, played safe by retaining the High Commission
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Territories under direct Imperial control. As targets of many
years standing for Afrikaner expansion, the High Commission Terri¬
tories were seen to be a good lever in encouraging the process of
co-operation within the Union. Although the same reservations applied
to Southern Rhodesia, it was not included in the Union in 1909 for
quite a different reason.
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The inclusion of Southern Rhodesia in the proposed Union of South
Africa would have solved a number of problems relating to the terri¬
tory. In the first place the settler population of Southern
Rhodesia was strongly British Imperialist in character and would
have been a very reassuring addition to the anti-Afrikaner national¬
ist population. Secondly, the Chartered Company had invested a
substantial amount of capital in the territory, for no immediate
return, and were keen to dispose of the area, if compensated for
their losses and assets in it. Inclusion would also have solved
the problem of the Rhodesian settlers themselves. Prior to Union
the settlers and their leader, Charles Coghlan, were strongly in
favour of joining the proposed Union, as they saw this as a means
of acquiring representative government, ridding themselves of
their unpopular Company rule, and at the same time removing the
threat of being overwhelmed by the Africans. Imperial, Company
and colonial interests would all have been served by Southern
Rhodesia becoming the fifth province of South Africa. Lord Selbourne
convincingly advocated Rhodesia's inclusion in a federation of South
13
Africa. In his memorandum of 1907, Selbourne argued that a South
Africa within and totally loyal to the British Empire would find
its urge for northward expansion aided as far north as Lake
Tangyanika. Although Afrikaner opinion divided on the issue, with
Hofmeyr opposed and Steyn unsure, Botha and Smuts were keen. They
saw the incorporation of Rhodesia with its fertile land and small
settler population as an ideal solution to their poor white problem.
All the interested parties, with the obvious exception of the
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Africans, whose views on the matter were of no consequence in
Imperial, colonial or Company opinion, were in favour of Rhodesia's
inclusion in the proposed union. What prevented it was the
cost.
The British Government was not prepared to compensate the Company
and its shareholders, though fully agreeing that remuneration would
be required in any transfer of authority in Southern Rhodesia.
However, neither the Rhodesian settlers nor the emerging Union of
South Africa were in any position to meet the Company price. Not
that the South African leadership was unwilling to try, but Botha's
14
offer of 20 million pounds in 1909 was turned down by the Company.
This decision stemmed from the fear on the part of influential men
within the Company that Rhodesian inclusion in the Union would result
in the Boer domination of all southern Africa. Other British South
Africa Company directors, among them Drummond Chaplin, were willing
to consider Rhodesia's inclusion, but they cautiously insisted on
delay. They felt it was safer to wait and see how South African
unification would work in practice and "... how far the policy
of a United Boer South is consistent with Imperial interests ..."
1
before agreeing to any South African offer to the Chartered Company.
The matter was further complicated by the dispute arising from the
confusion surrounding what actually belonged to the Company and
what did not. This lack of clarity had already frustrated British
16
Government attempts to end Company rule in 1903 and 1907. The
17
British Government was loth to enter into this murky area again.
However, it must be noted that that although Rhodesia was not
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included in the Union of South Africa in 1909, all concerned were
convinced of the inevitability of its eventual incorporation.
British policy was to maintain the status quo until the Union was
in a position to meet the Company's price for the end of Company
rule.
The only debate concerned how much of Africa the Union could
expect. That it would gain at least Southern Rhodesia and the High
Commission Territories was not in doubt. The Secretary of State
for the colonies in 1913, Viscount Lewis Harcourt, was of the opinion
that both the Rhodesias were part of South Africa's heritage, but
that South Africa could not expect to incorporate Northern Rhodesia
until Southern Rhodesia had joined the Union. Britain's High
Commissioner in South Africa, Viscount Herbert Gladstone, disagreed
and argued strongly in favour of the river Zambesi marking the
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northern limit of South African rule. The Colonial Office showed
its preference by its refusal to allow the Chartered Company to
amalgamate its administrations for Southern and Northern Rhodesia
in 1913, on the grounds that Northern Rhodesia, unlike Southern
Rhodesia, was part of black Africa. Much as Botha, Smuts and the
Union's Government wanted the Rhodesias and High Commission Terri¬
tories, they wanted Southern Mozambique, and its ports at Beira
and Lourenco Marques, even more. In 1910, the Liberal Government's
Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Gray, was convinced that the Union of
South Africa would be satisfied with nothing less than the incorpora¬
tion of Delagoa Bay. Gray was sympathetic to the Union's Mozambique
ambitions and felt that it would also be in Portugal's interests to
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sell her colonies. Harcourt (on this occasion with the support
of the Colonial Office) was in favour, in 1911, of partitioning
20
Mozambique between Nyasaland and the Union.
It was recognised by both Asquith's Government and the South African
leaders, Botha and Smuts, that World War I presented a golden oppor¬
tunity for the Union to fulfil its longstanding eastern ambitions.
More importantly, the Liberal Ministers in Asquith's coalition
21
Government supported South Africa's demands for Southern Mozambique.
In 1915, soon after the Union's conquest of German South West Africa,
Botha, and more particularly Smuts, were strongly advocating that,
on the capture of German Tanganyika, the northern po-rtion be joined
to British East Africa, but that the southern portion be exchanged
22
with the Portuguese for Southern Mozambique. To further this
proposal, Smuts was keen to get South African troops assigned to
the east African campaign to hasten the conquest of German East
Africa.
South Africa's agitation for gaining Mozambique harbours cannot be
I
seen in isolation from the aims of Southern Rhodesia. After the
inflexible imperialist aims of the Chartered Company and its con¬
servative allies had been denied with the formation of the Union,
they sought to promote Southern Rhodesia as a bastion opposing Boer
expansionism. This goal was pursued by attempting to enlarge
Southern Rhodesia and widen any split in Afrikaner unity. Accordingly,
Southern Rhodesia competed with the Union in claiming parts of
Bechuanaland and Mozambique for itself while British imperialists
within South Africa recognised the many advantages to be gained
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from co-operating with the moderate wing of Afrikanerdom.
In 1916, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, Viscount
Sydney Buxton, proposed partitioning Mozambique, south of the
Zambesi, between Rhodesia and South Africa. His proposal was an
attempt to reach a compromise that would go some way to fulfilling
both Southern Rhodesia's and South Africa's territorial ambitions
in Mozambique, whilst not closing the option of Rhodesia's
incorporation into the Union in the future. In addition to his
Mozambique plans Buxton proposed that Bechuanaland should be
partitioned between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, with South
Africa incorporating South West Africa, minus the Caprivi strip
which would go to Southern Rhodesia and the Company. South Africa
would also gain Swaziland and North Western Rhodesia would be amal¬
gamated with Southern Rhodesia. As Southern Rhodesian incorporation
was still considered by most observers to be inevitable in the end,
the Union might accept this compromise as it stood to gain a much
greater Rhodesia, on incorporation, yet this very expansion
strengthened Southern Rhodesia as a counterweight to South Africa
and, as such, might be acceptable to the Company and its British
imperialist allies.
Buxton sought to deflect opposition from the Aborigines Protection
Society and to still the fears in Nyasaland about incorporation by
offering to join North-Eastern Rhodesia with Nyasaland in a new
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Central African Protectorate. This would be administered by the
Colonial Office and would definitely not be included in any future
proposals for union with South Africa, even though Buxton was not
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convinced that Africans in the proposed Protectorate would fare
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better than in an enlarged Union.
In both Company and Union Government circles, confidence was high
that Portugal would be willing to withdraw to a position north of
the Zambesi and east of the Shire. In this matter, however, the
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scepticism of the Colonial Secretary, Walter Long, proved to be
29 28
more accurate. Although, Botha and Smuts continued to press
for the incorporation of southern Mozambigue into the Union, the
end of the war saw the status guo maintained in southern Africa
with the notable exception of South Africa's gaining German South¬
west Africa. The high hopes for South African territorial advance
as part of the outcome of the war had largely been unfulfilled, but,
on the other hand the Company and its supporters had not been able
to strengthen Rhodesia as a counterweight to the Union. Yet, on the
eve of the war, the hoped-for split in Afrikaner ranks had occurred
when Louis Botha dropped James Hertzog, the Minister of Justice,
from his cabinet because of the latter's forceful public support for
the principle of South Africa first and the Empire second. The
division between Afrikaner moderates and the diehard nationalists
resulted in a rebellion by the latter group when the moderate leaders
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took South Africa into the war. General Christiaan de Wet led the
Boer rebellion in October 1914 and did not finally surrender until June
1915 at Bloemfontein. The vigour with which the South African
Government quelled this anti-British rebellion was well received in
London. Not only did the Imperial Government believe that Botha and
Smuts had proved their loyalty by first taking South Africa into the
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war and then so thoroughly defeating the rebellion of their fellow
Afrikaners, but they also felt that it would be well nigh impossible,
as a consequence of these actions, for Afrikaner unity to be
restored. This had the effect of reinforcing the British Government's
inclination to use the Union as their envoy in Africa. The gains
made by Hertzog's Nationalist Party in the Union's October 1915
elections raised doubts in Conservative circles, but, by contrast,
increased the determination of leading Liberals to advance South
African interests. The Liberals hoped that this policy would enable
Smuts and Botha to show the advantages of their policy of co-operation
and strengthen their position and the support for their government, a
government which had been forced to rely upon Labour Party support to
remain in office since the Nationalist gains in October. The problem
was that by the end of the war, the British Government experienced
severe difficulties in granting any of South Africa's territorial
ambitions.
The British South Africa Company's charter had come up for review
in 1914. In seeking to have their charter extended until the next
review, in 1924, the Company had sought to play upon the anti-
Union bias of the Rhodesian settlers, a bias which had been increased
by the very same events which had convinced the British Government
of the South African Government's loyalty. Whitehall had been
influenced by Botha and Smuts' response to Afrikaner unrest. It was
not the response but rather the unrest which produced the strongest
reactions amongst Rhodesian settlers and South African imperialists.
Thus, although the Rhodesian settlers and their political leaders
had been in favoiit of inclusion in the Union at its outset,"^ by 1914
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the majority were opposed. The Company was aware that its rule was
unpopular amongst Rhodesian settlers, but from 1912 it launched a
campaign to persuade its territory's European population that con¬
tinued Company rule was better than Afrikaner rule. The Company
offered to write off Southern Rhodesia's £7 million deficit and to
lend money to white settlers to buy land to which the Company claimed
ownership. This campaign failed to make Company rule any more popular
in the Rhodesias, but it did fuel a growing anti-Union, anti-Afrikaner
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political climate in Southern Rhodesia. In this the Company was
aided by events in the Union itself. The Johannesburg strike of 1913,
the general strike of 1914, the Afrikaner revolt of 1914-13 and the
growth of the 'Indian problem', all added weight to the Company's
arguments.
The core of the aversion of Rhodesian settlers to incorporation,
however, was bilingualism and in an attempt to prevent its insidious
spread north, the Rhodesian franchise ordinance of 1912 was introduced.
This ordinance specifically excluded proficiency in Dutch as a means
of passing the literacy test, only English was acceptable. The driving
force behind this ordinance was the real fear of large scale 'poor
Dutch' emigration into the Rhodesias. By means of the ordinance the
mainly British Rhodesian settlers were attempting to lessen the danger
of a 'Bywoner' influx, and to limit the political impact of those who
did come. Although this measure sparked a fierce reaction in the
Union, the British Government felt that to block or dilute it would
only arouse even more anti-Afrikaner prejudice and agitation in
Southern Rhodesia. The British Government concluded that accepting
it would do less damage in South Africa than refusing it would do in
Southern Rhodesia. In the general election of 1914 the Southern
-25-
Rhodesian electorate firmly rejected any moves towards incorporation
with the south and as a result, the Imperial Government allowed the
British South Africa Company to carry on virtually as before in
Rhodesia.
South Africa's other hopes of territorial gain lay with the High
Commission Territories. Botha had pressed hard for the transfer of
the three territories, especially Swaziland, between April 1911 and
the outbreak of war. Although in these efforts he received gualified
assistance from the British High Commissioner in South Africa,
Viscount Gladstone, no agreement had been reached before war was
declared. Gladstone's successor, Viscount Buxton, managed to
persuade Botha to shelve the issue until hostilities ceased. The
campaign had only just been revived by Botha, in a letter to Milner
of July 1919, before his untimely death produced further delay in the
discussions."^ Although Smuts continued the pressure he was also
unsuccessful in achieving any immediate transfer. His biggest defeat
and the most serious set-back to South African northward expansion,
came in 1924 when the Southern Rhodesian settlers decided to opt for
limited representative government, rather than incorporation.
As we have seen, prior to the formation of the Union, political
opinion in the United Kingdom and southern Africa was generally in
favour of Rhodesia's inclusion in South Africa. Botha and Smuts
were most emphatic in their view that Southern Rhodesia was part of
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South Africa, and if well compensated, the Company was prepared
to see Rhodesia form South Africa's fifth province. When the Union
was formed without Southern Rhodesia and under an Afrikaner-dominated
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government, however, the Company worked forcibly for the creation
of a greater Rhodesia as an essential counterweight to the Afrikaner
South.In this they were initially supported by the Conservative
Party in the United Kingdom. The Liberals, on the other hand,
favoured Rhodesian incorporation in the Union, to help to guarantee
South Africa's loyalty, as soon as Botha and Smuts could meet the
cost, both financial and political.A combination of these factors
led to the renewal of the British South Africa Company's charter for
ten years in 1914. However, for a number of reasons, a much more
bi-partisan position appeared to be emerging by the end of the Great
War. The most important factor in this was that from May 1915 the
Conservative Party was part of a coalition government, a government
which worked closely with its Dominions to further its war effort.
These twin constraints, plus the favourable impression made by Smuts
in Lloyd George's war cabinet from March 1917 onwards, resulted in
the Conservative Party temporarily abandoning its opposition to
South African incorporation of Rhodesia.
In July 1918 the Privy Council awarded the British South Africa
Company the right to claim compensation from the British Government
for its Rhodesian deficit on the termination of its charter, but
ruled that most of the land claimed by the Company actually belonged
to the Crown. These two findings had the effect of greatly weakening
the Chartered Company's desire to continue to administer the Rhodesias.
Indeed, the sooner it could shed the responsibility and financial loss
of governing Rhodesia and receive adeguate compensation the better.
The Company would then be able to carry on running its mining and
commercial interests in the territory, without the drain of
-27-
administering it. The Company was also far less concerned about
establishing a greater Rhodesia as a counterweight to the Union.^
This resulted partly from the Privy Council's ruling, partly from the
frustration of having their attempts at creating a greater Rhodesia
continuously blocked by London, but mainly from the loss of its
major support in Conservative Party circles during the Lloyd George/
Bonar Law Coalition government.
On a number of occasions between the formation of the Union and the
end of the Great War, the Chartered Company had been thwarted in its
attempts to form a viable external British counterweight to South
Africa by the British Government. In 1911, Harcourt blocked Company
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attempts to gain control of Mozambigue's ports, in 1913, the
Colonial Office refused the Company permission to amalgamate the two
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Rhodesias and throughout 1913, prevaricated in the face of constant
and open pressure from the British South Africa Company for the
amalgamation of the Rhodesias. It must be remembered that the Company
and its supporters in political circles, both in Britain and South
Africa, were primarily concerned with the threat of an Afrikaner-
dominated Union and sought the amalgamation of the Rhodesias simply
because this would strengthen their use of Rhodes' counterbalance
policy to negate Afrikaner influence and halt its expansion.
In 1917, the Company made a concerted effort to achieve amalgamation
and succeeded in having a pro-amalgamation motion passed in the
Southern Rhodesian Legislature, overcoming the opposition of a
majority of the Legislature's elected members. In addition, the
Company was strongly urging the Colonial Office to use the newly-
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acquired colony of Tanganyika to help build a greater Rhodesia
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to act as a counterweight to the Union. Chaplin and the company
were bitterly disappointed when the Secretary of State, Walter Long,
turned down the proposal as they had been convinced that he could be
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relied upon to support their cause. The refusal of first Long and
then Milner to pursue the creation of a greater Rhodesia to balance
the Union, undermined the Company's determination to oppose South
African incorporation. Moreoever, once the British South Africa
Company began to see its future purely as a commercial enterprise,
no longer concerned with the administration of territories,
Rhodesian incorporation by South Africa became far more appealing.
Milner was closely linked with, and favourable to, the Chartered
Company and had previously worked for large scale European settle¬
ment in Rhodesia to strengthen its position as a counterbalance to
South Africa. By the time he became Secretary of State for the
Colonies, in 1919, however, he was convinced that this policy was
unrealistic and felt that Southern Rhodesia should "definitely"
and North-Western Rhodesia "probably" join the Union. Southern
Rhodesian settler aspirations for more representative government
were dismissed by Milner as "impossible and absurd", but he realised
that if these settlers rejected incorporation, some sort of holding
option would be required until Southern Rhodesia's inevitable,
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eventual entry into South Africa was effected. The main advantage
Milner foresaw in Rhodesian incorporation was that it would strengthen
political support for the non-republican element in the Union. Milner
had, in fact, been converted to the traditional Liberal Party position
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of supporting the internal balance, as opposed to external counter¬
balance. In addition to this, Milner hoped that once Southern
Rhodesia was part of South Africa it would be able to attract
settlers in larger numbers and more rapidly than it had as a Chartered
Company territory. By encouraging 'loyalist' immigrants to settle
in Southern Rhodesia, Milner hoped to make South Africa safe, and
remove, once and for all fears of an Afrikaner Nationalist dominated
South Africa.
In the immediate post war years Colonial Office resources were over
extended. Faced with the new mandated territories to administer, with
depleted resources due to Britain's precarious financial position and
an enormous war debt, the Colonial Office favoured delegating some
of its African responsibilities to the South African Dominion, if
this was politically feasible. It should be pointed out that Africa
remained low on the Colonial Office's priorities and in the interests
of its personnel, especially since the threat of a German-controlled
belt of territories stretching across Africa had now been removed.
Pre-occupied with anti-Empire agitation in India, Ireland and Egypt,
Milner, and after him Churchill, would gladly have handed over
responsibility for Rhodesia, and possibly more of Africa south of
the Sahara, to South Africa, if the Union had been in a position to
accept the task and if the Rhodesian settlers could have been per¬
suaded to agree to it. Milner was convinced that any attempt by the
British Government to force, or even to seem to be pressing Rhodesia
into the Union, would fatally undermine his chances of eventually
accomplishing his new policy of the internal counterbalance. Milner's
-30-
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view was strongly reinforced by Buxton. Smuts had served with
distinction in the war cabinet and had proved his worth on domestic,
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as well as Imperial matters. More importantly, he was trusted in
government circles, and was also very popular with the British public.
Given these circumstances, delegating British Imperial responsibilities
in southern Africa to Smuts would have given rise to very little
political opposition or public outcry. Milner was, therefore, hope¬
ful of Rhodesia's incorporation in 1919, if the Union Government
would only press its case, and offer the British South Africa Company
reasonable compensation. As the Company had, since November 1918,
been pressing the British Government to place a figure on the compen¬
sation it was due, incorporation would have had the added advantage of
relieving the Imperial Government of this financial burden. However,
the Union was unable to co-operate with the British Government to
the extent reguired to fulfil Milner's aspirations.
Before his death on 29th August 1919, Botha had been less inclined
to make an early push for Rhodesian incorporation because of the
priority he was giving to the introduction of settlers to South West
Africa, to speed its assimilation into the Union. Smuts, on
succeeding Botha to the premiership, placed Rhodesian incorporation
amongst his top priorities. He saw Rhodesian incorporation as the
first step towards building economic and political ties binding white
Africa together as far north as Kenya. A vital consequence of this
process would have been to enable Smuts to place Mozambique under
severe pressure, with the aim of eventually gaining for South Africa
the long sought after harbours and rail links of the Portuguese Colony.
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Smuts' aspirations were taken seriously in Africa and by African
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observers, but they came to nought. Lacking Botha's widespread
popularity in the Union, Smuts found it impossible to compromise
to an extent that would make his proposals acceptable to the Rhodesian
settlers. Bilingualism proved a particularly difficult stumbling
block, as Afrikaners in the Union would not countenance incorporation
without it and most Rhodesians strongly opposed its introduction into
their territory. In seeking to widen his room for manoeuvre, on this
and other issues, Smuts sought to strengthen his position and the
middle ground in South African politics. His South African Party
extended overtures to the Unionists about a possible amalgamation.
At the same time Smuts sought to counter the claims of the Afrikaner
nationalists that his government was closer to being an Imperial
lackey than the ruler of an independent territory.
Milner's policy was to delay and block Rhodesian settler aspirations
for representative government, while trying not to offend them and
hoping that Smuts' efforts to strengthen the moderate opinion in
South Africa would meet with success and strengthen his position
sufficiently to make feasible a South African offer for Rhodesia's
incorporation. In the meantime, the influx of new settlers to
Southern Rhodesia would, hopefully, help to dull the extent of
anti-Union feeling in the territory. This policy was dealt a severe
blow with the significant gains by Hertzog's Nationalist party in
the March 1920 elections in South Africa. The overwhelmingly anti-
Union and pro-representative government vote that was amassed in the
Southern Rhodesian elections of April that year, partly in response
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to the South African situation, further lessened Smuts' chances
of gaining the Rhodesias. Milner had already made it quite clear to
Smuts that "... as long as there is any fear ... of the
Nationalist party getting the upper hand in the Union - it would be
out of the question to think of getting Rhodesia into it."^
Thus because of internal problems in the Union and the opposition of
Rhodesia's settlers, South Africa lost the opportunity to gain the
Rhodesias and take on the X^periaL vnantLz of the British Government
in Africa, south of the Sahara.
Milner's policy (of trying to keep the Rhodesian settlers manageable,
while promising nothing and prevaricating until Smuts was in a position
to push strongly for incorporation, whereupon the British Government
would support his initiative) was first undermined, and then abandoned
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by his successors. Prince Arthur of Connaught undermined Milner's
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policy by advising Churchill that Milner seemed to have conceded the
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principle of representative government to the Rhodesian settlers.
Milner's policy was then abandoned when Churchill, largely through
lack of interest and by delegating responsibility for the area,
allowed Lambert, Amery and Buxton to speed towards representative
government for Southern Rhodesia. After a lull during the Milner
years, the external counterweight theory was very much back in
fashion.
Given that Milner had been gravely concerned by the gains by the
Afrikaner nationalists in 1920, it comes as no surprise that those
less committed to the internal counterweight were even more pro¬
foundly affected. Lambert had never shared Milner's rejection of
representative government for Southern Rhodesia"^ and the South
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African election results of 1920 strengthened his resolve in that
direction. Lambert's purpose for southern Africa was aided by
L S Amery remaining at the Colonial Office after Milner's retire¬
ment and by the new Secretary of State's lack of knowledge or
interest in the area. The timing of Milner's departure was particu¬
larly cruel for Smuts' and South Africa's expansionist aspirations.
In the very month that Churchill took over as Secretary of State
for the Colonies, Smuts and his South Africa Party achieved the
electoral success for which he and Milner had been waiting.
Under Milner's strategy for South Africa, Smuts' general election
victory of February 1921 would have committed the British Govern¬
ment to the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia into the Union.
Milner had, after all, been operating a holding exercise until such
a time as a consensus could be achieved in South Africa behind Smuts'
moderate, loyalist position. The February result appeared to show
that Smuts' consensus had been gained. The British South Africa
Company, as well as Smuts, were now convinced that both Rhodesias
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should be incorporated promptly. The Afrikaner threat had
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receded and Rhodesia's incorporation would confirm that trend.
Lambert and Amery had other ideas. On their advice, and in the same
month that he took office, Churchill appointed Sydney Buxton to head
a departmental committee to investigate when and with what reserva¬
tions, representative government could be granted to Southern
Rhodesia: incorporation by South Africa was not even considered.
Buxton's committee which reported on 14 May.1921, less than two
months after its formation, was composed of Lambert and four others."'
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During his time as High Commissioner in South Africa, Buxton had
moved away from favouring incorporation to a position sympathetic
to Rhodesian representative government. Amery thought that there
should have been no enquiry and Southern Rhodesia should be granted
representative government at the start of 1923 without recourse to
34
any further electoral endorsement. Moreover, Amery was, in 1921,
strongly pushing Buxton's proposals of 1916, for the amalgamation of
Southern Rhodesia with North Western Rhodesia. However, even he did
not finally rule out the option of this combined territory entering
the Union, if, at some future date, the Union's loyalty to Britain
could be assured.^ It was hardly surprising, therefore, that
Buxton's committee advocated representative government for Southern
Rhodesia after a referendum, on a constitution to be agreed with its
settler leaders. Churchill endorsed the report and in doing so,
irreparably reversed Milner's South African policy.
Churchill implemented this reversal through inattention and the
delegation of policy to Amery, coupled with a glaring ignorance about
the size of the settler population in Southern Rhodesia and the cost
to the British Government of representative government.^ Too late
did Smuts and the Chartered Company forcibly appraise him of the
reality of the situation. It made little difference that by
September of 1921 Churchill was convinced that he had introduced
the wrong policy.^ The referendum had been irrevocably agreed
and, try as he might, Churchill could not persuade Coghlan and his
colleagues to consider negotiating with Smuts.
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In December, in London, Churchill exerted considerable pressure on
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Coghlan to look favourably on incorporation. Coghlan, however,
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would not be cowed, even when Churchill urged on by the Company
and Smuts, threatened that the British Government would not pay the
Company the compensation award, leaving the newly-formed Southern
Rhodesian administration responsible for it and, as a result,
virtually bankrupt. In these negotiations Churchill's position was
undermined and Coghlan bolstered by two Colonial Office officials,
namely Lambert and Sir James Masterton-Smith,^ Permanent Under-
Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, who shared Lambert's fears
of a large influx of poor Afrikaners into Southern Rhodesia after
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incorporation. Lambert also gave Coghlan moral and practical
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support during these discussions. The sole consolation
Churchill was able to offer Smuts, was that specific proposals for
incorporation would be presented to the Southern Rhodesian electorate
and offered as an alternative to the representative government
constitution at the referendum.
Smuts published his revised terms for incorporation in July 1922
and toured the Southern Rhodesia for three weeks in August, campaign¬
ing in all but name,for his proposals. These were very reasonable,
containing substantial financial inducements, guaranteeing a spacific, amount
of ct-eu-e-lop*iett.C,
^promising Rhodesian control of, and full government support for,
European settlement in the territory and offering very generous
electoral representation of ten members in the Union Parliament.
Smuts had been as generous as he could, without severely under¬
mining his position inside South Africa. Hertzog's nationalists
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were fiercely opposing Rhodesian incorporation and constantly
accusing Smuts of surrendering the Union to the 'Kaffir' north.
The proposals inevitably included the extension of bilingualism
to South Africa's proposed fifth province, but even if this clause
could have been omitted, it is unlikely that Southern Rhodesia
would have voted for incorporation. Anti-Afrikaner prejudice and
the 'little Englander' mentality were too widespread and Coghlan
too popular. Nevertheless, the result might well have been a lot
closer if Churchill had followed Milner's intentions and left the
decision to a general election at the end of the following year.
The collection of groupings and individuals opposing incorporation,
under Coghlan's leadership, probably would have encountered far more
internal tensions and difficulties on deciding on an election manifesto
than on a single issue referendum. A delay of a year might also have
allowed Smuts and the Company more time to instil some passion into
the well-financed, but poorly organised and staid, pro-incorporation
campaign in Southern Rhodesia.^
South Africa's opportunity of incorporating Rhodesia in the fore¬
seeable future, appeared to have gone with the heavily pro-
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representative government vote on 6 November 1922. Although it
was understood that Southern Rhodesia could still enter the Union at
a later date,^ it was widely recognised that this was highly unlikely,
unless circumstances altered dramatically. Smuts, however, decided
to press on and attempt to achieve incorporation by other means.
The crucial issue of finance remained and Smuts sought to exploit it.
If the British Government could be persuaded to refuse to pay the
-37-
Cave Commission recommended compensation to the Company, but
instead could place responsibility for that on the emergent Southern
Rhodesian administration, the new territory would be virtually
bankrupt from its inception. Having urged the Union Association in
Rhodesia not to disband but to continue campaigning for incorpora¬
tion, Smuts set about gaining the co-operation of the Company and
British Government in his new strategy to induce Southern Rhodesia's
incorporation.^ Smuts was confident that Coghlan and his associates
could be persuaded to face economic realities and bring Southern
Rhodesia into the Union, despite the referendum result. He was,
moreover, endeavouring to obtain Northern Rhodesia as well, with the
Company retaining its land and mineral rights but receiving no
compensation at all. ^
Smuts' plan amounted to little more than the financial and economic
blackmailing of Southern Rhodesia to force it into the Union, while
hoping that Coghlan would concede to his demands and thus avoid the
need to carry out the unpleasant process. To succeed, however, Smuts
required the co-operation of the Company and the British Government.
The British South Africa Company had opposed representative govern¬
ment and worked for the incorporation of Rhodesia because their
wider, financial interests would be better served by an expanded and
loyal South Africa, given that they were to be compensated in the
terms of the Cave Commission for the loss of Southern Rhodesia.
Churchill's acceptance of the Buxton Committee's report produced an
angry response from the Company, but its leaders were also highly
critical of Smuts for failing to make a concrete offer for Southern
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Rhodesia before Milner's departure. Although in favour of
incorporation, the Company was not prepared to co-operate with Smuts
in making representative government unworkable, as any resulting
economic collapse in Southern Rhodesia would seriously affect its
financial interests there. On the contrary, the Company would
actively oppose such a policy and strive to promote financial con¬
fidence in the new territory, to protect its investments and other
financial concerns. In this it would receive the support of the
British Government.
Not only did the close links between the Chartered Company and the
Conservative Party establishment make any other outcome unlikely,
there were also political considerations. Support for Smuts would
have left the Bonar Law administration open to criticism from both
left and right. From within their own party they would have been
accused of failing British interests and a British community in
Africa while the question of African interests would have been
raised from amongst the Liberal and Labour ranks.
Although prevented in this instance from achieving northward
expansion for South Africa, Smuts remained committed to the goal of
a South African Dominion stretching to Kenya.^ He pursued this
aim in both government and opposition until his death in 1931. South
Africa's efforts to extend its borders to the North varied in
intensity and priority but it continued to be a constant theme of
the Union Government whether Smuts or Hertzog was Prime Minister.
For all their scaremongering about the 'black north' when in
opposition, the Nationalist Party under Hertzog, when in government,
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proved to be as determined as Smuts and his followers to gain at
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least the High Commission Territories and Southern Rhodesia.
The expansionist aims of South African governments, whichever
party was in power, remained a central concern for the British
Government's policy north of the Zambesi. The fear of the spread
of Afrikaner nationalism constituted a constant threat to the
British aim for hegemony over all of southern Africa, indeed it
affected British policy towards Africa as far north as Kenya.
All the developments which led to the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland must be considered against this background. British policy
in what came to be known as central Africa was formed always in
terms of the British Government's policy towards the Union of
South Africa. Whitehall always perceived the pressures for and against
amalgamation or federation of the territories north of the Limpopo
as a problem concerning the northern half of its South African policy.
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CHAPTER 2
To Amalgamate or Not?
Southern Rhodesia's rejection of incorporation by South Africa
ensured that it was the question of whether or not the central
African territories should amalgamate which dominated imperial and
colonial consideration of the region over the next quarter of a
century. Between 1922 and 1946 South Africa's opposition to the
amalgamation of the Rhodesias remained constant, but the views of
the other participants in central African politics varied according
to changing circumstances. This Chapter considers the ebb and flow
of support for amalgamation by Britain, Southern Rhodesia and
Northern Rhodesia and the reasons for their changes of opinion.
In 1923 amalgamation was unpopular in both the Rhodesias. The
settlers of Southern Rhodesia opposed any closer links with a territory
comprised of such a small European, and large African, populations.
The European community of Northern Rhodesia opposed union because they
believed that their separate identity and interests would be com¬
pletely submerged by the far larger Southern Rhodesian white popula¬
tion. The settler community of Northern Rhodesia was strengthened
in this resolve by the belief that its territory was economically
sound and poised for rapid development. The discovery near Ndola
in 1925 of sulphide deposits containing commercially viable amounts
of copper further strengthened anti-amalgamation opinion in Northern
Rhodesia.
Neither the discovery of mineable copper in Northern Rhodesia, nor
Hertzog's election victory in South Africa, in June 1924, noticeably
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dampened support in Southern Rhodesia for Coghlan's policy of
opposing amalgamation with the 'black North'. Although the victory
of Hertzog's Nationalists made the possibility of incorporation into
the Union even more unpopular in Souther Rhodesia than it had been in
1922, the dread of being swamped by a massively increased African
population remained a more potent fear; especially in the light of
2
the Devonshire Declaration of 1923.
Although specifically concerning Kenya, £)eyonshire's command paper
applied, by implication, to other British colonies in Africa and
advocated that "... the interests of the African natives must be
paramount, and that if and when these interests and the interests of
the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail.""^
The Secretary of State's ruling made very little difference to colonial
policy in practice. The Colonial Governors, who in theory implemented
colonial policy but in practice, to a very large extent, formed it as
well for their particular colony, on the whole paid no more than lip
service to it. The governors were well aware that the Imperial Govern¬
ment was in no position to force unpopular policies of African
trusteeship onto settler communities and continued to administer their
territories in much the same way after the Devonshire Declaration as
they had before it. Moreover, L S Amery, on his return to the Colonial
Office in October 1924, this time as Secretary of State, sought to
negate the Devonshire Declaration.
Until the Conservative Government's departure, in May 1929, Amery, as
Secretary of State at both the Colonial and Dominion Offices, pursued
a strategy designed to make co-operation with, and delegation of power
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and responsibility for trusteeship to, the European settler
4
communities in Africa, the main plank of Imperial policy. Amery
adopted this policy of colonial devolution on the basis that it
provided a moderate middle path between the uncompromising policy
of indefinite white rule propagated in South Africa, and the
economic and political stagnation of Imperial rule through the
Colonial Office. The native policy of South Africa, Amery argued,
was incompatible with the British Government's policy of trusteeship,
whereas colonial, as opposed to Imperial, rule was not only compat¬
ible with trusteeship but would also benefit the African with both
economic development and an envisaged century of British civilisa¬
tion.
It could be argued that, for the African, the difference between
permanent white rule, as pursued by South Africa, and a century of
settler domination, as advocated by Amery, was minimal. Concern for
the future of the African, however, was not one of Amery's priorities.
His motivation in seeking to undermine the Colonial Office's policy
of paramountcy of African interests, especially in Northern Rhodesia
and Kenya, was the fear of the spread of an Afrikaner controlled
South Africa, a fear which was shared by many figures in government
circles, the Colonial Office and the Colonial Service. Both Amery
and Stanley were convinced that to neutralise the excesses of
Hertzog's South Africa, sound British traditions and standards had
to be firmly embedded through British settler rule from the Rhodesias
to Kenya. They also feared that lack of concessions to settler demands
for devolution of power would result in South Africa eventually
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extending its borders to incorporate Kenya. To strengthen British
settler rule north of South Africa, Amery sought to build a large
federation in east and central Africa. In pursuing this policy he
was concurring with advice from Smuts, which he had received on a
regular basis since Smuts' loss of office.^
The strength of Southern Rhodesian opposition, led by the Prime
Minister, Coghlan, to any moves towards closer links with the North,
initially precluded a central African Federation. In an attempt to
surmount this problem the Ormsby-Gore Parliamentary Commission was
established, in 1924. It investigated whether or not the other British
territories of central and east Africa could be amalgamated or
g
federated. Although the Commission reported that any moves towards
9
union should not be considered for many years, Amery remained
committed to the idea of these territories playing their part in
creating an external counterweight to South Africa. To further this
end he appointed Sir Edward Grigg as Governor of Kenya in 1926,
10
intending, with Grigg's help, to create an east African federation.
Amery and Grigg failed in their efforts for the same reason that made
so many Colonial Office initiatives ineffectual, namely, the relative
ease with which colonial governors could delay, negate or ignore
Imperial Government instructions which they found unworkable or
11
unpalatable.
In this instance it was the Governor of Tanganyika, Sir Donald Cameron,
who provided the successful opposition. He was less successful,
however, in preventing Amery from introducing, as official Colonial
12
Office policy in east Africa, the devolution of power to settler
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communities although he could, and did, prevent its implementation
in Tanganyika whilst he remained governor. The twin roles of
trusteeship and steady devolution of administrative responsibility to
the settler communities, balanced very uneasily within Colonial
Office policy. It is worth noting here that the possibility of
African independence was not even being considered. It was Imperial,
settler and South African, interests which concerned the policy makers.
Nevertheless, it was the intransigent position of the Kenyan settlers
in refusing to concede the possibility of African rule on even the
Amery time scale, that was the decisive factor in forming Cameron's
13
policy of opposition to any east African federation.
Amery's initial attempts to create a large British settler controlled
territory in east and/or central Africa, to act as a counterweight
to South Africa, were unsuccessful. This external counterweight
policy of Amery's was baulked in the first place by the findings of
the Ormsby-Gore Commission. Secondly, and more importantly, it was
hindered by settler opposition to amalgamation in both Rhodesia?,
by Cameron's opposition to east African federation in Tanganyika,
and by Kenyan settler opposition to any closer association with
Uganda which was considered to be a 'native colony'. Although there
was some support for an east and central African federation in the
twenties, its supporters favoured federation only as a means of
gaining representative government. The failure, in 1925, 1926 and
1927, of Lord Delamere's sponsored, unofficial conferences on the
14
issue to reach any clear conclusions was due to this very factor.
None of the delegates were in favour of federation for its own sake
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but only as a method of gaining power in their own territories and
their own territory's interests and fears remained paramount.
Despite his efforts to build a northern counterbalance to South
Africa, Amery still had not completely dismissed the alternative
option of the Union proving its loyalty to the United Kingdom and,
as a result, eventually gaining the remainder of British 'White
15
Africa'. Indeed, on his return from South Africa in 1927 Amery
was quite confident that economic development and increased trade
with Britain would result in the Union co-operating more with British
imperial interests and moderating its internal policy and thus it
would become more acceptable to the British Government.
"The work of the Empire Marketing Board had already
attracted widespread attention and exercised a very
considerable political influence. It is no
exaggeration to say that an extension of preference
which would include fresh and preserved fruit, dairy
produce, meat and maize would transform the whole
political as well as the economic life of South
Africa, and make it definitely one of the strongest
instead of one of the weaker links in the Imperial
chain.
If these changes did not materialise, however, Amery was determined
to use Southern Rhodesia as the foundation for "... an independent
central South African Dominion to check and counterbalance the
17
parochial South African Union."
Britain's failure to formally commit herself to the external counter¬
weight solution to the South African problem was the result of the
difficulties she experienced, in the twenties, in trying to create
this counterbalance and to the disappointment of her hopes that
Hertzog's ministry would moderate its policies. Britain's refusal
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to transfer any of the High Commission Territories to South Africa,
despite Hertzog's strong pressure on this issue between 1924 and
18
1927, illustrates the Union's failure to move in the direction
which Whitehall wanted.
Amery's intention for the High Commission territories was to strengthen
the numbers and status of their British settlers, and then to have
them gradually transferred into the Union, beginning with Swaziland.
The rate of transfer would depend upon the extent of Hertzog's co¬
operation with the British. The transfer of each territory would
also in some small measure increase the British loyalist elements in
19
the South African electorate. Amery envisaged the process extend¬
ing over a great number of years. If South Africa proved dependable
enough to gain the final High Commission territory of Bechuanaland
then the process would have succeeded; if it did not Bechuanaland
would be retained to comprise part of the external counterweight.
It was to investigate the possibility of forming such a counter¬
weight, that the Hilton Young Commission was appointed in November
20
1927. Its findings, published in October 1928, further dented
Amery's prospects of succeeding with his African strategy. The
Commission ruled out any possibility of Kenya achieving representa-
21
tive government and strongly advocated the retention of Imperial
22
control throughout central and eastern Africa. This conclusion
was the exact opposite of what Amery was trying to establish as
accepted Colonial Office policy and it was small consolation for him
that the Commission advocated "the creation of a central organ of
23
government" for the three east African territories.
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The Commissioners could not agree on recommendations for central
Africa. In a minority report, the Chairman, Sir E Hilton Young,
advocated the formation of a greater Rhodesia, by uniting the north-west
of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, and creating a greater
Nyasaland which would be extended to include North Eastern Rhodesia.
The greater Northern Rhodesia would continue to have representative
government and the greater Nyasaland would become a Crown Colony.
Closer co-operation in the area would be established by the formation
of a central executive authority "which may and probably will develop
into a central legislature for a strictly limited number of
'transferred' subjects - such as defence, research, customs and
24
communications". Hilton Young, however, was opposed to Nyasaland
and North Eastern Rhodesia being wholly united with a greater Rhodesia
for the "foreseeable future", as their climate and conditions prevented
25
them from being "white man's country". Unfortunately for Amery,
his appointee as chairman could not even achieve a majority in favour
of this position within the commission, let alone the optimum position
of unanimous support. The majority report on central Africa advocated
maintaining the status quo for the present. It argued that "the
institution of a central authority would be premature" because
there were too many uncertainties, the most important being whether
or not north of the Zambesi was to be considered "white man's
.. 26
territory .
The Commission found that settler opinion in Southern Rhodesia was
now generally in favour of union with Northern Rhodesia, although
deep reservations remained about amalgamation with a 'native' protectorate.
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The reason for this change in opinion since 1923, was primarily
the amount of copper discovered in Northern Rhodesia since 1923.
Apart from gaining Northern Rhodesia's copper resources, Southern
Rhodesia's leaders were also concerned about the possibility that
Northern Rhodesia would be drawn into a loose grouping of other
northern territories, leaving Southern Rhodesia in an isolated
position in relation to South Africa. Another incentive was the Lure.
of large amounts of land in Northern Rhodesia potentially suitable
for European farming.
A more surprising, and debatable finding, was Hilton Young's view
that European opinion in Northern Rhodesia had also altered in favour
28
of amalgamation. Certainly, two Northern Rhodesian Legislative
Council representatives had approached the Southern Rhodesian Govern¬
ment for terms on amalgamation in February 1928 and obtained from
29
H U Moffat a generous offer, including over-representation in a
combined parliament and guaranteed minimum representation in the
combined government. This deal agreed between the Southern Rhodesian
Government and Captain Murray and Mr Strike was, however, roundly
attacked in Northern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesian settlers were keen
to escape from Colonial Office control and its association with
eventual African rule, but they wished to achieve this by gaining
representative government, not by amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.
Leopold Moore, the leader ofNorthern Rhodesia's Unofficials in the
Legislative Council, was dismissive of the Murray/Strike proposals:
"I think if there were a chance of anything being worse than Downing
Street it would be by submitting our affairs and direction to a
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united Rhodesia. Whatever money is available will be spent where
the balance of voting power is, and that is not North of the
Zambesi." ^ When the amalgamation proposals, agreed between
Strike, Murray, and Moffat, were formally introduced into the
31
Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council, in November 1929, only
their proposer and seconder supported them. Although London rule
was unpopular in Northern Rhodesia, the prospect of being controlled
from Salisbury remained more distasteful.
The formation of Ramsay MacDonald's second ministry in June 1929
ended Leopold Amery's stay at the Colonial and Dominions Offices,
but it was not the end of pressure for the formation of a northern
counterbalance to South Africa. Hertzog's victory in the 'Black
menace' election in South Africa in the same month, strengthened
calls for the implementation of this policy. The Imperial Secretary
in South Africa, Sir Bede Clifford, had proposed that the Governor
of Southern Rhodesia become the High Commissioner for Northern
Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Bechuanaland, while Amery had preferred that
the northern part of Bechuanaland, at least, be incorporated into
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Southern Rhodesia. The strengthening of Hertzog's Government as
a result of the 1929 election reinforced Clifford's efforts for the
formation of a British counterweight to the Afrikaner-controlled
Union.However, it was the result of the British general election,
rather than the South African one which had the most immediate impact
on support for the amalgamation of the Rhodesias in central Africa.
34
The publication of the Passfield Memorandum by the new Secretary of
State for the Colonies, in June 1930, came as a rude shock for the
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Northern Rhodesian Unofficials who hoped eventually for representa¬
tive government. Lord Passfield's Memorandum made it clear that
even if an Unofficial majority was achieved in Northern Rhodesia's
Legislative Council, the Imperial Government would continue to
control the implementation of its policy of African trusteeship.
In addition, the Secretary of State's document reinforced the
doctrine of the paramountcy of African interests, originally out¬
lined in the Devonshire Declaration. These two factors produced
uproar amongst Northern Rhodesia's European population, but their
demands for a conference were unambiguously rejected by the Secretary
of State.Although the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir
James Maxwell, calmed some fears by insisting that the Memorandum did
not involve any changes in the administration of the territory,
it was clearly recognised that colonial, as opposed to Imperial,
rule could now only be achieved through amalgamation with Southern
Rhodesia. Coinciding, as it did with a collapse in the price of
copper,^ the Passfield Memorandum produced in Northern Rhodesia a
large groundswell of support for this amalgamation.
The Secretary of State's intervention actually produced very little
difference in the Colonial Office's policy of indecisive dualism
but this was irrelevant in the situation. Scant heed, too, was paid,
in Northern Rhodesia, to a Parliamentary Joint Select Committee's
38
report, in the following year, which confirmed this situation.
What was crucial was that the settler population of Northern Rhodesia
was now convinced that Northern Rhodesia had been firmly placed
outside white Africa and the only way to avoid eventually becoming a
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native territory, was to amalgamate with the South. The importance
of the Passfield Memorandum was, therefore, not in what it achieved
which was almost nothing, but what it was seen as heralding for
Northern Rhodesia, by the European population of that territory.
It resulted in the Northern Rhodesian elected members giving their
support to the Southern Rhodesia Government's reguest to the
Colonial Secretary, J H Thomas, for a conference on amalgamation.
Although this reguest was rejected, support for a united central
Africa to counter the Union remained strong in influential guarters
in Britain which were also indifferent to claims for the paramountcy
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of African interests north of the Zambesi.
The African mineworkers strike, of May 1935, confirmed the majority
of Northern Rhodesia's European population in their desire for
amalgamation: a desire already made evident, in November 1933, with
the introduction into the Legislative Council by the Unofficials of
40
a motion calling for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. Although
the strike lasted only just over one week, it greatly frightened the
settler population. The speed with which the strike spread from
Mufulira to Nkana and then Luanshya, indicated organisation and
co-operation, and re-emphasised to the settlers the extent of their
41
isolation. The extent of European support, in Northern Rhodesia,
for amalgamation, can be gauged from the elections for its Legislative
Council in 1935, in which every candidate supported not only greater
Unofficial representation and responsibility but also amalgamation.
Nevertheless, the mining corporations and railway interests remained
opposed to amalgamation, because it would involve colonial rule
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replacing Imperial rule. Under colonial rule the influence of the
white labour force, and their trade unions, would massively increase,
as any colonial government would be cfependent on their support to
attain power. Amongst Nyasaland's tiny settler community there was
strong support for amalgamation with the Rhodesias and opposition to
any links with Tanganyika.^ The Scots missionaries, however, con¬
tinued to oppose any links with Southern Rhodesia, even though they
had by this time ceased to promote African advance in practice, while
they still held on to it as a theory.
the.
Whilej^European population of Northern Rhodesia was, by 1935, firmly
in favour of amalgamation, significant opposition to this union
remained in Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Labour Party was hostile
43
to amalgamation, as their 1935 party conference showed, because
of Northern Rhodesia's large African population and its lack of an
44
official colour bar. Their representatives at the first, and
45
unofficial, Victoria Falls Conference, in January 1936, made agree¬
ment on specific proposals for amalgamation impossible. The Rhodesian
Labour Party would only consider amalgamation on condition that
colonial control replaced Imperial administration of 'native policy'.
Although the Northern Rhodesian members of the Legislative Council
would have acceded to almost any terms, in order to secure firm
amalgamation proposals, it was obvious to all that the Rhodesian
Labour Party demands would be completely unacceptable to London.
The conference approved a proposal advocating the early amalgamation
of the territories, but no terms were forthcoming.
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A similar call for the early amalgamation of the territories was
passed by the Southern Rhodesian LegislativeCouncil, in May 1936.
In rejecting this demand, but not the policy of amalgamation,
A6
Malcolm MacDonald argued that circumstances had not altered
significantly since J H Thomas' decision of 1931. Thomas, MacDonald's
predecessor, had argued that Southern Rhodesia was not well enough
established to cope with the added responsibility of amalgamation,
particularly as this would include the added burden of administering
large areas of African territory.^
There were, in point of fact, other reasons which carried more weight
in determining the response of the Secretary of State in 1931 and 1936.
The most important consideration for the Imperial Government concerning
central Africa, was maintaining direct control of Northern Rhodesia's
copper mines.® Such control would obviously be endangered, if not
completely removed, by amalgamation. It was increasingly important
to the British Government that it retain control of Northern
Rhodesia's copper.
The increasing tensions in Europe lay behind this policy and the
deteriorating political situation was the second factor in determining
the Imperial Government's refusal to consider amalgamation in the
thirties. The rise of Nazism had re-opened the question of Germany's
old colonies. As part of a general pact guaranteeing peace in
Europe, Britain was prepared to concede to joint administration, with
Germany, of a massive belt of land stretching across the middle of
49
Africa. Included in this suggested zone of joint control were
part of Mozambique, Tanganyika, South West Africa and the Belgian
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Congo, as well as all of Angola, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
Although this proposal came to nothing, mainly because of Hitler's
refusal to give Britain acceptable guarantees over non-aggression in
Europe, the fact that it was made at all is significant. It is
relevant in two ways. First, it showed the extent of British anxiety
over the situation in Europe: this proposal would inevitably result
in Britain's control of Northern Rhodesia's copper being less than
complete. Secondly, it reveals the extent to which the British
Government viewed Africa as being comprised of building blocks
which could be combined in any manner considered desirable, and
control of which could be transferred between imperial powers with
relative impunity. It was in this way that the British Government
regarded the expansionist aims of South Africa and the Rhodesias, an
attitude not seriously questioned until after Labour's victory in
1945.
A further influence adversely affecting Rhodesian hopes for amalgama¬
tion in 1936, though not 1931, was Smuts' re-entry into the South
African Government. In December 1932, South Africa finally came off
the gold standard to try to counter the loss of capital to the
United Kingdom and prevent its recession from worsening. As a
further effort to combat South Africa's economic plight and resolve
the political crisis precipitated by abandoning the gold standard,
Hertzog and Smuts agreed terms and formed a coalition government in
March 1933.^ This national coalition was given overwhelming support
51
in the May election, and eventually lead to the fusion of the
52
Nationalists with the South African Party.
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The formation of the United Party,and the resulting self-imposed
isolation of Malan and the die-hard Afrikaner Nationalists, was
viewed with considerable relief in Whitehall. Not only were the
Republican extremists exiled from office, but concern over the
possible threat to Britain's continued use of the Simonstown naval
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base was removed. Although Htrtzog remained Prime Minister, Smuts
could be relied upon to defend British strategic interests. The
union of parties had the added benefit for Smuts that it finally
finished secessionist moves in his Party in Natal.
Smuts' return to a leading position in the South African Government,
placed the British Government in a much more difficult position con¬
cerning the Union's continuing demands for the High Commission
Territories. Smuts argued strongly that, as the Union sustained
the High Commission Territories economically, it should also have
political control.Despite J H Thomas' agreement with Hertzog,
in May 1935, that the Union and Britain should jointly invest in and
develop the three territories, and also co-operate in persuading the
High Commission Territories African populations to agree to transfer,
the United Kingdom Government's policy remained one of delay.
Frustation at Britain's lack of support for their agreed strategy,
as much as pressure from Malan at the lack of progress over transfer,
led Hertzog to accuse the British Government of breach of contract
when he returned from talks with Malcolm MacDonald, in June 1937; a
charge he had already confronted the British Government with during
the Imperial conference in May."^
-56-
During the same month, and into July, discussions on central African
amalgamation were held in London between MacDonald, the Governors
of the central African territories, together with Huggins, Moore,
Gore-Brown and representatives from Nyasaland. MacDonald argued
that while amalgamation was impractical at that time, nonetheless
the United Kingdom was seeking to devise means of closer co-operation.
The British Government was prepared to consider closer association,
but not amalgamation, and gave Huggins the choice of either a locally-
appointed inguiry or a British commission, to investigate the various
58 59
possibilities. The Bledisloe Commission was the outcome of these
negotiations. Its formation, after the rebuff of the previous year,
was seen by central African settlers as a definite victory for Huggins.
This view was confirmed later in the year when, at Huggins' instiga¬
tion, the terms of reference of the commission were extended to
include an examination of the option of amalgamation.^
During 1937, therefore, Neville Chamberlain's government was attempt¬
ing to keep all its options open. The first priority was to maintain
the status quo until Germany's response to their offer of dividing
up the middle of Africa, was known. After the withdrawal of this
offer, Britain's main concern was the continuing loyalty of South
Africa. As a result no major moves towards the formation of a
greater Rhodesia were feasible and the Bledisloe Commission's main
function was to buy time for the United Kingdom. Even though
MacDonald hoped for South African support in any conflict with
Germany, distrust of Hertzog and lack of faith in South Africa's long
term dependability deterred him from the early transfer of any of
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the High Commission Territories. On this issue as well, the British
Government sought refuge by forming a joint committee, in March 1938,
to investigate areas for co-operation.
The sense of elation amongst central Africa's European community
at the establishment of the Bledisloe Commission was guickly replaced
by anger and bitterness when its findings were published, early in
1939. The Commission favoured amalgamation, presenting in the second
part of its report strong arguments in favour of it, and urged that
the British Government adopt it as official policy. The report
pointed out that communication by road, rail and air would be
facilitated, that there were no geographical difficulties, that the
marketing of produce would be made easier and that administration of
the whole region would be far more efficient and economical under
one government. However, the Commission felt that it was not possible
to implement this policy immediately. The stumbling block to
immediate amalgamation was the differences in native policy between
Southern Rhodesia and the northern territories. The Commission's
eventual recommendation, to defer amalgamation until an expected
convergence on native policy occurred in central Africa, was
essentially a compromise.
Amongst the commissioners, Bledisloe and Astley Cooper were in
favour of immediate amalgamation, Fitzgerald, Mainwaring and Orr
Ewing were opposed while Southern Rhodesia maintained her policy of
parallel development. Evans' position was one shared by a great
number of people in Britian over the next few years. Evans faced
the dilemma that he supported the principle of amalgamation, but was
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concerned as to what it might produce in practice, because of the
Southern Rhodesian Government's policy toward the African. The
Commission's expectations of the convergence of native policy in
central Africa were more a technigue on the part of the chairman to
prevent a minority report, than an accurate assessment of future
trends. Indeed, Gore-Browne refuted this claim in a speech at Broken
Hill, Northern Rhodesia, on 18 May 1939: "It is as certain as
anything can be in politics that neither Southern Rhodesia nor the
Colonial Office will amend or abandon their policies to the extent
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that the divergence [in native policy] will disappear." It was
a view with which Roy Welensky concurred: "If we have to wait until
these policies meet, then amalgamation will never be seen".^
As a first step towards the eventual amalgamation of all three terri¬
tories, the Commission recommended that Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia should be united forthwith. This proposal met with ferocious
opposition in Northern Rhodesia, as it was widely recognised that
any such union would simply reinforce Colonial Office native policy
in Northern Rhodesia and make future amalgamation with Southern
Rhodesia that much less likely.^
There was one aspect of the Royal Commission's report that did meet
with settler approval. That was its proposal to enlarge the
Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, even if no union with
Nyasaland occurred, and to grant the elected members, at the very
least, parity with the official members. Nominated members, appointed
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to look after African interests, would hold the balance. Northern
Rhodesian settler agitation for greater representation and
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responsibility had been closely connected with the demands for amal¬
gamation and was regarded by many as being of even greater importance.
In 1936 Gore-Browne had raised the threat of collective resignation
unless some of their demands were met.^ Over the next three years,
the Unofficials in Northern Rhodesia made startling gains in repre¬
sentation. First, in 1937, they were granted representation on the
newly-formed Finance Committee, then, in 1938, they gained greater
representation on the Legislative Council and, finally, in 1939,
three Unofficials were accepted on to the Executive Committee. These
concessions were made, at least in part, to try to reduce demands in
Northern Rhodesia for immediate amalgamation, and buy the Colonial
and Imperial Governments breathing space on this question.
The outbreak of war in Europe pushed the amalgamation issue into the
background, even in central Africa, but did not stop all agitation
on the issue. Lord Bledisloe may have had to compromise in his
report, but he was firmly in favour of amalgamation and continued to
press the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on the matter.^
What is even more interesting than his continued agitation for the
acceptance of the principle of amalgamation and the instigation of
moves towards it, were the arguments he employed. Although not men¬
tioned in his report, Bledisloe's main argument for amalgamation in
central Africa, was the need for a counterbalance to the Union. In
pressing this argument on the Dominion and Colonial Offices, Bledisloe
was mirroring the arguments of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia,
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Herbert Stanley, who was also pressing for immediate amalgamation.
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British opponents of the amalgamation of central Africa were also
harassing the Dominions Office, concerned lest amalgamation was
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implemented under cover of the war. In fact, agitation for and
fears of moves towards amalgamation during the war were groundless.
The British Government had no intentions of doing anything so
drastic. Central Africa was of very low priority indeed during the
war and two important factors worked to preclude amalgamation.
These were the need to retain direct control of Northern Rhodesia's
copper production and the desire to do nothing to undermine Smuts'
pro-war administration in South Africa.
Smuts had also seen the possibilities of the war being used to dis¬
tract hostile attention, in Britain, from changes in southern Africa.
His concern, however, was not amalgamation, but the expansion of
South Africa. In October 1939, he pressed the British Government to
progress the transfer of Swaziland and Bechuanaland guickly and
guietly through Parliament, when its members' attention was focused
on the progress of the war.^ Although the United Kingdom Government
was unwilling to co-operate in this ploy, it recognised the strength
of Smuts' argument, namely, that the transfer of at least Swaziland,
and hopefully Bechuanaland as well, was one of the best means of
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combatting the secessionist tendencies of Malan's Nationalists.
Clark even implied that if Malan and Hertzog reconciled their
differences and united then the continued stability of Smuts'
government might depend on it succeeding where Hertzog's Government
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had failed in extending South Africa's borders northwards.
Smuts retained greater ambitions than the transfer of the High
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Commission Territories and had never lost sight of his goal of
stretching South Africa's borders as far north as possible. In his
opinion, Southern Rhodesia's long-term position was untenable and so,
along with hopes for a change in attitude in Southern Rhodesia
towards the Union, Smuts continued to believe that its incorporation
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would again become a viable option. As a consequence, he was
fiercely opposed to any agreement with Nazi Germany which would com¬
promise British control of any part of central or eastern Africa,
and in this he had the support of L S Amery.^
Smuts' hopes of even yet acquiring Southern Rhodesia were not fanci¬
ful, or at least were not regarded as such in London. Hailey, in
particular, urged, in 1940, the early amalgamation of central Africa,
irrespective of differences in native policy, as otherwise contro¬
versy over that issue would drive Southern Rhodesia towards the Union,
and into it if the terms were right.After taking up his post as
High Commissioner in South Africa in September 1941, Lord Harlech^
added his weight to Bledisloe's and Hailey's demands in urging the
immediate amalgamation of central Africa.^ As late as April 1943,
G F Seel in the Colonial Office was advocating a loose grouping in
central Africa in order to prevent Southern Rhodesia from drifting
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into the Union. This view gained the backing of Sir George Gater,
but Sir Edward Richards, the Governor of Nyasaland, would not
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countenance it. Considering the importance of those who were
pressing for amalgamation between 1939 and 1943 and the strength of
their support for the policy, it is rather remarkable that none of
the Secretaries of State for the period moved to implement
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amalgamation. Had Cranbourne remained at the Colonial Office after
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1942 it is probable that. Sir Henry Moore's proposals for the
amalgamation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would have been
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implemented, despite opposition within the department. Clearly
a major factor in the failure of this pressure to produce amalgamation
was the British Government's feeling of indebtedness towards Smuts
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for having brought South Africa into the war. With the rest of
British Africa increasingly dependent upon the Union for supplies
because of the war, the United Kingdom Government were loath to take
any action that could possibly weaken Smuts' hold on office. As
a result, in October 1941, Cranbourne and Moyne proposed that, any
decision on central African amalgamation be postponed until after
85
the war. With Churchill's agreement this became the official policy
but with the clear understanding that the Union would under no
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circumstances be allowed to expand beyond the Zambesi in the interim.
Smuts', however, was beginning to put forward proposals for a much
larger grouping in Africa.
By January 1942, Smuts was preparing his plans for a vast and initially
loose confederation tying together all of white Africa. He felt
that having the rest, of Africa increasingly reliant on South Africa
for supplies of food and materials was a positive step towards creating
a favourable climate for his grandiose plans. "It seems as if we
have now to carry all the smaller fry of Africa on our backs. In
years gone by they looked to Europe for their supplies, but now that
that prospect has failed they crowd in on us, and we have t.o do our
best with the very limited supplies at our disposal ... we
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are quite popular nowadays and hope that something greater may be
built on these foundations in the future. The Portuguese and
British colonies, Congo and French Congo are all in this plight.
They may yet be in the net. I am working on some such plan as that
of the pan-American union of our Yankee friends. After all, the
day for these pygmy units are past, and Hitler has at least proved
87 88
that." With the results of South Africa's 1943 general election
apparently securing his position, Smuts felt confident enough to put
his proposals formally in an address to a meeting of the Empire
Parliamentary Association at the Houses of Parliament, in November
1943.89
The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, was in
general opposed to Smuts' idea of regional confederations of British
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colonies attached to one of the Dominions. Nevertheless, he saw
distinct advantages in the formation of one for southern and central
Africa, so long as the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola
were involved, along with the Belgian Congo, to prevent South Africa
dominating the confederation. Cranbourne concurred with Stanley's
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proviso that east Africa must not be involved. It might be
supposed that London would have reacted more favourably towards Smuts
and his proposals. After all, he had brought South Africa into a
second war in support of Britain, he appeared to have gained a
consensus of South African opinion behind his policies and was now
presenting the British Government with the means of reducing the
problems of the transfer of the High Commission Territories and
central African amalgamation. A large, loose grouping in southern
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and central Africa, with South Africa as an interested, but outside,
power, would have allowed Britain to step back from these two con¬
tentious issues, and also provided scope for interminable delays
over making any definite decisions.
Unlike sections of the British Press which warmly welcomed Smuts' new
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ideas the British Government was wary of Smuts and his proposals,
because it was still not convinced about South Africa's reliability
as the guarantor of British policy in southern Africa. It was felt
in government circles that South Africa's loyalty was almost com¬
pletely dependent on Smuts, and he was seventy-three in the year of
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his electoral success. Moreover, many remained sceptical about
Smuts' disclaimers of all intentions of South African expansion.
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Sir Evelyn Baring, was amongst those who remained unconvinced and
drew attention to the heavy investment in Northern Rhodesia by the
South African mining concerns and their continuing search for other
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insurance against the exhaustion of South Africa's gold reserves.
In addition, Baring continued to believe that Smuts still hoped to
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extend the Union to include both Rhodesias.
Smuts was certainly keen for South Africa to take over the colonial
responsibilities which Britain was unable or unwilling to continue.
However, he and Pirow gave precedence to the maintenance of white
97
rule in Africa over the early expansion of the Union. The main
thrust of South Africa's policy for Africa, under Smuts, was to try
to prevent the devolution of power from the Imperial governments to
the indigenous peoples. Wherever this was proposed, particularly
where Britain was the Imperial power, South Africa offered to take on
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the responsibility of overseeing the colony. As a result, South
Africa's interests were not confined to the southern part of the
continent. In January 1941, Smuts objected to the British War
Cabinet's decision to restore Ethopia, as soon as possible, to an
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independent state under the rule of Haile Selassie. The implica¬
tion behind this disagreement was that South Africa could oversee
Abyssinia as a mandated or protected territory. Smuts was still
pressing the point In July 1945, when he asked that formal provision
be made for the Allies to consult with South Africa before any final
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decision was taken about the allocation of the Italian colonies.
The advent of a Labour Government, with its decision to work for
security through a strong United Nations Organisation, rather than
by independent strategic bases in Britain's colonies and dependancies,
and in particular the decision to withdraw from Egypt and the Middle
East, ended the few remaining hopes South Africa cherished of gaining
Abyssinia or other North African territories. The new Labour
Government was convinced that the advent of the atomic bomb nullified
most of the strategic arguments for maintaining colonies in Africa.
Labour went through the motions of consulting with Smuts about the
future of the Italian colonies during the post-war conference in
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Paris, in April 1946, but by then Smuts had lost any chance of
persuading Bevin to his point of view. So South Africa's efforts,
dating from the early thirties and continuing until Smuts' defeat
in 1948, to become a colonial power defending white rule in Africa
proved entirely unsuccessful.
The factors which doomed Smuts' efforts to failure - apart from those
already examined above - were America's attitudes towards Empire,
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Britain's growing dependence on the United States and the effects
of the Allies' propaganda during the war.
First, America's attitude must be considered. The extent of the
differences between the basic assumptions of the British and American
Government concerning the British Empire, were clearly demonstrated
at the meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt, at Placentia Bay
in August 1947. Roosevelt assumed when he advocated self-determination
in Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter, drawn up at these discussions,
that this applied to British Colonial peoples as much as anyone else,
whereas Churchill thought that no-one could possibly consider that
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it applied to people in the British Empire. Although Churchhill
made efforts to sort out the muddle,it became increasingly
difficult, as the war progressed, for Britain to maintain a case
for Empire exemption from Article 3 without appearing hypocritical,
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if not tyrannical. Yet, as both Lord Cranbourne and his predecessor
at the Colonial Office, Lord Moyne,1^ were strongly opposed to the
granting of wholesale independence to Britain's colonies at any time
in the future, a convincing argument for just such an exemption had
to be presented.
Moyne and Cranbourne's view, that the majority of the British Empire
should remain permanently under Imperial control, did not find favour
within the American Administration, but any transfer of territories
to South African jurisdiction would have been even more unpopular.
It was, moreover, realised in London, that this prospect of
permanent Imperial rule was hardly an incentive for the peoples of
British Empire to fight in the war. This presented a problem
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as it was increasingly evident that Britain would require the
martial efforts of its colonial peoples if it was to defeat Germany
and Japan. Moreoever, Britain was growing more dependent on American
support in its war effort. The extent of antagonism in the United
States towards the British Empire and what they understood to be
British colonial policy, was a major concern for the War Cabinet
p 4-u- 107for this very reason.
Churchill became convinced that a vindication of British colonial
policy past and present, was required to curtail the criticisms in
the United States and encourage support for the British Empire amongst
the peoples it ruled. On investigation however, it became clear
that Britain did not possess a colonial policy of any form or substance,
but merely a few, vague statements, frequently contradicting one
• I 109
another.
Britain's continued refusal to accept that Article 3 of the Atlantic
Charter applied to her colonies was a source of constant irritation
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in relations with the United States. What Britain needed was
for her past and present record on colonial matters to be presented
in as positive a light as possible and for the whole emphasis of the
debate to be shifted on to future intentions. By presenting plans
for economic development and provision for social care, the Colonial
Office and British Government hoped to dissipate American criticism
and restore the confidence of the colonial peoples in the Empire.
The tone was to be progressive, but no firm plans or commitments
to the granting of colonial independence were to be offered. In
this climate any transfer of colonial responsibilities to South
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Africa was impossible, even if the British Government had been
convinced that the Union's guarantee of co-operation extended beyond
Smuts.
The architect and instigator of this new presentation of the British
Empire to the world at large and the United States of America in
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particular, was Oliver Stanley. Stanley was very successful in
convincing erstwhile critics that the British Empire was bringing
economic development and other tangible benefits to its colonies.
He also succeeded, to a large extent, in creating the impression
that this new direction of British policy for its colonies was, in
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fact, simply the continuation of traditional goals. The lanquage
Stanley used to placate American opinion, however, had the side-
effect of raising false expectations amonqst Britain's colonial
peoples. Stanley emphasised the need for economic stability as a
pre-requisite for the qranting of political independence to any colonv.
The repeated use of the phrase 'self-qovernment' in this context
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by Stanley, was ambiguous, and intentionally so. The phrase
was generally interpreted as meaning representative self-government^
but in fact vague enough to allow Great Britain to stop well short of
this, if she so desired, while still being able to claim to be
adhering to the stated policy. Stanley was convinced, as his two
immediate predecessors had been, that only the largest colonies would,
eventually, be granted full independence. This was not how the
American Administration interpreted his statements and Stanley, clearly,
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was intentionally misleading them. He was probably not fully
aware that he was also, as a consequence, raising expectations of
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rapid development and progress to independence for the colonies,
not only in the Empire but in Britain itself.
Under Stanley, the Colonial Office had moved to a position whereby
the advance of colonial peoples, both economically and politically,
was to be fostered. In Africa, this took the form of promoting a
partnership, within a territory, between the indigenous people and
its European, and sometimes Indian, settlers. The concept was vague
and intended to stop well short of fully independent African rule.
What it recognised, however, was that in most of east Africa and
parts of central Africa, Amery's policy of devolution of power to the
European community alone, was no longer viable. Although this policy
change on the part of the British Government towards its colonies was
dramatic neither the supporters nor opponents of continuing white
rule in Africa realised that any change in policy had actually
occurred, let alone recognising the significance of the change.
Stante-y had instigated and overseen a significant change in policy
at the Colonial Office, indeed it could be argued that he had intro¬
duced a colonial policy for the first time. This policy was not as
radical at the United States understood it to be, but neither was it
the purely public relations job which British Imperialists were led
to believe.
What Stanley had succeeded in gaining was room for manoeuvre for
Britain over her colonies, but in so doing he was storing up problems
for Britain in the future. Indeed, his attempt to match British
Colonial policy with the terms of the Atlantic Charter changed, in
retrospect, the Devonshire Declaration and the Passfield Memorandum
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into the very policy the white settlers had originally feared,
but which the documents did not in fact represent at the time they
were produced. Nevertheless, by denying that he was making policy,
and insisting rather that he was merely re-affirming it, Stanley
sought to, and largely succeeded in, justifying and exonerating
Britain's colonial record which had been so widely criticised in the
United States. In this way, Britain avoided making any substantive
concessions to the USA on colonial issues, while maintaining American
support for the war effort.
The outbreak of World War II may have pushed the amalgamation issue
into the background in central Africa, but it did not stop all
agitation for its implementation. Most settler politicians in
central Africa recognised that any call for immediate amalgamation
was unlikely to be looked on favourably by London during the war.
Nevertheless, early in 1941, Roy Welensky formed the Northern
Rhodesian Labour Party to fight in the general election, later in
the year,with the stated purpose of campaigning for immediate amal¬
gamation. In introducing party politics to Northern Rhodesia,
Welensky came into conflict with Colonel Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, who
argued that Northern Rhodesia was not yet ready for such a development.
One of the main considerations which influenced Welensky's action,
was his desire to re-establish a united pro-amalgamation position
amongst the Unofficials in the Legislative and Executive Councils.
The war had created a boom in Northern Rhodesia's copper-based economy
and this, coupled with the gains made in representation by the
Unofficials from 1937 onwards, had contrived to undermine the consensus
-71-
supporting amalgamation which had emerged in the early nineteen
thirties. Economic growth and the political advances had
re-kindled the hope in many Northern Rhodesian settlers, that
representative government, without the necessity of amalgamating
with Southern Rhodesia, was once again a realistic possibility.
As has already been shown, support for amalgamation in Northern
Rhodesia was always a means to an end, not a goal in itself. Amal¬
gamation was only popularly endorsed in Northern Rhodesia when its
European supporters were convinced that without it representative
government would not be granted and European rule would gradually
be replaced by African control.
Welensky's move was initially very successful, with all five Labour
Party candidates being returned in Northern Rhodesia's 1941 elections.
However, his next initiative in attempting to recapture a united front
in favour of amalgamation was scotched. He tried to convene another
Victoria falls Conference with representatives from Southern
Rhodesia, early in 1942, but was out-manoeuvered by Gore-Browne.
Addressing the Legislative Council Gore-Browne stated:
"We all know that the political issue of amalgamation
had to be deferred, and I am sure that we all see
the justice of this and that none of us wish to
embarrass the sorely-tried government at home by
pressing this point at the moment.116
Although Welensky continued to advocate the merits of amalgamation
after this setback, he was still no nearer success by the end of
1943. His lack of progress is well illustrated by the failure of
his motion in favour of amalgamation to gain the support of all the
Unofficials in the Legislative Council in November of that year.
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It was perhaps not surprising that Gore-Brown opposed Welensky's
motion, given his views on agitation for amalgamation during the
war and the fact that he represented African interests. What is
more interesting, however, is that Welensky also failed to gain
the support of Major McKee (Midland electoral area) and Geoffrey
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Pelletier (Ndola electoral area). This lack of unanimity was
also mirrored in the European community as a whole, as is shown by
the fact that Pelletier had recently won his seat, in a by-election,
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against a Labour Party candidate. Yet, by the middle of 1945
Welensky had largely succeeded in obtaining his objective. His success
owed as much to force of personality as to the arguments he used.
By August of that year amongst the Unofficials in the Legislative
Council only Gore-Browne was not supporting his campaign for an
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early amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.
Throughout this period when Welensky was seeking to gain an Unofficial
consensus in favour of immediate amalgamation, the Governor, Sir John
Waddington, and his administration sought to remain non-committed.
The Northern Rhodesian Government refused to support Welensky's
motions in the Legislative Council, leaning heavily on the Bledisloe
Commission when pressed, and seeking to avoid being forced to
reject the principle of amalgamation as an option open for considera¬
tion. While there can be no doubt that it was entirely due to
Welensky's efforts that amalgamation remained a topical political
issue in central Africa during the war, the Prime Minister of
Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins, was also firmly in favour of
amalgamation.
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Huggins had remained largely inactive on the amalgamation issue for
most of the war, partly, at least, because of the substantial
minority amongst Southern Rhodesian Europeans who firmly opposed
any closer ties with the black north. Towards the end of the war,
however, Huggins began once more to publicly advocate immediate
amalgamation. The co-ordination of the war effort in central Africa
had resulted in closer co-operation and some joint bodies for certain
decision-making processes. Both Welensky and Huggins were confident
that these areas of closer association could be capitalised upon and
the British Government induced to move towards amalgamation.
Policy in London on central Africa was, as it always had been,
dominated by concerns over the possible expansion of South Africa.
In March 1944, Creasy and Cohen in the Colonial Office were concerned
lest a totally negative response to continuing demands for amalgama¬
tion in central Africa drive Southern Rhodesia into the Union. Their
proposals, which found favour with the Governors of the three central
African territories, opposed amalgamation for the foreseeable
future, but sought to strengthen and make permanent the war-time
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machinery for closer co-operation on matters of common interest.
One of the main factors behind the British Government's decision
to reject the amalgamation of central Africa in 1944, was the fear
that the European populations in central Africa would not be large
enough to enable it to emerge as a powerful self-supporting Dominion.
Unless it achieved this status it would fail to act as a counter¬
weight to South Africa and would, in fact, become increasingly
susceptible to Union overtures for incorporation, as its dependence
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on South Africa grew. In presenting this joint view of the Colonial
and Dominions Offices to the Cabinet, Cranbourne and Stanley were as
aware as Creasy and Cohen that a flat rejection of amalgamation could
well frustrate and anger Southern Rhodesia sufficiently for them to
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turn towards the Union out of pique. Any such northward advance
by South Africa had to be prevented for reasons already recounted.
Alongside these factors, however, was a new consideration for opposing
South African expansion. Any spread of Union influence northward
would strengthen settler opposition in east Africa towards Stanley's
new policy of African advancement in partnership with European and
Indian settlers. The settler communities of east Africa, especially
Kenya, had to be isolated from all external aid if this strategy was
to have any chance of being implemented. So, by April 1944, it had
been decided at Cabinet level, that the Central African Council and
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its secretariat would be established on a permanent basis. This
inter-territorial body would continue to be purely advisory and have
no executive powers, but for all that, its continuation appears to
have been accepted by Huggins, as a positive step towards amalgamation,
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when he was informed of it in London in July 1944.
London would not officially exclude amalgamation as a possible
solution, because of the furore this would create in central Africa.
Nevertheless, amalgamation had been dismissed by the British
Government as a viable policy option by the end of the war.
In May 1946, Welensky, Gore-Browne and Waddington held talks in
124
London with George Hall on proposed constitutional amendments to
the composition of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council.
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Welensky however used the occasion to press his arguments for amal¬
gamation on the Colonial Secretary, but received no support from
either Waddington or Gore-Browne. Hall rejected the case for amal¬
gamating the central African territories on the twin grounds of
African opposition in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and the nature
of Southern Rhodesia's 'native' policy. However, more important than
Hall's rejection of amalgamation was Oliver Stanley's insistence that
any Conservative Government which succeeded Labour would also reject
amalgamation. It was during Welensky's separate private discussions
with Stanley that the Conservative politician suggested federation
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as a possible alternative to amalgamation.
The British Government's decision to reject amalgamation was
undoubtedly based on the reasons Hall offered Welensky, but the
decision was also influenced by strong doubts as to whether or not
central Africa could survive as an independent unitary state, and
the knowledge that to do otherwise than reject amalgamation would
have strained relations with the United States even further.
In late 1944 and throughout 1945, Britain was resisting American
attempts to raise the whole issue of colonial mandates and territorial
trusteeship, both in direct talks with British representatives and
in general discussions at the United Nations' inaugural conference
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at San Francisco. Britain was seeking to maintain its autonomy
on colonial issues and the outcry that would have greeted the amal¬
gamation of central Africa, particularly from the Fabian Society and
the Church of Scotland, would have adversely affected this attempt.
Given that the United Kingdom Government was aware that it would
-76-
probably encounter severe criticism for supporting Smuts in his
attempt to incorporate South West Africa into the Union, it could
not afford also to be portrayed as constantly stifling moves towards
African independence by supporting permanent white settler rule.
The new Labour Government's policy of achieving world-wide security
through the strengthening of the United Nations increased the need
to avoid acquiring this image. In any event, any attempt to amalga¬
mate Nyasaland with Northern and Southern Rhodesia, would have been
strongly resisted by the Governor of Nyasaland and his administra-
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tion.
For the above reasons by 1946 the British Government no longer
considered amalgamation a feasible alternative for central Africa.
However, the need for closer association in central Africa appeared
to be growing. Many people in Whitehall and Westminster had been
convinced by the successful operation of a resident Minister in west
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Africa during the war of the need for larger units in colonial
administration. There was also a great deal of interest and support
in government circles for a variant on Smuts' proposals, of an inter-
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national regional body for southern Africa. The weakening of
Smuts' coalition Government, in October 1945, with the departure of
the Labour and Dominion parties, made the advent of an Afrikaner
South Africa, even before Smuts' death, a distinct possibility, and
served to strengthen the need for some form of definite closer
association in central Africa. Concern was heightened the following
year when the Southern Rhodesian elections resulted in Huggins
retaining only a precarious hold on government. Huggins' main
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losses were to factions opposed to any union with the north and more
favourably disposed to incorporation with the Union. The political
situation in Southern Rhodesia, therefore, would have ruled out
amalgamation in the immediate future, even if the British Government
had not already so decided. As it was, it served to complete the
dismissal of amalgamation from the Imperial .Government's considera¬
tion. 1946 also saw the rejection of any serious attempt to produce
an international conference for southern Africa, to discuss incor¬
porating the Portuguese and Belgian colonies, and the first indica¬
tion that Welensky and the Europeans of central Africa might settle
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for something less than full amalgamation.
London continued to maintain a studied neutrality towards the
principle of amalgamating central Africa in its public statements
and its communications with those territories, neither endorsing
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nor rejecting amalgamation. The United Kingdom continued to
refer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies' statement to the
House of Commons on 18 October 1944, and the Bledisloe report, to
block all attempts to force a decision from them on the issue.
Nevertheless, although the leaders of settler opinion in central
Africa did not realise it as yet, and the British Government refused
to admit it publicly, the option of amalgamation in central Africa
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had been definitely rejected by 1946. It took a further number
of years before everyone concerned accepted this outcome, but 1946
saw the end of any realistic hopes of the United Kingdom agreeing to
the amalgamation of central Africa.
SECTION 2




The UK's Economic Situation
Before looking in detail at the uneven emergence of the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland between 1946 and 1933, it is necessary to
outline briefly the political backdrop to the unfolding drama.
First, it should be noted that the federal issue did not emerge in
Britain as a politically contentious, or even important, issue until
after Labour was out of office. This was partly because there
existed broad, cross party support for the principle of closer
association, short of amalgamation, for central Africa, which
tended to reinforce the convention that colonial policy should
remain outwith the arena of party political dispute, and so the
dilemma of whether or not to impose an agreed federal scheme
against the overwhelming opposition of Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia's African peoples did not arise. Mainly, however, it
was that, in comparison with the succession of financial and foreign
crises and major domestic problems with which the Attlee administra¬
tion had to deal, whilst establishing the welfare state, the issue
of federation was a very minor concern indeed.
The ending of Lease Lend by President Truman in August 1943, served
to exacerbate the 'financial Dunkirk' which already faced the United
Kingdom at the end of the war. Britain had only managed to last the
war because of the United States' lease lend and Canada's mutual aid.
Keynes had already assured the Cabinet that only through substantial,
long-term aid from America could Britain hope to recover to anything
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approaching its pre-war position abroad and create a tolerable
standard of living at home. Britain did manage to extract a large,
long-term loan from the USA, although it was neither as large nor at
as low a rate of interest as Attlee's administration had wanted.
Moreoever, the two central conditions attached by the American
Government to the loan, when implemented, were to have unfortunate
consequences for the British economy. Nonetheless, with the loan
secured, Dalton's policy of 'cheap money' allowed the Government to
pursue its nationalisation and welfare provision policies throughout
1946. During the same period Bevin was seeking to maintain Britain's
standing as a world power, by attempting to honour the United
Kingdom's defence commitments abroad and actually add to and strengthen
the Empire in north Africa and the middle East.
The summer of 1947 saw a massive drain on Britain's dollar and gold
reserves, the underlying cause of which was the world-wide shortage
of food and raw materials, combined with Britain's inability to
reduce its massive trade deficit with the United States. These major
problems had been exacerbated in early 1947 by a sharp rise in
American prices, coinciding with severe shortages of fuel, particu¬
larly coal, in the United Kingdom. The implementation in July of
America's loan condition to make Sterling freely convertible into
other currencies, accelerated the dollar and gold drain to a
critical level. Only by the removal of the pound from free con-
vertability and the introduction of austerity measures by Cripps, who
had succeeded Dalton as Chancellor of the Exchequer on 13 November
1947, was Britain saved from total bankruptcy.
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The United Kingdom's gradual recovery was reinforced by the massive
injection of funds into Europe in general, and Britain in particular,
through Marshall Aid and the European Recovery Programme. Even so,
Britain's economy was under severe pressure once more from March 1949
and by September, Cripps was forced into a massive devaluation of the
pound. The recovery, produced by the new competitive level of
sterling and the adoption of Morrison's policy of consolidation, was
checked once more by huge increases in the defence budget. This
controversial measure was introduced by the Attlee administration,
under American pressure, in response to the outbreak of the Korean
war in June 1950. This difficult situation was worsened still further
by shortages of raw materials, produced by American stockpiling of
strategic items in preparation for its war effort.
Britain's dependence upon American financial aid and the necessity
to reduce expenditure were the twin factors which forced Britain's
retreat from Empire and overseas commitments. Withdrawals from
first Greece, Palestine and then Iran, were all based on considera¬
tions of economic necessity and relations with the United States.
Frequently British withdrawal occurred when challenged by new,
assertive nationalist forces within the territories concerned.
These attempts to achieve self-determination proved so successful
precisely because Britain was facing economic difficulties and so
had to maintain strict financial stringency. In addition, popular
anti-empire feeling within the USA remained high and the United
Kingdom had to take note of American views, as, in many essentials,
Britain was now dependent on America. ■ It was under these new post-
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war conditions that India, Ceylon, Malta and Newfoundland had all
gained independence by 1950.
Britain's continued belief in herself as the third world power and
increasing anxiety about possible Russian expansion outside of
Europe, lay behind Bevin's advocacy of the formation of a greater
Somalia in 1945 and 1946. Attlee's objections and continued
American opposition to any expansion of Britain's Empire, ended the
foreign Secretary's imperialist aspirations. With the obvious
exceptions of the conflicts in Malaya and Korea, from 1947 onwards,
Britain's main foreign pre-occupation centred on Europe, opposing
moves towards the formation of a Council of Europe and the implemen¬
tation of the Schuman plan, countering Russia's blockade of West Berlin
and fostering the establishment of NATO.
American opinion may have been antagonistic toward the British Empire,
but the United Kingdom's pretentions to super power status depended
upon a strong imperial base and continued close links of trade and
defence with the Dominions. Such aspirations proved to be increas¬
ingly impracticable after the war, although still strongly held by
the British Government, nonetheless. As for Empire, Britain sought
to develop it economically and, more importantly, to convince the
USA and the client states themselves, that the United Kingdom was
seeking to aid their economic advance. These efforts were not con¬
fined to the Overseas food Corporation and Colonial Development
Corporation, but increasingly involved joint efforts with other
colonial powers.
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Joint action on technical problems between colonies in Africa had been
discussed by Britain and France briefly in early 1940 and these were
resumed in late 1945. By May 1949, a conference in Lisbon, on the
problems of transport development in central, eastern and southern
Africa attracted delegates from the Governments of Britain, France,
Belgium, South Africa, and the colonies concerned, as well as the
host nation. Moreover, from early 1948 Britain and France were
considering the possibilities of economic co-operation in the
colonial sphere, particularly in east Africa, but with relevance
for Africa as a whole. Whilst Britain's ardour for these develop¬
ments to involve South Africa may have cooled after 1948, the Union
itself under Malan, remained as committed to regional groupings in
Africa as it had been when Smuts was Prime Minister. Concurrent
with these developments in Britain's colonial policy for Africa, was
growing opposition, within the Colonial Service, to any notion that
the areas of Africa where Europeans had settled in any significant
numbers could be developed along similar lines to the rest of
British Africa.
Finally, it should be noted that an important consideration in the
post-war development of the British Empire, lay in its producing
raw materials for the United Kingdom and providing dollars through
exports to North America. The economic progress of Britain's
colonies was thus shaped by the United Kingdom's trade and economic
reguirements than the individual needs of any one client territory.
The operation of the dollar pool, covering most, though not all, of
the Commonwealth, caused particular resentment in the Rhodesias as
much as anywhere.
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Support for a Greater Federation
Throughout the decades of pressure for closer association in central
Africa there also existed influential support for larger or somewhat
different unions of settler-controlled territories in east, central
and southern Africa. Mention has been made of some of these attempts
in the previous Chapter. The years immediately preceding the
establishment of Federation, however, saw a final flurry of activity
on this front and helped to form the political environment in which
the decisions to create it were taken. The achievement of a
Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was not seen as precluding
or even necessarily hindering the achievement of a greater federation
at a later date. For example, among the points in favour of federa¬
tion, contained in the UCAA National Executive Council's memorandum of
October 1932, - for members giving speeches during the Southern
Rhodesian referendum campaign - were the advantages it would bring
in any future negotiations on either closer association with other
territories, or for a corridor of land connecting central Africa to
the sea.''
Before looking in detail at the political process leading to the
creation of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland it is
useful to examine briefly some of the moves which were made at a
late stage to try and extend the proposed federation into a larger
✓
union.
In this context it is of interest to note not only the degree of
support in the early 1930s for uniting the proposed central African
Federation with east Africa, Bechuanaland, even the northern part of
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South West Africa and Natal, but also the clear differences brought
out by these pressures in attitude and approach between Huggins and
Welensky. Initially Huggins was open to suggestions of pressing for
the establishment of a greater Federation while Welensky wanted to
concentrate on achieving federation in central Africa before consider¬
ing any wider expansion. However, by 1953, Welensky was far more
willing to consider a central African Federation joining with other
territories at an early date, whereas Huggins was primarily concerned
with consolidating the soon to be created Federation.
Between 1950 and the establishment of Federation at the end of 1953,
there were four important initiatives for the creation of a
settler-ruled federation consisting of more than just Nyasaland,
Southern and Northern Rhodesia. On only the first of these initiatives
were Welensky and Huggins completely in accord with one another.
In February 1951, Kendall Ward, a leading Kenyan Unofficial, sounded
out David Stirling about Southern Rhodesia's probable reaction to
Imperial Rule being unilaterally rejected and "something like a Boston
Tea Party" occurring in Kenya. Ward asked Stirling to attempt to
gain Huggins' and Welensky's support for such developments in Kenya
and sought his advice on whether or not the Kenyan settlers should
approach Malan with a reguest for help in such an endeavour. Ward
also asked if the white Kenyans could "expect material as well as
moral support" from the Rhodesias and assured Stirling that he was




Huggins, Welensky and Stirling were concerned at the proposed
constitutional changes in Kenya, but urged Ward and his associates
to show restraint and not be provoked into pursuing an unconstitutional
route towards independence."^ Huggins felt that the best assistance
he could offer Kenya's settlers was to publicly advocate the adoption
of Southern Rhodesia's twin pyramid policy in other British Africa
colonies. However, what primarily concerned Huggins and Stirling was
not so much the threat of Kenya's settlers declaring UDI, but the
possibility that they would ask for help from Malan's South Africa.
In Stirling's reply to Ward, probably towards the end of March 1951,
the leader of the Capricorn Africa Society emphasised that both he
and Huggins, with whcmhe had had a long discussion, were adamant that
no approach for help of any kind be made to Malan. Stirling argued
that Malan's Government could do nothing in response to such a
reguest from over two thousand miles away, but the fact that Kenya's
settlers had made the reguest would produce grave repercussions in
Southern Rhodesia.
As you know a section of our population favours a
political merger with the Union. Malan would
immediately exploit an appeal for assistance from
the white settlers in Kenya in a way which would be
most embarrassing to us here. It would certainly
mean his capturing more support in Southern Rhodesia
than he has got at the moment, thus contributing
towards the undermining of the only British European
bulwark in Africa.4
Throughout 1951, Huggins, Welensky and Stirling continued to
discourage Kenya's settlers from taking action that would provoke a
constitutional crisis. Moreover, while the Rhodesias' white leaders
remained worried about the proposed constitutional changes in Kenya
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and Tanganyika which would weaken the position of those territories'
white settlers, they did not encourage Kenyan and Tanganyikan settler
overtures for an early link up with the Rhodesias.^ Nonetheless,
it improbable that the second initiative in the attempt to form a
greater federation was in response to, or inspired by, the first.
During the latter part of 1951, Colonel David Stirling and the
Capricorn Africa Society began to organise and publicise an east and
central Africa settlers convention to press for the creation of a
greater federation, to be held in Salisbury in March 1952. Stirling
claimed widespread support for such a convention including "the
informal support of Mr Lennox-Boyd and also Sir Edward Twinning,
Governor of Tanganyika" and "the enthusiastic support of Mr Gordon-
Walker", who, he claimed, was arranging for a number of interested
Labour and Conservative MPs to attend.^ While Stirling was well
known for his tendency to exaggerate the extent and degree of
support for his campaigns, his idea of a settlers' convention was
taken seriously enough in Whitehall for personal meetings to be
arranged in November 1951 with Foster, Minister of State at the
Commonwealth Relations Office and in January 1952, with the Common¬
wealth Secretary, Ismay. At these two meetings, Stirling stressed
the urgent need for the early production of official proposals for
a greater federation of east and central Africa.
Initially Welensky was not opposed to the convention provided it
did not interfere with the prospects of securing federation for
central Africa. In making Huggins aware of where he stood Welensky
added:
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"I can see considerable advantage in all the
European Settler communities situated in this
area saying with one voice that they want some
form of political unity and a settled policy".8
However Welensky became convinced that the convention would hinder
the establishment of a central African Federation. By January 1952,
he and Rennie were in agreement that the proposed convention was
badly timed and that no proposals for a larger federation should be
(
considered until the central African Federation was well established.
Thus, while Welensky does not appear to have aided Rennie in the
Governor's efforts to undermine support for the March convention,
10
neither does he seem to have attempted to put a stop to them.
In contrast, Huggins was initially strongly in favour of Stirling's
proposed convention and agreed to speak at it. By January 1952 he
had begun to reconsider his position, possibly influenced by
Welensky's point of view, but Stockil's appointment to Stirling's
Organising Committee made it politically difficult for him to with-
11
draw his support, particularly as other influential names had lent
their weight to the cause of a greater federation, amongst them
N H Wilson, J W Keller, G M Ellman-Brown, C J Bourden, Stanley Cooke,
Geof Beckett, Humphrey Gibbs, H St L Grenfell and other figures
12
of note from Kenya and Tanganyika. In the end it took the personal
intervention of Sir Evelyn Baring, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia,
to persuade Huggins to neither address nor attend Stirling's settler
convention.^
A couple of months after the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister had
extracted himself from Stirling's scheme, a third attempt to produce
-88-
a greater federation began. Leading members of the Kenyan settler
establishment sought Welensky's support for Kenya, and possibly
Tanganyika as well, to join the proposed central Africa Federation.
Welensky outlined his position on the proposed union most clearly
in a letter to Havelock of 6 June 1952.
I told Blundell last year that my view was that it
was necessary for the Europeans in Kenya to maintain
the status guo until we had achieved Central African
Federation. Once we have achieved that and have the
status of a near Dominion it will be much easier for
us to help the British Colonies adjoining. I men¬
tion this to you because I do think that any changes
that may be possible in your part of the world
should be made bearing in mind the fact that at
some not too distant time in the future there is
the possibility of a link-up with us. I think I
must also try and impress on you that for the
present it would not help our cause here in Central
Africa to suggest we are likely to link up with East
Africa. This is due to a fairly strong element in
Southern Rhodesia who fear the possibility of Asiatic
immigration from East Africa into the Rhodesias.^
The British Government was also strongly of the opinion that any
serious canvassing of the idea of a link up between central and east
Africa should be avoided as it would endanger the chances of
successfully achieving central African Federation, by sowing con¬
fusion and creating the impression that Federation was the first
step in a larger strategy to invest control of the whole of British
15
east and central Africa in the hands of the white settlers. The
British Government may not have intended this larger strategy but
some at least of the white settlers most certainly did, as Welensky's
letter to Havelock, above, indicated.
After the Southern Rhodesian referendum the establishment of a
Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland seemed to be guaranteed
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and, in the strategy, the Kenyan settler leaders had agreed with
Welensky, the next step was to press for the formation of a
greater federation of east and central Africa. Havelock and
Welensky had decided that the best plan was for Kenya to maintain a
loose east African Association, allowing Kenya and Tanganyika, but
not Uganda, to be incorporated into the central African Federation
at the earliest possible opportunity after its formation. Welensky
was, moreover, going to investigate with the British Government the
possibilities of the Federation, once it was constituted, assuming
16
the Trusteeship of Tanganyika from the United Kingdom. However,
in duly 1953, Havelock heard from Blundell and Ward, who had met
with Welensky in London a few weeks earlier, that he now favoured
the formation of an east African Federation which would be able to
unite with the central African Federation at a later date.
Havelock remained committed to the earlier plan and claimed that
Baring fully supported his proposal that the settler leaders of east
and central Africa should launch a co-ordinated campaign for the
17
establishment of a five nation federation. In contrast Huggins
had informed Blundell that he believed that it would be a decade
18
before the Federation would be in a position to expand northwards.
Welensky's change of approach to the attainment of a greater
federation seems to have been motivated by the wish to maintain
northward expansion as a realistic option in the face of Huggins'
lack of enthusiasm and the opposition of Southern Rhodesia's white
population to such a move. Indeed, Welensky admitted to Havelock
that he and Huggins disagreed on the issue of moving towards a greater
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federation. Huggins felt that Kenya needed to gain greater
political autonomy from London before union with the central
African Federation could be considered, whereas Welensky recognised
that the stumbling block was white Southern Rhodesian popular
opinion. He saw the early federation of Kenya and Tanganyika as
a means of preventing the British Government from increasing
African representation in those two territories to such an extent
that union with the central African Federation would become an
anathema to white Southern Rhodesians.
Although Welensky was, by August 1953, convinced of the need to
consolidate the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland before
looking to add Kenya and Tanganyika, he remained committed to
such expansion as a desirable objective. Welensky recognised that
there was no possibility of closer association with east Africa
at that point in time, given the fears generated by the Mau Mau
disturbances and Southern Rhodesian concern over the size of
Kenya's and Tanganyika's Indian populations. Nonetheless, while
Welensky recognised that future moves towards closer association
with Kenya and Tanganyika would need to be undertaken gradually and
cautiously, he remained convinced of the desirability of such moves,
20
which cannot be said of Huggins.
In the early 1950s as well as the various attempts to initiate moves
towards closer association with the central African territories'
northern neighbours, there occurred a determined effort to bring
Bechuanaland into the proposed Federation. Before examining this
development we must consider briefly some of the more extravagant
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plans for a greater federation that were mooted in all seriousness
during this period. It should be borne in mind that the main
motivation for these proposals was to ensure that the sought-after
central African Federation would be strong enough to maintain its
independence from South Africa and, if possible, have the potential
to rival the Union as a regional power.
In early 1952, the Southern Rhodesian Joint National Council (JNC)
led by F Gordon Harper and A C Soffe sought Welensky's support in
their attempt to persuade the Trusteeship Committee of the UNO to
agree to the incorporation of the northern portions of South West
Africa and Bechuanaland into the proposed central African Federa-
21
tion. Welensky supported Harper and Soffe's desire to secure a
seaport for the proposed federation and extend its borders south¬
wards, acguisitions that the JNC had been campaigning for since at
22
least 1950. Moreover, although Welensky was prepared to
encourage them in their attempt albeit unofficially, he was also
very aware of the immense difficulties facing the JNC in their
pursuit of this goal. Not least of these problems was the lack of
23
Huggins' support. The combined opposition of the British, South
African and Southern Rhodesian Governments ensured that the JNCs cam¬
paign was abandoned almost before it got started, despite support
from other influential figures in Northern Rhodesia.^
In retrospect such grandiose schemes may appear slightly farcical but
at the time they were contemplated in all seriousness and not just by
white settlers. In June 1952, Frederick Crawford, who went on to
become the Governor of Uganda, wrote to Welensky setting out his
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thoughts on the whole issue of creating a federation in central
25
Africa to act as a counterbalance to the Union. Whilst Crawford's
views may not have been representative of other senior figures in
the Colonial Service, they do show that even as late as 1952, the
idea of redistributing the territorial boundaries and authority for
governing huge chunks of Africa was very much alive.
In his letter, Crawford informed Welensky of his conviction that
if a central African Federation failed to emerge then South Africa
would eventually absorb the Rhodesias. Crawford advocated the
creation of a greater federation consisting of not only the Rhodesias,
Nyasaland and Bechuanaland but also the other two High Commission
territories, Natal and either the southern section of Mozambigue or
the northern section of South West Africa. His justification for
such a large federation was opposition to what he saw as the
Government's policy of appeasement towards South Africa and fear
of Afrikaner expansion, as his advice to Welensky - that all
Afrikaners in the Rhodesias be expelled - reveals. The notion that
Natal might secede from the Union of South Africa and join a central
African Federation was a realistic possibility. Throughout 1952,
sections of the white, English speaking population of Natal were pre¬
paring the ground for a possible break with the Union and receiving
26
strong support from the state's United Party. Be that as it may,
neither Crawford's nor the JNCs initiatives came to anything. However,
the interesting point is that the two proposals were made at all,
and were taken seriously by some of the individuals and governments
central to establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland .
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Indeed, as we shall see, Welensky was prepared to pursue the idea of
incorporating Bechuanaland and the northern part of South West
Africa on his own initiative only one year later.
One aspect of the JNCs and Crawford's suggestions that was pursued
with some vigour in the lead up to the creation of a central African
Federation was the proposed incorporation of Bechuanaland. During
1951, Whitehead and Welensky had voiced their support for the
incorporation of either the whole of Bechuanaland or its northern
27
part into a central African Federation. Then, in duly 1952,
L S Glover of the Bechuanaland European Advisory Council approached
Welensky with proposals for Bechuanaland's entry into the soon to be
28
created Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Welensky's response
was enthusiastic and, while making it clear to Glover that Huggins
was not in a position to reply formally to his approach, Welensky
did attempt to get the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister involved
in an indirect and unofficial dialogue with Glover on the issue of
29
Bechuanaland's incorporation. In response Huggins adopted the
attitude that while Bechuanaland's inclusion would be welcome his and
Welensky's efforts should be concentrated on obtaining the three
territory federation on offer; to attempt to include Bechuanaland
at this late stage would only complicate matters.Huggins felt,
moreover, that Bechuanaland would inevitably eventually join a
successful federation rather than be incorporated by South Africa
but, initially at least, all the Federation's resources would be
fully allocated in developing Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and
so would be unable to cope with a third under-developed territory.
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Given Huggins' response, Welensky could do no more than encourage
Glover to attempt to build support within Bechuanaland for incor¬
poration into the Federation and await the opportunity to re-open
discussion of the issue with the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister.
In the meantime Welensky maintained a regular correspondence with
Glover in order to be kept abreast of developments. In October 1952,
Glover informed Welensky that Bathoen II, OBE, Chief of the
Banwaketse was keen that Bechuanaland be incorporated into the central
African Federation provided the High Commission Territory's
individual identity could be preserved within the Federal State.
Moreover, Glover believed that Bathoen II could convince Tshekedi
Khama of the advantages of entering the Federation and emphasised
to Welensky the benefits that would accrue to the British supporters
of Federation in presenting their case if Bechuanaland's African
Chiefs came out in favour of entering the central African Federation.^
Welensky was not slow to inform Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of
State for Commonwealth Relations, about the contents of Glover's
32
letter. The following month he received more good news when
Glover informed him that Bechuanaland's European Advisory Council
had voted 7 - 1 in favour of the motion:
That Council consider the Draft Federation Scheme
relative to the proposed Federation of the Rhodesias
and Nyasaland and that action be taken to explore the
advisability and opportunity for the Bechuanaland
Protectorate to become a Member State within the
Federation.33
Initially the intention had been to place the motion agreed at
the European Advisory Council before Bechuanaland's Joint Advisory
Council, but as there was not another meeting of this Council
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scheduled until May 1953, Glover decided in March to send the
motion directly to the High Commissioner. In the same month
Glover informed Welensky that one of the repercussions of the
Bamangwato affair was that Bathoen II was not now prepared to
publicly support Bechuanaland joining the central African Federation
without the support of Tshekedi Khama, support which was not as yet
forthcoming."^
Towards the end of duly 1953, Glover made a revised proposal to
Welensky in which Bechuanaland and South West Africa would be
divided between South Africa and the Federation along the twenty-
first parallel?"' As Glover explained to Welensky, the proposal
should be attractive to the Union as they would be gaining a large
portion of Bechuanaland and giving up only a small section of South
West Africa, while the Federation would be gaining the all-impor¬
tant seaport it required. The difficulty would be in obtaining
the British Government's consent. Welensky was hopeful that
agreement could be reached along the lines outlined by Glover.^
The following month he wrote to Huggins in an attempt to convince
the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister of the need to begin
negotiations."^
38
Huggins' initial response was non-committal, but it soon became
clear that he was opposed to taking any sort of initiative over
39
Bechuanaland or in pursuit of a seaport for Federation. The
Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was loath to offend Malan and now
believed that Southern Rhodesia's white opposition would oppose the
addition of another overwhelmingly 'native state' to the Federation.
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Huggins was content to let the matter rest until such time as the
United Kingdom Government proposed to allow part of Bechuanaland
to be incorporated into South Africa, at which time the central
African Federation would absorb the northern area of the High
Commission Territory, an area to which Southern Rhodesia had staked
a claim.
Huggins' position was uneguivocable, but on being informed that not
only was Bathoen II in favoir of Bechuanaland entering the central
African Federation but also most of the territory's other African
Chiefs, Welensky determined to make one last attempt to gain
40
Huggins1 support for the Federal Government to take the initiative.
In January 1954, Welensky wrote to Huggins arguing in favour of
vigourously pursuing Glover's proposals on Bechuanaland and South
West Africa and requesting a meeting with the Southern Rhodesian
41
Prime Minister at which he could expand his arguments. At this
meeting Welensky managed to persuade Huggins to meet with Glover to
discuss his proposals further.^ However, before such a meeting
could be arranged Bechuanaland's Resident Commissioner forcefully
rejected any suggestion that all or part of the territory would be
allowed to merge with the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland
and thus enabled Huggins to reject Welensky's overtures and return
to his position of wait and see.^
One can only speculate as to why Welensky was repeatedly more open
to the suggestions for the expansion of the proposed central African
Federation to include additional territories to the north or south,
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but one factor influencing his approach may well have been that
the larger the Federation the more difficult it would be for




Huggins and Welensky diverge over
the form of Closer Association
An important change in central Africa produced by the second world
war was the establishment of the Central African Council. This
Council's actions and relationships with the governments of the three
Territories were of prime importance in generating and shaping the
moves towards federation during the immediate post-war period.
The Central African Council and Nyasaland
By the middle of 1946 considerable differences existed between the
Governor of Nyasaland, Sir Edmund Richards, and the Chief Secretary
of the Central African Council (CAC), W A W Clark. Richards
remained convinced that Nyasaland should be linked with east Africa
and prevented from joining any attempts at closer association in
1
central Africa. He viewed with disquiet Clark's attempts from
November 1945 onwards to establish a unified Central African
European Education Department, arguing that such a move would be
"an irrevocable step in the direction of amalgamation, which has
been completely ruled out as impracticable by the British govern-
2
ment" whilst the African populations remain opposed. Although
Clark countered with the argument that the east African example
had shown that the unification of a few departments did not result
in amalgamation, but merely closer co-operation, Richards strongly
maintained his position, strengthened by the knowledge that Clark
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was seeking a unified European Education Department at the behest
of Roy Welensky and Gore-Browne.
Differences between the Nyasaland Government and the CAC were not
confined to European education alone. A further cause of friction
was the different interpretations placed upon the term 'joint
services'. The Nyasaland Government understood 'joint services'
to be where the department of one territory provided the service
for all three with the costs split among them or where a public
utility was administered by a joint body on behalf of all three
territories. Clark and the Northern and Southern Rhodesian
Governments regarded 'joint services' as being the formation of
unitary departments to cover all three territories."^ Clark's
frustration with the Nyasaland Government's obstructionist attitude
4
towards the CAC was shared by the Governor of Southern Rhodesia,
Sir Campbell Tait."' Sir John Waddington, Governor of Northern
Rhodesia, backed Clark's position and gained the support of A B Cohen
(later Sir Andrew) at the Colonial Office.^ Cohen argued
vigourously and convincingly within the Colonial Office for
Nyasaland to be instructed to co-operate with the CAC and for full
backing to be given to this "essay in regionalism".^ Indeed, so
eager was Cohen for closer co-operation to be achieved in central
Africa, that when Richards accused Clark and others of using the CAC
g
as a vehicle for amalgamation, he ignored the evidence of Clark's
9
own memorandum in categorically dismissing the claim. Cohen
rejected Richards' accusation, not because it was false, but because
he feared that to admit its validity would undermine the position of
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the CAC to the extent that the whole policy of regional co-operation
in central Africa would come under threat.
Sir Eric Machtig and Sir George Cater, Permanent Under-Secretaries
at the Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Offices respectively,
accepted Cohen's proposed course of action in instructing Richards
to co-operate, but tacitly accepted the truth of the Nyasaland
Governor's claim when spelling out imperial policy for central Africa
to Clark. Machtig went to some pains to emphasise to Clark that
joint services were not a step towards amalgamation but an integral
part of Britain's policy of working for closer co-ordination which
had been adopted as "a workable alternative to amalgamation" since,
in accordance with the 1944 declaration "amalgamation is not prac-
10
ticable under existing circumstances". Gater, in instructing
Richards to co-operate over joint services, also made an attempt to
convince the Nyasaland Governor that his present attitude only
served to enhance the prospects of the very thing he opposed: "Unless
we are prepared to make a real working success of the CAC the forces
which are working towards amalgamation will only be strengthened.
Hence the importance of showing on our side a wholehearted willing¬
ness to make the policy of co-ordination a successful one in
practice". Aware that Machtig had brought Clark into line, Gater
assured Richards that he had misjudged Clark and was wrong in attri-
11
buting pro-amalgamation leanings to the CAC's Chief Secretary.
We must immediately ask why Clark was striving to foster moves
towards amalgamation, in direct contradiction of Imperial Government
policy, until brusquely reminded of that policy. More importantly,
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why was Cohen so determined to support closer association in
central Africa that he attempted to mislead his superiors as to
Clark's attitude?
Clark was convinced that only by a policy whereby the United
Kingdom consciously sought amalgamation - with due provision for
safeguarding African rights and interests - would Imperial aims in
central Africa conform "with the evolution of the Commonwealth and
Empire to date, and with the policy which is being pursued by the
UK government today in other parts of the colonial Empire."
In Clark's view, the Secretary of State's statement of 18 October
1944 supported moves towards closer association in central Africa
and unless such moves were seen to be being vigourously pursued
by Britain and its representatives in central Africa, then the
government and people of Southern Rhodesia would become disillusioned.
If that occurred then the reversal of the Southern Rhodesian negative
attitude regarding federation with the Union of South Africa would
12
become a real possibility. Clark may also have been persuaded
that his policy was in sympathy with the views of the Secretary of
13
State at the Dominions Office, Viscount Addison.
Moreover, the fear of Southern Rhodesia turning away from the
liberal North and towards South Africa was central to Cohen's
response to the controversy over joint services. Cohen emphasised
the economic benefits closer association would accord the territories
and argued that Northern Rhodesia's unofficial colour bar would
never be successfully eradicated until such times as Southern Rhodesia
removed this feature in its economy. By introducing joint services
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for subjects such as European Education, Customs and Posts and
Telegraphs, Cohen argued that there was every chance of Southern
Rhodesia becoming convinced of the advantages of Nyasaland's
liberal attitude towards employing Africans and no real danger of
Southern Rhodesian social custom spreading to Nyasaland. In this
manner Southern Rhodesia would, hopefully, begin to question its
colour bar and the Colonial Office could endeavour to encourage this
tendency, albeit by indirect means. Cohen's final point was that
the growth of a liberalising attitude in Southern Rhodesia would
benefit Sir Godfrey Huggins, as opposed to the Liberal party which
14
had been heavily backed by the Afrikaner vote at the recent election.
It is worth noting that almost identical arguments were used to
promote a limited form of federation after the CAC had been irreparably
undermined in 1949-50.
Any continuing ambiguity regarding Nyasaland's attitude towards the
CAC was apparently dispelled when Sir Geoffrey Colby succeeded
Richards in 1948. Certainly, Colby was far more positive towards the
CAC than his predecessor had been, yet his support was not based on
a belief in closer co-ordination in central Africa, but rather on
the acceptance of Gater's argument to Richards that any other
approach would only serve to strengthen the demands for amalgamation.
Colby firmly believed that Nyasaland's best interests would be
served by closer association with east Africa and Tanganyika in
particular. In accepting the need to support the CAC to frustrate
efforts aimed at political integration, Colby did not lose sight of
this, his ultimate hope for Nyasaland.
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Cohen was concerned enough by Colby's attitude to try to persuade
Creech Jones to discourage strongly the Nyasaland Governor from
this viewpoint during the Secretary of State's visit to Nyasaland
15
in April 1949. If such a reprimand was delivered, it evidently
failed to deter Colby from continuing to argue the merits of an
16
east African linkage. In maintaining this stance against the
united opposition of the Colonial Office in London, Colby was
bolstered by the open support he received from his senior Colonial
17
Service officers in Nyasaland, not so much for his east African
aspirations as for his view of Southern Rhodesian designs, which in
turn strengthened his will to seek to avoid Southern Rhodesian
domination, by linking with the North. Colby and Cecil Barker,
Nyasaland's Northern Provincial Commissioner, regarded Southern
Rhodesia as only interested in Nyasaland as a cheap labour pool
and believed that there was every likelihood of both the Rhodesias
18
being submerged into the Union. This was yet another argument,
in Colby's view, for Nyasaland to link with east Africa rather than
the Rhodesias. It is interesting to note that one of the arguments
used by Cohen in attacking Colby's hopes of an east African link up
was "the extreme importance of Nyasaland labour to Central
19
Africa".
As has been shown, Richards and Nyasaland were unco-operative over
CAC from its inception and strongly opposed to what they saw as
the underlying purpose of the Council, namely the promotion of
amalgamation. Richard's successor, Colby, whilst supporting the
Council, did so only as a means of frustrating moves for amalgamation
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and, like Richards, would have preferred Nyasaland to break from
central Africa and be more closely linked with Tanganyika and east
Africa. The British Government's enthusiasm for the CAC was
founded more on expediency than principle. Clark, the Council's
first Chief Secretary actively sought to use its mechanism as a means
to fostering moves towards amalgamation. Indeed, the CACs only real
support came from succeeding Governors of Northern Rhodesia, Sir
20
John Waddington and Sir Gilbert Rennie. They endorsed its
stated aims of promoting co-operation on economic matters and
technical and administrative services whilst not threatening the
three territories' political separateness, although others may have
tried to use it for this purpose. Huggins and the Southern
Rhodesian Government had been disappointed that all that was forth¬
coming in 1944 was the CAC. Nevertheless, it was accepted as being
better than nothing and as a small step towards amalgamation.
Moreover, Huggins had seen immediately that the Council could be used
to push for amalgamation, but, if progress were not forthcoming, this
very lack of movement could be used as an argument for something
21
more concrete to replace it. The CAC was therefore viewed in
different ways as a vehicle for promoting amalgamation, a means of
preventing amalgamation, and a mechanism for delaying any decision
over closer association in central Africa. Only within the Northern
Rhodesian administration was it regarded as being an end in
itself.
Having persuaded Welensky not to reject the CAC out of hand, but
22
instead to use it as a means of pushing for amalgamation, Huggins
was undermined in this strategy by the results of the 1946 Southern
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Rhodesian General Elections. Even during the election campaign
the United Party tended to play down their commitment to amalgamation
because of its lack of appeal in the country,^ although Huggins
25continued to campaign forcefully in favour. The large gains won
by the Liberal Party on a ticket strongly opposed to any links with
the 'black north', served to strengthen the tendency in the minority
United Party Government to avoid the amalgamation issue altogether,
if possible. Huggins' government, dependent on the Rhodesia Labour
Party for a majority in the Legislature, retained amalgamation as a
stated policy, but in practice did nothing and sought to postpone or
deflect debates, demanded by the Liberal Party, proposing immediate
Dominion status for Southern Rhodesia as an alternative to amalgamation.
As a conseguence Welensky experienced a very frustrating two years
in which not only would no initiatives on amalgamation be forthcoming
from Southern Rhodesia, but his own attempts in that direction
regularly failed to even gain a response from Huggins' government.
Welensky's Efforts to keep alive the Campaign for Amalgamation
Welensky has expected the Southern Rhodesian election result to lead
27
to a weakening of Southern Rhodesia's commitment to the CAC, but
their refusal to face the amalgamation issue, placed the responsibility
of maintaining pressure on the Imperial and Colonial Governments for
closer association squarely at his door. The extent to which the
Southern Rhodesian Government had abandoned the pursuit of amalgama¬
tion was clearly revealed in December 1946. In that month Welensky
proposed a conference of Southern and Northern Rhodesian parliamen¬
tarians to be convened by Creech Jones and called on the Southern
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Rhodesian Government to state its position on amalgamation in
27
order to help convince the British Government. The lack of
response from Southern Rhodesian official circles was total.
As we have already seen, Welensky had been seeking to pressurise
the Northern Rhodesian Government over the amalgamation issue since
28
early in 1941. From 1944 he had been presenting proposals for
amalgamation in the Legislative Council as freguently as standing
orders allowed: about every six months. His primary intention in
so doing was to force the territory's government to drop its
blocking device of referring each proposal to the Bledisloe
Commission Report and the statement of 18 October 1944, and force it
into either definitely accepting or clearly rejecting the principle
of amalgamation. In this attempt, the wording of his proposal
presented in October 1946 was particularly perceptive.
Welensky's motion read:
"That it is in the best interests of both
Europeans and Africans that the territories of
Northern and Southern Rhodesia should be amal-
29
gamated as soon as it is reasonably practicable."
This skilfully worded motion presented the Northern Rhodesian
Government with the dilemma that the use of the usual method to
neutralise the proposal could be widely perceived as a rejection
of the desirability of amalgamation, a view that Welensky would be
sure to emphasise and seek to capitalise. Not only would such a
position be very unpopular amongst the Europeans in Northern Rhodesia,
it would also be a departure from previous statements which had
tended to support amalgamation in principle, whilst accepting its
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impracticality under existing circumstances. Yet, to accept
Welensky's statement would be in direct conflict with the Colonial
Office policy for central Africa of supporting closer association
short of amalgamation or federation. Although the Colonial Office
had taken care to avoid publicly stating its policy, it had,
nevertheless, definitely determined to reject amalgamation, as
31
Welensky knew well.
Welensky's other purposes behind his motion were twofold. He sought
to force the territorial government to open up the crucial and
highly charged question of 'native' policy and to examine any
differences between the two Rhodesias' policies towards the Africans.
Such an examination would be highly embarrassing to both the
Northern Rhodesian and British Governments, containing, as it must,
implicit criticisms at least, of Southern Rhodesia's 'native' policy
and highlighting differences between the theory and practice of
Northern Rhodesia's 'native' policy. However, as both Bledisloe
and the official statement of October 1944 advocated, the indefinite
delay of amalgamation due to differences in 'native' policy between
the Rhodesias, only by forcing the British and Northern Rhodesian
Governments to face and re-examine the issue could Welensky hope to
resurrect the feasibility of amalgamation.
The other intention of the motion was to enable the Unofficials
representing African interests in the Legislative Council to support
it in good faith. By avoiding actually proposing amalgamation, but
only seeking agreement that it was in the best interests of both
African and European, Welensky hoped to succeed whereto had failed
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in the past and gain the support of Gore-Browne, Mrs Hay and Dr
32
Fisher, the Bishop of Northern Rhodesia. Indeed, so keen was
Welensky to gain their support, Gore-Browne's in particular, that he
temporarily altered the wording of the motion to accommodate their
33
views.
When Welensky's motion was actually debated in Northern Rhodesia's
Legislative Council, on 11 December 1946, its rejection signalled
defeat for his three hopes. The Unofficial representatives for
African interests failed to support it and the territorial govern¬
ment stonewalled effectively to avoid both raising the 'native'
policy question and giving the impression that they were rejecting
the principle of amalgamation."^ The territorial government
achieved this result by continuously referring Welensky to the
Bledisloe Commission Report, paragraphs 478-479, and adopting the
position that no judgment could be made on the divergent 'native'
policies of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, because it was too soon
to be certain how they would develop and which one would, ultimately,
prove to be in the African's best interests. The government main¬
tained that, until the trends in the differing 'native' policies
became clear and all doubts as to their consequences were removed,
amalgamation could not be contemplated."^
This setback, closely following Southern Rhodesia's lack of response
over the amalgamation issue, does not appear to have dented Welensky's
resolve to continue to campaign for the union of central Africa.
Indeed, he took measures to intensify his efforts. After being
elected as Gore-Browne's successor as leader of Northern Rhodesia's
Unofficials, on 18 November,Welensky resigned from the Executive
-109-
Council on 21 December in order to disassociate himself from the
administration and its decisions and to free himself to lead the
Unofficials in the Legislative Council more vigourously as an
effective opposition to the government.^ The effect of Welensky's
resignation was tempered by the other two Unofficials, Gore-Browne
and Page, retaining their places on the Executive Council. Neverthe¬
less, Welensky continued to press for amalgamation in and out of
the Legislative Council.
In April 1947, Welensky made another attempt to involve the Southern
Rhodesian administration over amalgamation by demanding that it
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state its official position on the issue. No response was forth¬
coming and it was the Liberal Party that finally forced Huggins to
break his silence, in May. Stumbles claimed that the CAC was outwith
Southern Rhodesia's control, too expensive and moving towards amal¬
gamation. Denying all three charges Huggins replied that it was
ridiculous to claim that the CAC was promoting amalgamation as its
only member, apart from himself, to support that policy, was
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Welensky. Huggins' analysis of the views of the members of the
CAC may have been accurate,^ but Clark, the Chief Secretary, had
continued to foster amalgamation through the Council as best he
could, despite the clear instructions from London to desist. In
January 1947, Clark had claimed that the CAC was making small, but
nevertheless, significant advances towards the implementation of
amalgamation and eventual Dominion status and he established a




Although the Southern Rhodesian Government remained passive
Clark's leadership of the CAC was not the only support Welensky
was receiving on the question of amalgamation. The abdication of
the government from involvement in any move towards amalgamation,
from late 1945 onwards, was not accompanied by a similar withdrawal
by Southern Rhodesian business and press. Within business circles
support remained high for the United Party's election programme of
the progressive attainment of central African union, Dominion status
and closer co-operation with central Africa's neighbours, leading
eventually to a greater federation or United States of Africa.^
The Rhodesia Herald and The Bulawayo Chronicle frequently filled
the void, caused by the administration's silence, warmly endorsing
Welensky's calls for amalgamation and aqitating for Southern Rhodesia
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to re-enter the closer association lists. Nevertheless, without
the clear support of the Southern Rhodesian Government for amalgama¬
tion Welensky's arguments were weakened and he was inhibited from
pressing the issue to a confrontation resulting in opposition to, and
non-co-operation with, the Northern Rhodesian Government.
Frustration with the Southern Rhodesian attitude caused Welensky to
consider more indirect ways of promoting amalgamation and possible
methods of circumventing Southern Rhodesia's official indifference,
by appealing directly to its electorate. In June 1947 Welensky
seriously considered touring Southern Rhodesia with Beckett in order
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to make amalgamation a live issue again in the territory. Having
rejected this option on the grounds that resentment in outside inter¬
ference in Southern Rhodesia's internal affairs would be likely to
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outweigh any support for amalgamation produced by the campaign,
Welensky turned his attention elsewhere. He proposed the amalgama¬
tion of Northern Rhodesia with Nyasaland, apparently as a first
step towards the complete unification of central Africa, although
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he avoided presenting it as such. Colby certainly had no doubts
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as to what Welensky's motives were. There can be no doubt that
this was a serious attempt by Welensky to unite the Northern terri¬
tories, as his insistence that the proposal be forwarded to the
Secretary of State indicates. The Northern Rhodesian administration
had successfully stalled over the issue, but nevertheless Welensky
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was demanding a response by May 1949.
In addition to his moves towards union with Nyasaland, Welensky
was, from late 1947, pressing for constitutional advances towards
responsible government in Northern Rhodesia. In January 1948, he
stepped up his campaign, demanding that if there were no moves
towards amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia then progress towards
responsible government would have to be forthcoming. His efforts
were boosted by the support of Gore-Browne who argued that African
rights were adequately safe-guarded under the Unofficials' proposals.
The Unofficials were enraged by Thornton's claim in response, that
these proposals for responsible government could be seen as the
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forerunner of amalgamation. Although Gore-Browne categorically
denied Thornton's claim - which was repeatedly attacked for having
destroyed any chance of African support for the constitutional
proposals through his linking them with amalgamation"^ - Colby used
the fact that representative government was being sought and the
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uncertainty over its outcome and effect on Southern Rhodesia's
attitude towards amalgamation, to reject any consideration of
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Nyasaland amalgamating with Northern Rhodesia. There is some
justification for Thornton and Colby's view, as Welensky, Beckett
and other Unofficials tended to present their demands for the amal¬
gamation of central Africa and their proposals for responsible
government as, at best, complementary and, at worst, dependent on
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one another.
Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials'pressure for responsible government
coincided with two separateattempts to form committees in Southern
Rhodesia to press for amalgamation. Stanley Cooke under the auspices
of the Southern Rhodesian Goodwill Mission held an exploratory
meeting in Bulawayo early in February and Captain F E Harris met
with Welensky and Beckett in Lusaka later in the month to discuss
a similar idea."^ Colonel David Stirling's Salisbury-based Federal
Union Capricorn Africa was already in existence and had been since
July 1947, but the emphasis of its campaigning was for a United
States of Africa, rather than concentrating on the Union of central
Africa as a first step.
There is evidence to suggest that Huggins was at least supportive of
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Harris' initiative and even sponsored the idea of his Lusaka visit.
That Welensky and Gore-Browne released their responsible government
proposals immediately after Harris' visit indicates that their pur¬
pose was not confined to settler advance in Northern Rhodesia, but
also to encourage Southern Rhodesia to look more favourably on union
with the north. Harris had only recently retired from politics after
-113-
surviving for twelve years as Minister for Agriculture in Huggins'
government and was regarded as something of an elder statesman
within Southern Rhodesia. With the support of Huggins and Welensky,
the United Central Africa Association was formed at two meetings
in Bulawayo on 12 and 31 March 1948. Harris was elected President
and the committee consisted of Stanely Cooke, R F Halsted (Food
Controller for Southern Rhodesia), Colonel C M Newman, A C Thornton,
and A M Bentley (Chairman of Rhodesia Stock Exchange).The
organisation was to be non-party political and so, although both
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David Young and G A Davenport had supported the association's
establishment and spoken up publicly in favour of amalgamation,
neither was on its central committee.
Federation Supplants Amalgamation as the favoured means of
closer Association
The next event of any significance affecting the amalgamation issue
occurred not in central Africa, but in South Africa. As has already
been demonstrated, South Africa and British Imperial policy towards
the Union, were a constant and over-riding factor influencing
support for closer association in central Africa. Smuts' defeat
in the South African general elections of 26 May 1948 and the forma¬
tion of a Nationalist-Afrikaner government by David F Malan on the
3 June produced dramatic changes in central Africa and London.
Welensky's immediate response to the news was that it served to
underline the need for the creation of a counterbalance to South
Africa, a united central Africa, but that if such unity was not
forthcoming then this new Afrikaner threat would bring Northern
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Rhodesia's union with east Africa into consideration. Although
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Welensky had long favoured the principle of closer association with
east Africa he felt that the geographical and communications diffi-
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culties made it impracticable. It is possible that the emergence
of an Afrikaner South Africa persuaded him to re-examine the
feasibility of links with east Africa, but even if this was the case,
Welensky's main consideration in raising this alternative possibility
would have been to apply pressure and gain leverage on the Southern
Rhodesian and British Governments over amalgamation for central Africa.
This is not to say that Welensky did not take the danger of the
Rhodesias being absorbed into an Afrikaner-ruled Union seriously. He
did, but he was very aware that others would have taken it just as
seriously and view the possibility with even more antipathy. More¬
over, given an Afrikaner Union to the south, Britain might concede
in central Africa what Welensky's consistent pressure, since the
early forties, had failed to achieve: closer political associa¬
tion.
Apprehension over Afrikaner immigration as much as the acceptance of
George Hall and Stanley Oliver's unequivocable opinions of 1946,^
persuaded Welensky to drop demands for amalgamation in favour of
federation. Another determining factor may well have been H Nigel
Parry's conviction that, whereas the United Kingdom would never
agree to amalagarnation it might well consider federation. After
discussions between Welensky and representatives from the UCAA early
in June, it was announced that federation, rather than amalgamation,
was the association's goal. It was explained that this change in
policy was intended to allay African fears and convince any observer
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that African interests would be adequately safeguarded. The
other, unstated, reason was that it would enable Welensky to point
to support for federation in Southern Rhodesia when he pressed the
case for it, rather than amalgamation, to Creech Jones in London in
late July. Although aware that official talks on closer association
were not possible, as only Northern Rhodesian representatives would
be in London, Welensky had requested, through Rennie, that a frank
exchange of views take place^ and the Colonial Office had agreed
4- i-u- 64to this.
As a result of this activity Sir Thomas Lloyd^ was confidently
expecting Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials to change their demands
from amalgamation to federation before long.^ The Colonial and
Commonwealth Relations Offices were also being informed by Parry
that the CAC had achieved about as much as it could. This refrain,
that the CAC had outlasted its usefulness, was one that was to be
increasingly heard within Southern Rhodesia from late 1948 onwards.^
For that reason it is worth noting that the main factor that convinced
Parry that the Council had gone as far as it would, was Huggins'
deliberate determination to curtail the Council and prevent it from
achieving any clear success. When it is noted that by the time of
the CACs formation, Huggins had already mapped out a scenario, which
the Council's failure would strengthen the weight of argument for
amalgamation, Parry's conviction appears to have been accurate.
Parry, therefore, believed Huggins would prevent the CAC from
succeeding and was sure that Britain would never agree to amalgama¬
tion and, as a result, he began to push the idea of a federation.
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In a memorandum circulated to members of the CAC on 12 July 1948,
Parry strongly advocated the case for the early federation of
central Africa with the longer term possibility of linking with
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east Africa. As a result Parry received a reprimand from Lambert
for presenting proposals when this was not part of his remit.
Within a few weeks, however, Lambert was forced to admit that the
United Kingdom was seriously considering the idea of federation.
The main reason for this change in official policy was that the new
support within central Africa for the idea of federation had been
seized by Cohen as a possible means of resolving the United Kingdom's
long-standing hopes for central Africa and fears of South African
advance.
Cohen had felt for some time that federation should be Britain's
ultimate goal for central Africa, but had taken the line that this
could only occur once the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia
had developed enough politically to play an effective role in the
federation structure. This position was almost certainly strengthened
by the hope that African opposition to any form of closer association
with Southern Rhodesia would decline with time. The change of atti¬
tude by Welensky and the UCAA, along with Parry's analysis of the
limitations of the CAC, accompanied by supporting arguments for the
alternative of federation, encouraged Cohen to advocate that the
United Kingdom Government take the initiative in moving towards
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federation. The recently-established East African High Commission
was the obvious model for central African federation.^ At this
stage, Cohen was less concerned about possible schemes than with
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establishing federation as the British Government's policy. Clark
supported the early establishment of federation in central Africa
but expressed the concern that this policy might fail to gain public
support in central Africa. Cohen envisaged the main stumbling
block would be in producing a scheme which retained the United
Kingdom Government's ultimate responsibility for Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia, whilst not infringing on Southern Rhodesia's position as
a self-governing colony.^
The issue of federation for central Africa was thoroughly examined
at a meeting between representatives of the Colonial Office and
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Commonwealth Relations Office on 21 July 1948. Lloyd accepted
that the CAC would need to evolve and Cohen pressed hard for an
early move to constitute a federal association "for a limited range
of subjects." Machtig and the CRO however, were far from convinced
by the arguments for federation and pointed out that Southern
Rhodesia's priority was Dominion status, and its political leaders
would be unlikely to consider anything other than an all European
federal association. It was agreed to defer any recommendations until
the matter had been discussed with Huggins when he was in London in
October. It is probable, but not certain, that Gordon Walker discussed
the possibilities of federation with Huggins when he visited Southern
Rhodesia in September 1948.^
Both Colby and Rennie were opposed to raising the issue of feoera-
tion and felt that adequate progress was being made under the CAC
set-up. Apart from African opposition, the reasons they cited in
opposing moves toward federation were, that their territories did not
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have sufficient able people to support both a Legislative Council
and a Federal Assembly, and that their territories were committed
to development programmes on which they wanted to concentrate
without the disruption of new and closer links with the rest of
central Africa.^ So when Welensky presented his arguments for
federation to Creech Jones and the Colonial Office on 30 July 1948,
he received a sympathetic hearing, but only Cohen, of the others
present, was convinced of the need for federation.^ At this meet¬
ing Welensky conceded that amalgamation could no longer be considered
for central Africa. Although arguing strongly in favour of federa¬
tion, he accepted that if Southern Rhodesia were not prepared to
consider it as an alternative there was no point in proceeding with
further discussions on it. The meeting agreed to Rennie's suggestion
that the practical possibilities should be explored in central Africa
prior to any further discussion with London.
Welensky appears to have returned to Broken Hill under the mistaken
belief that Creech Jones accepted the case that the CAC had outlasted
its usefulness.^ Creech Jones did accept that if the CAC had
reached the limit cf its potential then some central authority,
responsible for certain services along East African High Commission
lines, would be reguired. The Secretary of State, however, made it
perfectly plain that he was far from convinced that the Council had,
in fact, achieved everything of which it was capable.^ Whether
this was the result of a genuine misunderstanding or an attempt by
Welensky to intentionally mislead and raise the expectations of
the European community in Northern Rhodesia and so put pressure on
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the British Government, is unclear. However, the exchange of
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telegrams between Lloyd and Rennie after Welensky's claims that
the creation of a British Central African Dominion was imminent, on
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19th August 1948, would seem to support the latter. The fact that
the Northern Rhodesian electors were going to the polls just over one
week later and that a successful trip to London would reflect well
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on Welensky and his supporters, should also be borne in mind.
The Southern Rhodesian elections of 16 September 1948 saw Huggins
and his United Party establish complete dominance, winning in 24 of
the Assembly's 30 seats, on a tide of fear and prejudice against
the emergence of an Afrikaner Nationalist government in South Africa.
Although neither the immediate cause of the election - engineered by
Huggins over a minor defeat on a CAC matter - nor the underlying
reasons for it - primarily problems of sugar production - had any¬
thing to do with the sentiments that won the election for the
%
81
United Party, it was an impressive achievement. Within the
Colonial Office and CRO as a whole, the election results of 1948
in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia served to strengthen the con¬
viction that Huggins' role as a moderate settler leader needed to
be fostered to prevent him losing out, as Smuts had, in the Union,
to a reactionary - white - coalition of urban labour and poor
farmers. Increasingly it was felt that some accommodation of his
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aims for central Africa had become necessary.
Huggins was to be in London in October for the Dominions Prime
Ministers' and Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference and it had been
agreed in July by the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices,
to take the opportunity to hold discussions on federation with him.
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Prior to Huggins' departure different accounts were reaching London
as to his views regarding federation. Cohen and Lambert had held
talks with Welensky - who was in London for the British African
Colonies Conference - who informed them that Huggins now favoured
federation rather than amalgamation and had asked him to arrange
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talks with Creech Jones. Cohen was eager to respond positively
and arrange a meeting between Huggins, Welensky and representa-
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tives from the Colonial Office and CRO. Yet in accepting Welensky's
assurances as to Huggins' change of heart, Cohen appeared to over¬
look the position the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister had actually
been advocating in Africa. Although Huggins did not rule out the
option of federation in his public statement of 19 September and
in his radio broadcast of 2 October, it was all too evident that his
understanding of federation bore little resemblance to Cohen's and
was fairly indistinguishable from amalgamation. Moreover, given
that one of the main arguments used by Cohen in pressing for the
early federation of central Africa was to establish a counterbalance
to the Afrikaner ruled Union, Huggins' post-election victory speech
on 17 September must have been disguieting. An elated Huggins had
stated that he would press, in London, in October, for the union of
the Rhodesias as the first step toward forming a central African
Dominion with Nyasaland and a partnership with South Africa, leading
eventually to a United States of Africa. Although Huggins emphasised,
a couple of days later, that any United States of Africa was in the
distant future, his plans for a united central Africa would appear
to have completely undermined the main reason, in Colonial Office
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eyes, for such a federation. It is inconceivable that Cohen
was unaware of Huggins' utterances. They were disregarded because
Cohen felt they were not Huggins' real views, or that these had
changed since Huggins' arrival in the United Kingdom, or else simply
because they would prove inconvenient in his advocacy of a central
African federation.
Apart from strengthening "Southern Rhodesia's hand in dealing with
the Union", Cohen felt that the other great advantage of a
federation for central Africa would be that it would enable the
Colonial Office to build on the efforts already made by the CAC in
persuading Southern Rhodesia to move toward its position on 'native'
policy. Whilst conceding that Welensky had expressed doubts about
Huggins' and Southern Rhodesia's acceptance, Cohen firmly proposed
that the east African inter-territorial scheme be the model for
central Africa. Lambert and Cohen recommended that the British
Government clearly emphasise to Welensky and Huggins that this
position would be the greatest degree of unity that they would be
prepared to consider and that the specific problems of implementing
the scheme, particularly that of persuading African opinion to
accept it, would have to be resolved by the elected representatives
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in central Africa. Lloyd added his support to the Cohen/Lambert
position, but the proposed discussions between Creech Jones and
Huggins did not occur, because Creech Jones avoided them.
Creech Jones had a great deal of respect for the views and abilities
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of Lloyd and Cohen, as his advancement of their careers showed, yet
88
on this occasion he neglected to follow their recommendations. It
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is difficult to be sure why Creech Jones prevented the proposed talks
from proceeding, but the indications are that he felt the whole
question was being rushed and so resisted Cohen's attempts to
initiate moves towards the early creation of a federation in central
Africa. Certainly the reason he offered to his officials and
Welensky, that as Huggins had failed to raise the matter with him
during their talks at the Commonwealth Conference, he assumed that
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they were not pursuing their reguest for talks, cannot be accepted.
One reason why Creech Jones wanted the whole question re-examined was
that he felt that any counterweight to South Africa should include
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the High Commission Territories. Indeed, in a 'Top Secret' memor¬
andum to his senior officials early in October, Creech Jones con¬
cedes that there is a need for closer association in central Africa,
but that such a grouping should be connected with the South African
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High Commission territories. He ends the memorandum by requesting
suggestions for resolving the inherent problems involved.
After adopting this stance, Creech Jones could not allow early
attempts at federation limited to central Africa to go ahead in
case agreement was reached, rendering the slender chances of High
Commission Territory involvement void. In seeking such a radical
re-organisation of British policy for southern and central Africa,
Creech Jones would have required much more than the support of the
Foreign Secretary, upon which he could normally depend. Moreover,
even if the CRO could be won round - an unlikely prospect - and
Attlee's personal antipathy to the Secretary of State overcome,
Creech Jones was in no position to devote the time and energy
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such an enterprise would have required. It can be argued,
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therefore, that Creech Jones rejected Cohen's initiative over early
moves toward a central African Federation, on East African High
Commission lines, because he saw them as an impossible dream. It
will be seen, however, that impossible dreams could be realised in
central African politics however unlikely they appeared at this
time.
Cohen was disappointed that his proposals for early moves toward
federation had not been accepted. Given that Welensky and the
UCAA had endorsed federation and Huggins had apparently come around
to supporting it as well, Cohen felt that a great opportunity for
achieving a federation, with minimal central political control, had
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been lost. The accuracy of his view is open to debate, but
what cannot be disputed is that Huggins had definitely not rejected
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amalagamation in favour of federation. Political realism moti¬
vated Welensky and the UCAAs adopting of what they openly described
as the second best option, but Huggins was not prepared to drop
amalgamation without a much longer struggle. Welensky may have
thought that the categorical assurances given by Creech Jones and
the Conservative Shadow Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, in
London early in October, to the effect that no British Government,
whether Labour or Conservative, would accept amalgamation, had con-
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vinced Huggins to drop his amalgamation demands. If so, he was
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very rapidly made aware that this was not the case.
With their hoped-for discussions on federation failing to materialise,
Huggins and Welensky decided to take the initiative and announced,
on 27 October, their plans for a conference to be held at the
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Victoria Falls early in the new year. Southern Rhodesian opposition
and Government spokesmen would be invited, as would Unofficial
members of the northern territory's Legislative Council. The aim
of the conference would be to agree on specific proposals for
closer association as the basis of a negotiating position to present
to the British Government. Welensky took some encouragement from
Creech Jones' reiteration of his July position, that the United
Kingdom Government would consider any scheme for closer association
presented to it.
The Secretary of State took the opportunity of his final meeting
with Welensky, late in October, to impress upon him strongly that
no scheme would gain the support of the United Kingdom Government
unless it was evident that it was acceptable to African opinion
in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. As the Secretary of State
had made the same point in July there could be no ambiguity over
the matter. As far as Creech Jones was concerned the lack of
African opposition, if not actual support, was a prereguisite for
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federation. Given the intensity of African suspicion, in the
Northern territories, toward Southern Rhodesia and the attitudes
prevalent amongst the European community there, Welensky would have
been under no illusions as to the difficulties of the task he had
been set. His problems were not eased by Creech Jones instructing
the Governments of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia not to take any
initiatives over federation, but to leave the whole question with
Welensky and the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials and with the
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Southern Rhodesian Government. As a result Hudson, Northern
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Rhodesia's Secretary for Native Affairs, could do no more than
support Welensky and Gore-Browne's calls for Africans to examine
the terms of federation carefully and to emphasise that federation
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was not amalgamation.
Having had his efforts to produce a central African Federation
rebuffed in 1948, Cohen re-commenced his endeavours prior to
Creech Jones' visit to central Africa in April 1949. ^ Within
the Colonial Office the rough proposals for closer association
agreed to at the February 1949 Victoria Falls conference were
considered to be entirely unacceptable. Not only would the
Nyasaland Government rebel at the prospect of such a degree of
subjugation to Southern Rhodesia, it was also recognised that
African opinion in the northern territories, particularly in
Northern Rhodesia, would be exceedingly hostile. Cohen regretted
that his proposals of 12 October 1948 had not been acted on, since,
as the Unofficials conference had not only taken place but had
agreed to a scheme with such a high level of central authority, it
would not prove very much more difficult to obtain agreement on a
scheme with minimal federal control, along the lines of the east
African inter-territorial scheme. Cohen was highly sceptical that
the Southern Rhodesians, in particular, would be satisfied with so
limited a degree of federal control. He argued that closer associa¬
tion in central Africa would only be forthcoming if Britain altered
its present position and took the initiative in producing an accept¬
able scheme.
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Cohen and Lambert proposed that negotiations be started with the
CRO to deduce the extent to which the east African scheme would
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have to be adapted for central Africa. Lloyd agreed that this
would at least provide a suitable starting point for future discussions
with representatives from central Africa. At these inter-office
talks, Creech Jones definitely conceded that the CAC, as it was at
present constituted, was inadeguate. It was accepted that the
agreement on a federal scheme arrived at by the political leaders
of the European communities at the Victoria Falls was unacceptable,
as it virtually surrendered the northern territories' independence
to Southern Rhodesia. Any remaining hopes on Creech Jones' part
for the High Commission Territories involvement in the federal
planning ended when it was decided to avoid, if possible, the
guestion of Bechuanaland, and Southern Rhodesian claims to all, or
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the northern part of it.
As the Colonial Office and CRO were not yet in a position to offer
a definite initiative over federation by the time of Creech Jones'
departure for central Africa, his visit was inevitably going to be
of a primarily fact-finding nature. The line adopted by the
Colonial Secretary was to listen sympathetically but not to commit
the United Kingdom Government to any changes or definite positions.
Nevertheless, in a meeting with Huggins and Welensky, the Secretary
of State informed them that he now accepted that the CAC was
inadeguate. Whilst stipulating that the British Government would
consider any proposals presented to it, it was evident, to Creech
Jones at least, that there was a vast gulf between London and central
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Africa over what federation would entail. The extent of this
difference was almost certainly not equally obvious to the
Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister and Welensky, as Creech Jones
confined himself to expressing concern at aspects of the Victoria
Falls proposals and did not state the narrow limits Britain envisaged
for closer association. Moreover, although the Colonial Secretary
did not give Welensky the assurance he sought that London would not
reject federation proposals simply because of African opposition,
Creech Jones did indicate that "sound proposals" would not be rejected
on the basis of "ignorant or ill-informed opposition". Although the
Secretary of State's actual words committed the British Government
to precisely nothing, the impression they conveyed to Welensky and
Huggins was that if a workable scheme could be agreed upon in central
Africa and enough pressure applied on the United Kingdom Government,
federation would be forthcoming and African opposition could be
safely ignored. The argument that was going to carry most weight
in applying pressure to London was that of the Afrikaner threat
from the Union through immigration into the Rhodesias, and Welensky
made ample use of it during this meeting with the Colonial
Secretary.
The one firm commitment Creech Jones gave during his visit to
central Africa was the old and oft-repeated one that the British
Government would consider any federation proposals presented.
Welensky's and Huggins' difficulty lay in gaining each other's
agreement on such a scheme. At the heart of Welensky's and Huggins'
failure, throughout 1949, to reach agreement on a specific scheme
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for the joining of central Africa was that, whilst Welensky had
accepted that only federation was attainable, Huggins, and his
Cabinet colleagues even more so, were still only really interested
in amalgamation. Announcing the date of the February 1949 Victoria
Falls Conference, after discussions with Huggins on 18 December 1948,
Welensky stated:
"I still believe that the easiest solution would be
amalgamation, but it is no longer possible. The
reasons are the opposition of the United Kingdom
Government and of the Africans, certainly in Northern
Rhodesia and possibly in Nyasaland".105
The Pressure on the United Kingdom Government to produce an
initiative on Closer Association
Huggins' fleeting flirtation with federation in London in October
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had passed before the Victoria Falls Conference. Indeed he had
returned from London convinced, by Creech Jones' avoidance of dis¬
cussions concerning federation, that the British Government had
determined not to negotiate the closer association issue with him.
According to Parry, Huggins was convinced that the alternatives
were early moves towards either a strong unitary federation or
entry into the Union as the fifth province. Not surprisingly, it
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was the former option he pursued. The Southern Rhodesian Prime
Minister's conviction that London was deeply prejudiced against
closer association for central Africa, would eventually convince
him that orthodox negotiations were useless and encourage him to
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pursue more aggressive tactics. However, frustration with the
discussions inside his own Cabinet and the lack of agreement with
Welensky were other contributing factors. The resurrection of the
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amalqamationist cause by the Southern Rhodesian delegation on the
16 and 17 February caused a deal of friction with the northern
representatives, particularly those from Nyasaland, who were feeling
slighted in any case at the lateness of their invitations to the
conference, and because Welensky and Huggins had failed to keep them
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informed during 1948 about talks in London on closer association.
Although the February conference presented a unanimous position in
its report, this was only achieved by omitting areas where
differences remained and by referring other problems to sub-
conferences to be resolved during the year. These disagreements
were not on minor points but rather concerned matters of crucial
importance for any scheme of closer association. Moreover, the degree
of dispute between the various delegations on these topics tended
to be wide rather than narrow. These insuperable problems of trying
to gain agreement for a specific scheme were highlighted by the
conference and its subsequent sub-committee's failure to produce
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actual proposals to present to the United Kingdom Government. The
Colonial Office was, nevertheless, fully cognisant of all the pro¬
ceedings at the Victoria Falls conference as the provincial
Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia's Southern Province, G E Fane-
Smith, who attended the conference as an observer, provided it with
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a copy of the verbatim report.
The tone of the conference was established from the start when
Huggins strongly attacked the northern territories' rejection of
amalgamation because of the opposition of their African inhabitants.
In response Welensky accused Southern Rhodesia of being heavily
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responsible for the lack of success over closer association, with
its virtual abdication from the amalgamation campaign since Bledisloe,
and reiterated his reasons for abandoning amalgamation in favour of
federation. The leader of the Nyasaland delegation, Malcolm P Barrow
(later Sir Malcolm) endorsed Welensky's sentiments and argued for a
very decentralised federal structure, in part at least, because only
through emphasising its differences from amalgamation could the
policy of federation have any chance of being accepted by Nyasaland's
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African population. This basic dispute as to the extent of the
proposed federal authority's powers, was to dog all discussions between
the three territories right up to the creation of the federation and
beyond. Throughout 1949 the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet was to adhere
to a position that favoured a unitary system of government, with no
residuary powers to be held by the territorial governments who
could not appeal to the Secretary of State over the central govern¬
ment, and whose reserve powers would, in any case, have been trans-
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ferred to the federal administration. The northern territories
meanwhile advocated the federal option with the territorial govern¬
ments retaining extensive authority and independence. The arguments
they presented were in response to the reaction of the United Kingdom
Government and their respective African populations, but the Unofficials
in both territories were also well aware that while the European popu¬
lations in the north favoured closer association, the price of
domination by Southern Rhodesia would be considered by many to be
too high.
The failure to make any headway on closer association during 1949
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proved frustrating for many of the leading Unofficials in central
Africa. It was becoming increasingly apparent that an initiative
from the British Government would be reguired to engineer an agree¬
ment. The Europeans of central Africa would not compromise enough
to be able to present proposals to the United Kingdom Government,
so increaingly attempts were made to pressure London into taking
the initiative. Welensky increasingly threatened to launch a
campaign of disruption and non-co-operation with the Northern
Rhodesian Government unless early progress towards the establish¬
ment of federation was evident. Parry warned the Colonial Office
that if federation did not materialise in the near future the
Southern Rhodesian Government would begin to apply economic pressure
on Northern Rhodesia and as a result the CAC would disintegrate.
Parry also confirmed Welensky's stated intent to "paralyse the
government" of Northern Rhodesia over lack of progress on closer
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association.
These claims were not dismissed nor treated lightly in London.
It was recognised that Welensky could engineer the breakdown of
government in Northern Rhodesia because of the important role played
by Unofficials in administering the territory. Such a campaign
of disruption would have been particularly embarrassing for the
Colonial Secretary, as he had been responsible for encouraging
Northern Rhodesia's European leaders to play a major part in
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government. Creech Jones was, moreover, not at all keen for
the extent of Unofficial involvement in running Northern Rhodesia
116
to be publicised. In an attempt to placate the Northern
-132-
Rhodesian Unofficials and stem their campaign of agitation in the
Legislative Council, Lord Listowel, Minister of State for Colonial
Affairs, emphasised the need ror different policies in Africa. He
argued, in late November, that moves toward responsible government in
east and central Africa, unlike west Africa, would of necessity
require to accommodate the settlers as well as African communities
117
in mutually beneficial partnership.
It was not just the Unofficials and members of the CAC secretariat,
however, who were pressing for British Government intervention in
central Africa to produce a federal scheme during 1949. As early as
February R C 5 Stanley was advocating the creation of a central
African Federation. The Northern Rhodesian Chief Secretary argued
that it ultimately came down to a choice between promoting a White
man's federation, which could be a strong supporter of the Common¬
wealth and a bulwark against communist infiltration into Africa,
or promoting independent Black man's territories which would show no
loyalty to the United Kingdom and would be liable to become communist
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strongholds. The Colonial Office was increasingly aware that
to refuse to make any move over closer association would antagonise
Southern Rhodesia and alienate European opinion in Northern Rhodesia.
Clark's successor as the CACs Chief Secretary, A E T Benson (later
Sir Arthur), the former Chief Secretary of Nigeria, was warning
London, by duly, that the minority in Southern Rhodesia which favoured
joining South Africa was growing and would clearly benefit if Southern
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Rhodesia's central African ambitions were baulked. So, it was
widely accepted within the Colonial Office that there were both strong
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practical arguments, from the point of view of defence, economic
development and communications, and strong political arguments,
notably to create a counterweight to the Union, for the creation of
120
a federated block in central Africa. The problem was that the
Colonial Secretary remained reluctant for the United Kingdom Govern¬
ment to be seen to be taking a lead in establishing such a federa¬
tion and concerned as to the conseguences, from such a move, for
African interests in the northern territories. As a result the
next attempt to break the deadlock over closer association, and
involve Britain, emanied from Southern Rhodesia.
This initiative arose directly from the breakdown in discussions
between Welensky and Huggins over the preparation of a draft
constitution for a central African federation, in late September
1949. It appears that, although Welensky and Huggins initially
reached almost complete agreement in early September over a draft
constitution, pressure from Beadle and Whitehead forced Huggins to
re-assess his position. These Southern Rhodesian Cabinet Ministers
were strongly opposed to the minimal form of federation, which had
almost been agreed between their Prime Minister and Welensky, and
advocated something far closer to the February Victoria Falls
Conference proposals, although it was known that these were totally
unacceptable to the Europeans of Northern Rhodesia, and even more
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unacceptable to the Africans.
With no prospect of reaching agreement with even the Unofficials of
the northern territories over federation, Huggins sought to involve
the British Government once more in an attempt to break the impasse.
-134-
Welensky was also very anxious that the United Kingdom Government
be brought in at this stage as he was aware that without an
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initiative from London the prospects of federation were remote.
Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs,
T H W Beadle and Attorney-General V" L Robinson were dispatched to
London in November, to seek the United Kingdom Government's help
in producing a scheme that might be tolerated by the various non-
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African groupings in central Africa. They were also to bring to
London's attention Southern Rhodesian dissatisfaction with the CAC.
During the discussions, Beadle made it clear that the government
of Southern Rhodesia was only prepared to support the CAC's continued
existence if assurances were given by the British Government that
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the Council was regarded as a stepping stone to closer union.
R F Halsted, Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Trade, accompanied them
to London but does not appear to have been involved in the closer
association negotiations.
The position adopted by the British Secretary of State, was that the
CAC should be fostered and developed into something resembling the
east African inter-territorial scheme. Although Creech Jones had
conceded to Welensky and Huggins in April that the CAC arrangement
was inadeguate, he and Noel-Baker emphasised the progress that had
been achieved under its auspices and advocated its evolution and not
its destruction. The Secretaries of State were, in addition, firmly
convinced that no federal scheme would find favour with all three
territorial governments and Westminster, even though Cohen argued the
case for a limited federation. Creech Jones and Noel-Baker agreed to
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convene a conference of territorial representatives in London to
discuss the difficulties being experienced in central Africa over
reaching any agreement for closer association. The conference, which
would also consider possible forms of inter-territorial association,
would only be called after Southern Rhodesia had responded to the
British Government's reguests for specific information on the dis¬
satisfaction with the CAC and their reasons why it could not be
1 25
developed further. This pre-requisite was required by the
Secretaries of State because they had been unimpressed with Southern
Rhodesian criticisms of, and arguments for, the discontinuation of
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the CAC presented up till then.
The Secretaries of State adopted this stance in the discussions with
Beadle partly because the strong support for the CAC by Rennie,
Benson and Colby, convinced them that the Council had been successful
and could be even more so if Southern Rhodesia stopped sabotaging
it. Rennie, in particular, was displeased that Huggins and his
Cabinet colleagues had continued to make unwarranted criticisms of
the Council throughout 1949:
"In my view the Council has done good work and it
could do more and better work if the Government
of Southern Rhodesia were prepared to make better
and wiser use of it".127
The British position was definitely disappointing as far as Beadle
and Southern Rhodesia were concerned. Nevertheless, the Secretaries
of State's offer of a London conference was a significant advance on
Creech Jones' avoidance of direct discussions on closer association
in October 1948. Moreover, Beadle's extraction of a promise from
Creech Jones and Noel Baker that Britain would, in future, follow
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a more positive line over central African closer association could
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have been exploited at the proposed conference. Given these
concessions from Britain the Southern Rhodesian response could be seen
as an over-reaction, if it were not for the other contributing
factors.
It is true that Huggins was angered by Beadle's reports from London
that the Secretaries of State had ruled out totally the possibility
of African Affairs being within the remit of any federal authority
and were also insisting that progress over closer association had to
be through the development of the CAC. However, his attack on the
Labour government in early December, was as strongly influenced by
the well-founded belief that such a move might reverse the steadily
declining popularity of the United Party government in Southern
Rhodesia. Using the occasion of the Gatooma and District Caledonian
Society St Andrew's Dinner, Huggins castigated the British Labour
administration for their intransigence over closer association.
He argued that the British Government's attitude ruled out amalgama¬
tion and federation, but he made it absolutely clear that their
favoured policy of the development of the CAC along East African
High Commission lines was completely unacceptable to Southern
Rhodesia. He claimed that at its inception it had been hoped that
the CAC would prove to be a step towards amalgamation, but the
British Government's opposition had prevented this development from
occurring. Huggins emphasised the need for a United States of Africa,
but with entry into the Union also unacceptable to Southern Rhodesia,
129
the territory would have to preserve its current status.
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The abrasive tone adopted by Huggins for his Gatooma speech was
followed by the decision to withdraw from the CAC. The matter was
discussed on Beadle's return and the decision taken by 10th December,
although the United Kingdom Government was not officially alerted to
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the discussion, by Rennie, until the 23rd. The Southern Rhodesian
Cabinet had failed to convince the British Government by their
arguments that the CAC had failed and reguired to be replaced by a
powerful unitary federal government structure. In part, this was
because the two governments measured the Council's success or
failure by very different criteria, for Southern Rhodesia the CAC
could only succeed by bringing amalgamation closer. This it had
evidently failed to do and so it needed to be replaced. As far as
London was concerned, however, the Council had been specifically
designed to encourage co-operation in central Africa, whilst rigidly
maintaining the constitutional status quo. The CAC, therefore,
inevitably had to dissatisfy one government or the other. As we have
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seen, Huggins did not hold out high expectation of the Council
succeeding, according to his terms, at its inception. He had been
confident, however, that if it failed to bring amalgamation closer
it could be discarded in a manner that would strengthen the case for
closer association. Having failed to convince the United Kingdom
administration of the need to replace the Council with something more
concrete, Huggins sought to force the British Government to do so, by
formally announcing at the Council's January meeting Southern
Rhodesia's intention of leaving the CAC in one year's time.
Prior to Huggins' January announcement strenuous efforts were made by
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Benson, Colby and Rennie, as well as the CRO in London, to persuade
the Southern Rhodesian Government to withdraw its ultimatum and
accept the compromise of a revised CAC. Huggins showed a willingness
to compromise but was prevented from doing so by Beadle, Halsted and
Whitehead in the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet. Although the Cabinet
remained sharply divided over the CAC and closer association, the
general view within it was that while the Council or a similar body
for inter-territorial co-operation existed, the United Kingdom
Government would continue to block and deflect all Southern Rhodesian
demands for closer union. There was, in fact, precious little else
concerning closer association on which the Southern Rhodesian
Cabinet could agree.
In Cabinet meetings of the 4th, 16th and 18th January the full gamut
of fears, proposals and demands were presented. Davenport on one
occasion was advocating that a policy of isolationism be followed
for at least two years to allow Southern Rhodesia to consolidate its
development. Simultaneously, fears, held broadly throughout the
Cabinet, that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would seek closer union
with east Africa if ties with Southern Rhodesia were not maintained
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and strengthened, were forcefully expressed.
Although not specifically referred to at these Cabinet meetings, the
constitutional developments in the Gold Coast at the end of 1949
would have given rise to feelings of disquiet within the Rhodesias,
1
particularly concerning the future development of Northern Rhodesia.
It should also be noted that Huggins faced with a Cabinet composed of
strong willed and independent men, coupled with a large majority in
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the Legislature, experienced increasing difficulties during 1949
in maintaining control over his Cabinet. Indeed, a proposal to
give six months notice of withdrawal from the CAC to take effect
immediately, was passed as early as 4th October by the Southern
Rhodesian Cabinet, whilst Huggins was absent.To a certain
extent Huggins fulfilled a moderating role within the Cabinet, but
the extent of his control over it is hard to guantify. Whilst it is
clear that his grip was at times tenuous, it is likely that the pose
of a moderate held captive by his more extreme colleagues proved a
useful device when dealing with London and members of the Colonial
Service in central Africa. Nevertheless, on the issue of with¬
drawal from the CAC Huggins undoubtedly had scant scope to compromise
even if he had so wished, with only Davenport and Winterton showing
the least inclination to moderate their positions.
After the October 4th decision by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet to
withdraw from the Council - a decision which Huggins sidelined until
December and Beadle's return - Benson and Colby met in Zomba to
consider a plan for a possible alternative form for the CAC to take.
On 30th December they met with Parry in Salisbury to consider further
Benson and his deputy's scheme. The proposal was closely modelled
on the east African inter-territorial scheme and Huggins agreed to
put it to his Cabinet colleagues on 4th January. It was presented
as a Cabinet Office Paper, since to acknowledge it as a CAC
secretariat proposal would have resulted in it being dismissed out
of hand, so strong was the anti-council prejudice within the
Cabinet at that time. Although the paper received a measure of
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qualified support from Davenport and Winterton, in the main it was
135
severely criticised and rejected.
On 13th January Gordon Walker sent a personal appeal to the Prime
Minister of Southern Rhodesia to drop the proposed withdrawal from
the CAC in view of the advances made and concessions reached at the
136
November 1949 discussions with Beadle. This message was more
conciliatory and less strongly worded than the Colonial Office
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wished, but even so was rejected by Huggins after the Cabinet
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meeting of 16th January. This negative response was particularly
disappointing to Rennie because he thought that he had succeeded,
in conjunction with Gordon Walker's appeal, in dissuading Huggins
from issuing Southern Rhodesia's intention to withdraw. Beadle's
role appears to have been crucial in ensuring that the Southern
Rhodesian Cabinet's resolve to withdraw remained firm. Rennie's
intervention did at least ensure that the Southern Rhodesian
Government's intentions were not stated as bluntly as they were in
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the original draft. What is made abundantly clear in Huggins'
reply to Gordon Walker, however, is that the Southern Rhodesian
Cabinet were in effect issuing an ultimatum to the British Govern¬
ment to produce an alternative to the Council that would clearly
enhance closer association, or face the consequences of a Southern
Rhodesia no longer tied to central Africa.
The Southern Rhodesian Cabinet could agree that it disliked the
Benson, Parry, Colby proposals, but it experienced great difficulties
in deciding what it did want. At the special Cabinet meeting on 16th
January, it was finally agreed that a position paper dealing only with
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the CACs defects and political objections to it, and offering
nothing constructive in its place, would form the basis of Southern
Rhodesia's case for giving notice to quit the Council at its next
meeting on the 25th. Benson remained very concerned that the atti¬
tude of the Southern Rhodesian Government and the tone of its pro¬
posals for the forthcoming CAC meeting were likely to endanger any
future co-operation with the northern territories on a level already
achieved under the Council. By lobbying Davenport, prior to the
Cabinet meeting on 18th January, Benson managed to tone down the
Southern Rhodesian stance, that it would pursue its own course
regardless of the views of the northern territories.''^ As we
shall see, the insular and arrogant attitude adopted by the Southern
Rhodesians over the CAC dispute and the question of closer associa¬
tion as a whole, caused a great deal of resentment amongst the
leaders of the northern territories' European communities.
Southern Rhodesia's declaration of its intention to withdraw from
the CAC one year from January 1950, climaxed two long-running
issues; one concerned fears about South African expansionism; the
other, northern Officials1 anger at, and Unofficials) dissatisfaction
with, the Southern Rhodesian attitude towards the CAC and closer
association.
As has already been shown the long history of pressure for a central
African state had been dogged by fears within Northern Rhodesia of
being dominated by Southern Rhodesia. Equally, there were clear
reservations within Southern Rhodesia about the wisdom of joining
with territories containing such massive disproportions between their
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European and African populations. These concerns were largely con¬
cealed between 1938 and 1948 because the European populations in
both Rhodesias favoured full amalgamation, albeit for different
motives and to differing degrees. The problems began to re-appear
and rapidly escalate from the point when Welensky and the Northern
Rhodesian Unofficials abandoned amalgamation in favour of some sort
of federation. As of June 1948 Welensky and Huggins were advocating
different forms and degrees of closer association and as a result
tensions and disputes began to mount.
One specific area which generated a great deal of friction was the
CAC. The Officials and Unofficials of the northern territories
were largely in agreement that the Council was beneficial and should
be utilised to the utmost. This is not to say that the Northern
Rhodesian Unofficials, in particular, did not have criticisms of the
Council nor that they did not want it to be replaced with something
stronger, but the general consensus was that until a better scheme
was agreed upon to replace it, the CAC should be maintained and
fostered. As has already been shown, the Southern Rhodesian Govern¬
ment, after its poor showing in the 1946 elections, sought to minimise
the importance of the CAC and tended to become increasingly critical
of the body. This attitude, although annoying the northern terri¬
tories, was tolerated because of the awareness of Huggins' difficult
position in Southern Rhodesia. After the Prime Minister's triumphal
victory on 16 September 1948, however, a change of attitude by
Southern Rhodesia was confidently expected by the north. The failure
of such an alteration and, indeed, the Southern Rhodesian Government's
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crit.ical posture towards the Council actually hardening and
intensifying, led to growing frustration in both government and
Unofficial circles in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The decision
by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet to give one year's notice of their
intention to leave the Council brought this underlying irritation
out into the open.
Benson, Colby and Rennie all complained to London during January
and February 1950, about the Southern Rhodesian Government's
uncooperative attitude towards the CAC, which had been particularly
noticeable over the preceding eighteen months. Benson proposed that
the northern governments should make plain at the Council meeting
in January:
"that the Central Africa Council's lack of
strength as a foundation and the creaking of its
machinery have been due entirely to the lack of
support which it has received from the Southern
Rhodesian Government."
Colby adopted an even stronger position, arguing that the Council's
unpopularity in Southern Rhodesia had been, to a large extent,
engineered by Southern Rhodesian Cabinet Ministers. Nyasaland's
Governor believed that the Council's very success as a consultative
and advisory body had produced the Southern Rhodesian Government's
attacks on it. Southern Rhodesia wanted the CAC scrapped, not because
it was not a success, but because it was not a suitable instrument
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of progress towards amalgamation. The Southern Rhodesian Government's
attitude towards the Council had also, Colby agreed, effectively
blocked any serious consideration of political integration short of amalgamat
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"Up to the present the achievement of
any progress towards closer union or federation
has been made largely impossible by the attitude
of the Southern Rhodesian Government".
Rennie too held the Southern Rhodesian Government largely responsible
for the CACs unpopularity in that territory. He felt that after
the September 1948 elections Huggins and his Cabinet became increas¬
ingly lukewarm towards the Council, and was convinced that "the
limitations and defects of the CAC lie largely in the way in which
the Government of Southern Rhodesia has used the Council up to date."
Having had their attempts to persuade Huggins not to proceed with his
ultimatum rejected, and sharing the conviction that the Southern
Rhodesian Government had, since September 1948, systematically
sought to undermine the CAC through non-co-operation and public
attacks, the northern territories' Governors and the Council's Chief
Secretary, all urged the United Kingdom administration to adopt an
uncompromising response to Southern Rhodesia's notice of withdrawal.
Benson understood the Southern Rhodesian Government to be seeking
to pressurise the British Government into making concessions over
closer association by the announcement of its intention to leave the
CAC. Southern Rhodesians, whilst only wanting union on their own
terms, were not prepared to have closer association ruled out
altogether, which explained the extended period of notice they had
given, before they would be reguired to act. As the Southern
Rhodesian Cabinet had failed to agree on any scheme or body to
replace the Council and were clearly severely divided on the whole
issue, Benson advocated that Imperial and Colonial governments take
-145-
the initiative and place the Southern Rhodesian administration
under pressure. Under the Council's Chief Secretary's proposals,
Huggins would be informed that the CAC would be wound up within three
months and that Southern Rhodesia had until the end of April to
produce detailed plans for an acceptable alternative. Faced with the
choice of no mechanism for closer co-ordination in central Africa
or the continuation of the CAC, Benson was convinced that the
Southern Rhodesian Government would moderate its demands and accept
the modified Council proposals in his and Colby's compromise scheme,
which had been rejected by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet on 4th
i 145January.
Colby supported Benson's advice to London, but added that whilst
he considered it necessary to retain in central Africa some form of
machinery for co-ordination in the economic and administrative areas,
any such body required the goodwill of all three territories to
succeed. The Governor of Nyasaland favoured development along the
lines of the east African inter-territorial scheme and was per¬
suaded that present Southern Rhodesian opposition to such a move
would diminish as awareness spread of the extent of Afrikaner
immigration and the danger this represented combined with an
expansionist, Afrikaner Nationalist Union.Rennie was also
convinced that the CAC or any alternative would only work if the
Southern Rhodesian Government was prepared to co-operate. In arguing
that an East African High Commission type scheme was the only
feasible solution, he maintained that the further any proposals
moved from the position of minimal federal authority, the harder
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it would be to gain the support of Northern Rhodesia's African and
European populations. Rennie favoured the continuation of the CAC,
or some similar body to co-ordinate economic co-operation, and the
exploration of the possibilities of political integration along mini-
malistic federal lines.^
In preparing their response to the Southern Rhodesian ultimatum over
the CAC, therefore, the British Government was in no doubt as to the
views of the Colonial Service officials in central Africa. Whitehall
would have also been aware of the tensions within the Southern
Rhodesian Cabinet and the differences between it and the Unofficials
in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.
When Welensky arrived in Salisbury on 24th January, for the CAC meet¬
ing the following day, he discovered that the Southern Rhodesian
Cabinet had, in fact, agreed on an alternative scheme to the Council
at their meeting on the 18th. The proposal, for the amalgamation of
Southern Rhodesia with the line of rail area in Northern Rhodesia was,
however, completely unacceptable. Welensky informed Huggins and his
Cabinet that even if he were to accept their scheme for the division
of Northern Rhodesia, which he did not, a clear majority of his
Unofficial colleagues would remain vehemently opposed.At the
CAC meeting on 25th January, a lot of animosity was generated
between Southern Rhodesia's representatives and the Unofficials from
the northern territories. Welensky was highly critical of Beadle's
remarks in a press interview of 20 December in which the Southern
Rhodesian Minister of Justice had accused the CAC of being a nomin-
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ated body that weakened the elected Government of Southern Rhodesia.
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Huggins claimed that it was pointless for the Southern Rhodesian
Government to attempt to defend the CAC as it was so unpopular in
the territory. Welensky, however, countered that the Council should
have been publicly defended, and attacked the Southern Rhodesian
Government for failing to present the good case which existed for
the CAC.
Barrow went further in arguing that the Southern Rhodesian Govern¬
ment was, at best, making no effort to support the functioning of
the Council. He went on to accuse Southern Rhodesia's representa¬
tives on the Council of "throwing spanners in the works", and claimed
that the majority of the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet were not only
antagonistic to the Council, but were actively attempting to under¬
mine it, because they sought the complete union of the Rhodesias,
if not Nyasaland. This fierce denunciation of Southern Rhodesia's
attitude and motives was strongly supported by Beckett. He argued
that the CAC was threatened, not because it was not working, nor
because it was not necessary, but because it had become, through
no fault of its own, a political embarrassment to the Southern
Rhodesian Government.^
It is evident that a fair measure of agreement existed in early 1950
between the northern territories' Officials and Unofficials with
regard to the CAC and Southern Rhodesia's attempts to undermine it.
There was an equal measure of concord concerning their opposition
to Southern Rhodesia's continuing demands for amalgamation. The
exact form closer association should take varied widely amongst the
Officials and Unofficials of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, but
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Southern Rhodesia's desire to dominate central Africa was recognised
and opposed. It was for this reason that Rennie had strongly opposed
the proposals in the February 1949 Victoria Falls Conference,
claiming that they would "amount not to federation but, for all
practical purposes, to the absorption of the Northern Territories in
a government dominated politically and economically by Southern
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Rhodesia". The failure of Southern Rhodesia to gain agreement
on a federal scheme during 1949 can also be directly attributed to
Southern Rhodesia's desire to dominate central Africa and the
determination of Unofficials from the northern territories to avoid
such a development, a determination shared by the Governments and
African populations of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.
Although Welensky and Huggins sought throughout 1949 to bridge the
differences that existed between their positions on closer associa¬
tion, and hide their dispute from public view, their differences
remained large. Welensky admitted this during the debate, on 9 December
in the Legislative Council, on his motion urging Britain to take the
lead in creating a central African Federation. He conceded that it
had not been possible to prepare a draft constitution for a
federal state, as had been intended at the Victoria Falls Conference,
because of "basic" and "grave" differences between Southern and
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Northern Rhodesia. Although Welensky would not admit to it, it
was evident from the speeches by Beckett and Morris that Northern
Rhodesian Unofficials were far from happy with the attitude and
actions of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Welensky had succeeded
in avoiding a full scale clash with Huggins during their negotiations
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in 1949, but he was aware that unless a new initiative was forthcoming
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from the British Government this clash could not long be delayed.
Sooner or later he and Huggins would have to face sguarely the full
implications of their mutually exclusive aspirations for central
Africa's constitutional development. Other prominent figures, apart
from Welensky and the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, were seeking
to persuade the British Government to take the lead over closer
association. Any examination of these appeals, however, has to
be placed in the context of growing fears concerning the possible
absorption of the Rhodesias by South Africa, the second issue
brought to a head by Huggins' ultimatum on the CAC.
The historical context of the United Kingdom Government's apprehen¬
sions concerning the Union's northward ambitions has already been
dealt with at some length. In the eyes of many influential figures,
South Africa's brooding presence loomed as large over central Africa
in 1950 as at any time in the past. Benson was, in December 1949,
urging that London take the initiative in producing a workable
format for closer association. The politicians of central Africa
had shown themselves to be incapable of producing such a scheme
and the result of failure to establish a central African block would,
in Benson's opinion, be Southern Rhodesia's slow slide into the
Union. That such an occurrence would as an inevitable conse-i
guence drag the High Commission Territories into South Africa, was
a further argument, Benson believed, for the United Kingdom
Government to act and act soon.^^ At the same time Kennedy was
expressing concern to London at Afrikaner immigration into Southern
-150-
Rhodesia. Although the Afrikaner element still only comprised
14% of Southern Rhodesia's European population, the level of Boer
immigration from the Union was running at over one quarter of all
immigrants entering the territory. Moreover, the Afrikaners were
more de-stabilising than their numbers suggested as they tended
to farm great blocks of land together, forming Afrikaans speaking
11
communities whose "sympathies and loyalties are all with the Union".
As has already been shown, Colby was also deeply worried by the level
of Afrikaner immigration into the Rhodesias, though he had felt that
this internal menace would, once it was realised, force the Southern
Rhodesian Government to moderate its demands for amalgamation.
As we shall see, the threat of Afrikaner immigration into the
Rhodesias, enhancing the danger of these territories being persuaded,
or forced, into a receptive Union, was considered to be a very real
possibility by influential figures within the Colonial and Common¬
wealth Relations Offices. Official perceptions of South Africa con¬
tinued to determine Britain's policy for central Africa, just as they
had done since before the Union was formed.
In early 1950 there was considerable agreement in the advice issuing
from central Africa to London. Rennie and Welensky were agreed that
the status quo of the CAC or some similar body should be maintained
while efforts, led by the British Government, were made to produce
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a measure of political integration short of amalgamation. Benson
was of like mind, but more insistent that Westminster take the
initiative. Colby, too, favoured closer political association, short
of amalgamation, but felt that no moves were possible until Southern
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Rhodesia moderated its demands and was "prepared to consider more
reasonable proposals for political integration designed to form a
British block in Central Africa and thus be in a better position
157
to resist absorption by the Union".
Only Southern Rhodesia remained out of step with these views, but
there were some indications that having forced a showdown over the
CAC, Huggins and his Cabinet were prepared to co-operate while await¬
ing London's response. On 15 February the formation of a CAC sub¬
committee, to examine proposed developments of the Council and
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alterations to it, was announced. At least initially, the
Southern Rhodesian Government appeared prepared to concede to the
general consensus in central Africa and hope for the return of a
more sympathetic government in Britain's general election.
Nevertheless, the composition of the Southern Rhodesian representa¬
tion to the CAC sub-committee clearly indicated that Southern
Rhodesia had no intention of dropping its demands for the Council's




The United Kingdom elections of 26 February 1950, did not produce the
return of the Conservative Party to Office, as many in central Africa
had hoped. Nonetheless the result had significant repercussions
for central Africa. It resulted in two new Secretaries of State at
the Colonial and Commonwealth Relation Offices and, with an overall
Labour Party majority of only five, an early change of government
was thought probable. With such a small majority the British
Government decided not to push ahead with any radical legislation or
contentious policies. Nonetheless, the Labour Party, in Parliament
and the country at large, remained in high spirits and confident mood
1
throughout its brief second term. These factors indirectly
influenced Imperial policy on whether or not to initiate moves
towards closer political association in central Africa. The Govern¬
ment of Southern Rhodesia's ultimatum over the continual existence of
the CAC, however, made the prospect of any decision other than a
positive one, very unappealing.
Initially, Creech Jones' non-election at Shipley, partly as a conse¬
quence of the Home Secretary, Chuter Ede's politically inept redistri-
2
bution of constituencies during 1948 and 1949, and Attlee's dropping
of Noel Baker from the Cabinet, by moving him, as Gaitskell's
successor, to Fuel and Power, made no impact on the situation in
central Africa. However, over the longer term the inexperience of
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Griffiths and inn ate conservatism of Gordon Walker, the new
Secretaries of State, played an important role in promoting the
federation of central Africa. Whilst the promotion of Gordon Walker
was a logical move, the transfer of Griffiths from National Insurance
to the Colonial Office was one of Attlee's more bizarre decisions.^
Certainly Griffiths' reputation as a capable Minister had been
greatly enhanced during his tenure at the Ministry of National
4
Insurance and his promotion into the Cabinet was overdue, but the
Welshman's lack of knowledge of Colonial issues was in marked contrast
to the expertise of his predecessor. It is highly unlikely that
Cohen would have been able to advance federation at the speed and in
the way he did during 1950 and 1951 if Creech Jones had held Shipley,^
but this is not to detract in any way from the determination Griffiths
showed, in and out of office, in seeking to ensure that Britain
honoured its responsibilities towards the indigenous peoples of central
Africa.
In November 1949, Creech Jones and Noel Baker had clearly indicated
that no federal scheme was likely to gain the support of all four
governments concerned, so although they had been prepared to discuss
Southern Rhodesia's complaints concerning the CAC and listen to their
proposals for amalgamation, the Secretaries of State had indicated
that, for the time being, all aspirations for the political integra¬
tion of central Africa would remain unfulfilled. In the aftermath
of Southern Rhodesia's announcement on CAC, the British general elec¬
tion and the advice flowing from central Africa, this stance was no
longer so assured.
Benson's advocacy of an aggressivse response to the Southern Rhodesian
ultimatum over the CAC was not pursued by the British Government,
possibly because the Southern Rhodesian Government's decision to
co-operate with the CACs sub-committee looking at alternatives,
indicated that they were prepared to be reasonable. Moreover, Benson's
response would have produced an unwelcome early crisis for the two new
Secretaries of State. Instead, advantage was taken of Huggins' short
visit to Lisbon in late March, to hold discussions with him in London.
Welensky had also made it clear that federation and the future of
the CAC would be raised whilst he was in London, from late April, for
Northern Rhodesian constitutional talks.^ Huggins held discussions
with Whitehall officials en route to Lisbon on 20 and 21 March.
These talks were, however, concerned with his Portuguese visit and
it was not until his return from Lisbon that closer association was
raised.
In deciding on an agreed position during their talks with Huggins,
a significant difference of opinion emerged between the Colonial
and Commonwealth Relations Offices. At an initial meeting on 15 March,
attended by Lloyd, Cohen, Baxter, Gibson and Gandee, an agreed line
had been adopted without much difficulty. It was decided to inform
the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia exactly what the maximum
amount of political integration in central Africa the British Govern¬
ment was prepared to accept. The Officials agreed that this limit,
a fairly minimal form of federation, would be facilitated by the
acceptance and promotion of Benson's proposals. The only problem
envisaged was that this scheme had already been roundly criticised
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and rejected by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet on 4 January. As all
except Huggins believed the proposals to be an integral Cabinet
document, Britain would need to be careful how the proposals were
promoted.^ At the end of March, London was informed that Benson
and Parry appeared to have reached agreement with the three terri¬
torial governments on a bi-annual Governors' Conference to replace
the CACs current format. The Council's secretariat would remain
g
intact to service the Governors' Conferences and their decisions.
It was at this point that a difference in view between the two
government departments became apparent.
The Commonwealth Relations Office believed that a successful con¬
clusion to the CAC controversy would result in a general diminution
of agitation for closer association in central Africa as a whole,
especially in Southern Rhodesia. As the CAC oroblem appeared now to
have been resolved, Gordon Walker wished to spell out to Huggins at
their meeting on 3 April, that amalgamation or federation was "out
of the question". The Colonial Office disagreed with the CROs belief
that pressure for union in central Africa would cease now that an
acceptable replacement to the CAC had been agreed. Colonial Office
officials were also very opposed to any blunt rejection of aspira¬
tions for political integration being delivered, as they believed
9
the repercussions in both Rhodesias would be very grave.
It is clear that the Commonwealth Relations Office totally misunder¬
stood the purpose of Huggins' ultimatum over the CAC and the condi¬
tional nature of his agreement to participate in its replacement,
the bi-annual Governors' Conference. The Southern Rhodesian Govern¬
ment had encouraged criticisms of the CAC, undermined its worth, and
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then, against this background, announced their intention to with¬
draw from it, in an attempt to force the British Government to concede
closer political association in central Africa. The Government of
Southern Rhodesis's ultimate goal was and remained an amalgamated,
and fully independent, central African state. Their co-operation
over any other machinery for closer co-ordination would only be
forthcoming when the United Kingdom Government was openly and clearly
committed to moving towards this end.
It is also worth noting that at this stage, March 1950, Gordon Walker
was opposed to both amalgamation and federation for central Africa
and was prepared to stand firm on the issue. In adopting this
position Gordon Walker was probably influenced by the impressions
which Sir Percivale Liesching gained in talks with Huggins and
Kennedy during his visit to Southern Rhodesia in late March 1949.
The CROs permanent Under-Secretary of State felt that Huggins had
only become involved in the closer association agitation to prevent
Welensky from dominating the issue and, as a result, gaining popular¬
ity and a possible power base in Southern Rhodesia. The Southern
Rhodesian Prime Minister was not really in favour of, or even
interested in, federation, but rather favoured the amalgamation of
and, Liesching speculated, the domination of central Africa by
10
Southern Rhodesia. Gordon Walker presumably believed that if
Huggins was indifferent to federation then Southern Rhodesia would
accept closer co-ordination for central Africa if it was well
administered and await the emergence of a British Government more
favourably disposed to amalgamation. Huggins' lack of support for
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Welensky's campaign for closer association since the war possibly
encouraged Gordon Walker to believe that once the unpopular CAC
was replaced, the Southern Rhodesian Government would return to its
former low key attitude concerning closer association. This anti-
federation attitude of the Secretary of State was to undergo a
complete transformation over the next eighteen months.
The CRO and its Secretary of State remained adamant in their view
that, providing the Governors' Conference could be made to work,
Huggins and his Cabinet would drop their support for a federal
scheme. Gordon Walker was adamant in his support for this position
11
in a meeting between the two offices on 31 March. He was very
rapidly disabused of his view at the meeting with Huggins on
12
3 April. IZ
Huggins proposed the amalgamation of Nyasaland with the Rhodesias,
excluding Barotseland. However, if the United Kingdom Government
13
were averse to its inclusion, he was prepared to exclude Nyasaland
and sought to refute any accusations that Nyasaland's involvement
was sought just so that Southern Rhodesia could control its labour
supply. Huggins claimed that the majority of Europeans and their
elected members in both Rhodesias favoured amalgamation, but was
forced to concede that Welensky opposed the amalgamation of Southern
Rhodesia with the 'European part' of Northern Rhodesia and was at
present drafting a federal constitution to form the basis of union
discussions with Southern Rhodesia. One element in Huggins'
strategy at the 3 April talks was to discover whether the amalgama¬
tion option was definitely barred by the British Government or whether
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they would agree to it remaining a possibility. As Welensky
insisted that he had switched from pursuing amalgamation to
federation because the United Kingdom Government would never accept
the latter, a denial of this attitude by the Secretary of State,
would be of great value to the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister
in seeking to gain Welensky and his Unofficials' support for amal¬
gamation as opposed to federation.
A second part of Huggins' policy in the talks was to impress upon
the British Government that moves towards modelling Northern Rhodesia
into an African state would, as a direct consequence, result in
Southern Rhodesia being driven towards closer association with South
Africa. This move was a blatant attempt to influence the Northern
Rhodesian constitutional talks, scheduled for later in the month,
but it involved the central thesis pursued by Huggins during these
discussions, namely, the danger of Southern Rhodesia being forced
into the Union.
Whilst frequently assuring his hosts that he was not issuing threats,
Huggins' whole purpose was to convince the United Kingdom Government
that Southern Rhodesia's entry into South Africa would remain a con¬
tinuous, if fluctuating, possibility until closer association, accept¬
able to Southern Rhodesia, was achieved. The establishment of a
satisfactorily constituted central African Union would strengthen
the economic and strategic position of the three territories in
resisting incorporation pressure from the south. Huggins detailed
the various factors which could hasten Southern Rhodesia's entry into
the Union. These included, Afrikaner immigration, failure to achieve
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amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and a deepening
14
economic crisis for which no other solution appeared feasible.
The last possibility was particularly relevant, given the precarious
state of the Southern Rhodesian economy and its large burden of
debt. This also helps to explain Huggins' insistence on a common
Treasury for central Africa and the Northern Rhodesian Government
and Unofficials' reluctance to concur, given the booming state of
Northern Rhodesia's economy.
The extent of the gulf between Huggins and Welensky's positions on
closer association in central Africa was underlined by the Northern
Rhodesian Unofficials leader's constitutional proposals of April 1950.
Welensky envisaged a two-chambered federal parliament, under a
Governor-General, to administer common service departments. This
was a top heavy means of introducing legislative and executive
authority for a relatively minor amount of closer association and
16
was criticised as such. However, Welensky's proposals produced
a further altercation between the London departments, as the CRO
insisted that the Colonial Office refrain from strengthening their
arguments by informing the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials leader of
Huggins' belief that central Africa possessed neither the manpower
nor the finances for such a scheme. Whilst acceding to the Common¬
wealth Relations Office request, the Colonial Office was displeased
17
by the incident and made their views plain.
In his discussions concerning federation with the Secretaries of
State, on 3 and 4 May 1950, Welensky, like Huggins, dwelt on the
dangers of Afrikaner immigration and claimed that unless federation
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occurred "there was a danger of the whites in Northern Rhodesia
1B
becoming overwhelmingly Afrikaner", and at the next general election
securing a majority of the elected representatives. According to
Welensky, the Afrikaners were concentrating in mining, railways,
19
farm schemes and the civil service. The last named area of
Afrikaner influence is of particular interest as, at the time of the
Bledisloe Commission, there had been accusations that the Northern
Rhodesian Government was "dominated" by its "pro-South African Civil
20
Service". Whilst this was clearly an exaggerated claim, it was
undoubtedly true in the forties and early fifties that Northern
Rhodesia's reliance upon white labour from the Union to fill the
minor posts in its civil service, resulted in a definite tendency
towards an apartheid mentality amongst the junior clerks and its
21
other lower echelons. For all that, it can be stated with con¬
fidence, that both Welensky and Huggins were exaggerating the threat
posed by the Afrikaner influx in order to enhance the prospects of
closer association for central Africa. The dispute between the
Rhodesias' leaders, as to the form of closer association remained.
Welensky admitted that Huggins had already rejected his draft scheme
for federation as half hearted. Rennie's comment on this situation
is worth consideration as it highlighted the general attitude of
Northern Rhodesia's senior officials towards Southern Rhodesia,
a collective view that was not dispelled as federation approached nor
by its inauguration. The Southern Rhodesians were amalgamationist
at heart. They were not in favour of any form of federation that
would restrict their sovereignty and they wanted the three states
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reduced to the status of Provinces. Although Welensky gained as
little satisfaction from these discussions on federation as from the
main batch of talks on Northern Rhodesia's constitution, on one
point he was completely in accord with a growing number of Colonial
Office and CRO officials; that point was his request that the
British Government take the initiative in producing agreement for a
federal central Africa.
With the arrival of a new Secretary of State, Cohen recommenced his
efforts to achieve a British Government initiative over closer
association for central Africa. In a secret memorandum entitled
23
"Relations of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland", produced in late
February or early March, Cohen listed the strategic, economic and
communications arguments in favour of the joining of central Africa.
The argument upon which Cohen placed most emphasis, however, was that
"the creation of a solid British block of territories in central
Africa, would make it easier to resist economic and political pressure
from the Union of South Africa and to prevent the undue spreading
of South African ideas northwards". Cohen concurred with the requests
of Benson, Rennie and Welensky, and advised that the British Govern¬
ment take the initiative in promoting the federation of central Africa,
but in so doing make every effort to avoid alarming African opinion.
The British Government's intervention should take the form of a
conference. Preceding such a conference, however, Cohen proposed
that a meeting of officials from the four Governments concerned should
take place with "the purpose of narrowing the issues for discussion
at the main conference and presenting an analysis of the problems and
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recommendations as to a solution". In addition to promoting this
view in London, Cohen sought the support of the leading Colonial
25
Service figures in central Africa.
The initial response, in late April, to Cohen's scheme was encourag¬
ing, with not only Benson, but also Gisborne, the Secretary to the
Southern Rhodesian Cabinet, giving the idea of an Official Conference
26
their keen support. Lambert and Lloyd favoured Cohen's idea, which
received a further boost in early May, when Baxter at the CRO also
came out strongly in favour of the United Kingdom Government taking
the initiative over federation by means of an Officials Conference.
Baxter argued that the British Government needed to act promptly in
order to pre-empt the emergence of greater unity in central Africa
on this issue as this would almost certainly lead to demands for
far greater powers for a proposed federal government than the United
27
Kingdom Government would be prepared to concede. The one discour¬
aging note for Cohen was that Baxter's views were not in accord with
those of his Secretary of State. Gordon Walker had moderated his
position, in the light of the recent talks with Huggins, and no
longer advocated a flat rejection of federation or amalgamation.
Nonetheless, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary was strongly arguing
for a delay over any British Government moves on federation, until
it became clearer how the new bi^Trriual Governors' Conference was
working. Gordon Walker's hope was that Southern Rhodesia would prove
to be co-operating with the new closer co-ordination machinery and so
remove the need for any early moves towards federation.
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In maintaining this view the Commonwealth Relations Secretary
was at odds, by early May, not only with the Colonial Office, but
also with his own officials, who were by this stage firmly convinced
28
of the need for a British Government initiative over central Africa.
The collective view of the officials at both these government depart¬
ments was that unless the Government in the United Kingdom was clearly
seen to be seriously considering other forms of closer association,
short of amalgamation, then Southern Rhodesia would withdraw into
isolationism and the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials would boycott
the Executive Council and oppose and obstruct the Government in the
Legislative Council and elsewhere. The result of these actions would
be to increase support within the Rhodesias for union with South
Africa and decrease the chances of African development. Egually, it
was important that the British Government's intervention achieved a
successful conclusion, as failure would result in virtually the same
conseguences in central Africa as if the United Kingdom had taken no
initiative at all. On this understanding, the officials of the
Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices jointly proposed a full
conference on closer associatiom, preceded by a preparatory conference
of officials from the four governments involved.
"It would probably be best not to describe this
meeting of officials as a conference, but
merely to arrange for officials to meet here to
sketch out proposals which might subseguently be
considered by a full dress conference."29
Gordon Walker's remaining hopes that Southern Rhodesia would
co-operate with the new Governors' Conference on central Africa, even
though no moves on closer association were in the offing, were dashed
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during late June and early July. In that short space of time the
Southern Rhodesian Government clearly demonstrated that it would
prove as obstructive over the Rhodesias-Nyasaland conference as it
had been for the last eighteen months of the CAC, unless moves towards
the political integration of central Africa were forthcoming from
Britain. In late June the Southern Rhodesian Government opposed the
proposed establishment of a central African tourist board and then,
in early July, it rejected the Rhodesias-Nyasaland conference's
secretariat's scheme for a united agricultural and veterinary
research department. The latter decision was of particular signifi¬
cance as Benson and Parry attached a great deal of importance to the
scheme because, "apart from the valuable contribution it would have
made to the development of the area, it was thought that its accept¬
ance or rejection by the Southern Rhodesian Government would provide
a valuable indication of the extent to which that Government was pre¬
pared to co-operate on a central African basis under the new set-up".
As a result of these decisions Parry was convinced that it was point¬
less proceeding with the Rhodesias-Nyasaland conference, unless
Southern Rhodesia could be persuaded to alter its attitude and
31
co-operate. This opinion was reinforced by Benson in meetings
in London in late July.
Benson left Griffiths and officials from the Colonial Office and CRO
in no doubt that the Southern Rhodesian Government would not co-operate
until a clear, definite and positive position with regard to closer
association was adopted by London. Benson was convinced that if
Southern Rhodesia did not obtain satisfaction on this point then it
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would be "driven into the arms of the Union" with the strong likeli¬
hood of Northern Rhodesia following it. Only the political union of
central Africa could, in Benson's opinion, prevent South Africa
enveloping the Rhodesias. By arguing strongly for Cohen's proposed
officials conference, Benson persuaded Griffiths to support both it
and the closest possible co-operation in central Africa, providing
that the British Government's responsibilities to the African peoples
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of the northern territories were safeguarded. With both Welensky
and Huggins also indicating their support for the United Kingdom
Government calling an officials conference,both the principle of a
British initiative and the form it was to take had been basically
decided by the end of July 1950.
It is of over-riding importance that the central reason for producing
the British Government's initiative over closer association for
central Africa, was the fear that in its absence both the Rhodesias
were likely to merge with the Union of South Africa.It comprised
the main argument in Gordon Walker's minute to Attlee of 5 October
1950, officially requesting the convening of the officials conference-
a request supported by Griffiths. In the minute, Gordon Walker argued
that although Southern Rhodesia's desire for amalgamation could not
be satisfied, by associating the Crown colony as closely as was prac¬
ticable with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia the "very real" danger
of Southern Rhodesia turning to the Union could be countered.^
The official request of 5 October also indicated a marked change in
the attitude of the Commonwealth Relations Secretary with regard to
federation. From holding a position of fierce opposition in early
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March, Gordon Walker had changed, by October 1950, into an articulate
advocate of federation. This transformation was based squarely on
his growing conviction of the Afrikaner danger.
Between the attainment of a rough consensus for an officials confer¬
ence in July and the formal application in October only two diffi¬
culties occurred. One was the recurrence of friction between the
Colonial and the Commonwealth Relations Offices and the other was a
challenge, from Colby the Governor of Nyasaland, to the unofficial
consensus favouring a British Government initiative.
The dispute between the Colonial and the Commonwealth Relations
Offices concerned responsibility for the officials conference.
In co-operating with the CRO in the planning of this event the
Colonial Office officials concerned became frustrated and annoyed
with what they regarded as the haughty attitude of their opposite
numbers at the Commonwealth Relations Office. Williams and Lambert
in particular were convinced that the CRO would have liked, if they
could, to edge the Colonial Office out of the officials conference
and the process of initiating closer association in central Africa
altogether. This seemingly trivial rift is important because it
indicates that the resentment felt by the Colonial Service Officers
in the northern territories towards the Southern Rhodesian officials
was echoed, albeit in a minor key, in Whitehall.
Colby's challenge of the generally accepted view on closer associa¬
tion in central Africa, was based on long-standing arguments that
were to sustain his opposition to federation until the end of 1952.
In September 1950, Colby opposed the calling of an officials conference
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and rejected the arguments for closer association because Nyasaland's
African population was totally opposed and the opinion of its small
European community was hardening against the idea. He argued that
the territory should be concentrating on economic development rather
than political integration. Nonetheless, Nyasaland would not boycott
an officials conference if the three other governments sent represen¬
tatives.^ Colby neatly turned the arguments being used in support
of the creation of a federation to his own ends. He argued that the
heavy Afrikaner immigration into the Rhodesias, coupled with the strong
likelihpod of a reactionary successor to Huggins, greatly increased
the danger of the Rhodesias being absorbed by the Union. Nyasaland
had no wish to be absorbed as well and so it opposed closer associa¬
tion with the Rhodesias, and instead favoured links with east Africa.
Colby continued:
"Personally, I fail to see what advantage this
territory is likely to gain from closer politi¬
cal union with Southern Rhodesia. Whatever they
may say to the contrary, we are convinced that
their only interest in this territory is that
they want our labour and I find it guite incon¬
ceivable that money raised by taxation in Southern
Rhodesia would be used for the development of this
country".38
Faced with Colby's rejection of his policy, Cohen's primary concern
was to ensure that the Nyasaland Governor's opposition was not used as
39
grounds for postponing or not holding the officials conference.
The support of Lloyd, and complete backing from Northern Rhodesia,
ensured that this did not occur.^ As the officials conference
approached, Colby's attitude hardened. He continued strongly to
maintain that Southern Rhodesia would not finance Nyasaland's
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development after closer union. Such a course of action would not
be politically viable, given the attitude of Southern Rhodesia's
European population. As to the Afrikaner threat, Colby refuted the
argument put forward by Benson, amongst others, that closer associa¬
tion would prevent Southern Rhodesia being absorbed into South Africa.
He claimed that Southern Rhodesia would inevitably be incorporated
into the Union when it next experienced an extended recession and
that the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia would, in all probability,
be drawn into the Union as well. Colby gave Cohen some forewarning
of problems that would arise during the officials conference when he
informed him that Nyasaland's representatives would be briefed not to
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commit themselves to any proposals.
The officials conference was held in the Commonwealth Relations
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Office between 5 and 31 March 1950, under the chairmanship of Baxter.
It was in no small measure due to the skills of Baxter and Cohen that
the officials conference reached any conclusions at all. In January,
prior to the opening of the conference, a definite difference in
approach to the issues involved surfaced between the two Rhodesias'
delegations during talks in Salisbury. The Northern Rhodesian
officials argued that all discussions of specific issues, such as
subjects for joint services and the division of functions, must, by
necessity, await the decision as to the form which closer association
would take. The Southern Rhodesian officials held the opposite
view, that only after all the specific items had been agreed upon
could an informed decision be made as to the mechanism that would
administer the united features of the territories. Although Benson
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and Parry managed to prevent a confrontation over this issue, it
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re-surfaced almost immediately at the conference.
The issue of which should come first, specific areas of co-operation
or the form the overall association was to take proved such a con¬
tentious problem because of underlying factors. What was in fact at
issue was whether closer association should take the form of amalgama¬
tion or a federal structure. The delegations from the northern
territories shared their respective government's animosity towards
amalgamation, regarding it as a means by which Southern Rhodesia
sought to dominate the area and gain control of Northern Rhodesia's
finances and Nyasaland's labour force. It is immaterial whether
or not this did underpin Southern Rhodesia's promotion of amalgama¬
tion. The important point is that the officials and unofficials of
the northern territories were in no doubt that it was Southern
Rhodesia's goal.
Those participating in the conference were well aware that failure
on their part to recommend a solution for closer association would
effectively stop any progress toward political union for the fore¬
seeable future. All those participating in the conference believed,
to varying degrees, that without political union for central Africa
the region stood in real danger of being absorbed into South Africa.
It was also realised that to avoid this fate and secure agreement
for closer association, compromise would be necessary. Despite this
the Southern Rhodesian delegation strenuously pursued their arguments
for amalgamation, which was implacably opposed by the officials from
the northern terrtories.
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In previous attempts to produce union in central Africa, most notably
the Bledisloe Commission, the issue upon which the arguments in
favour of union inevitably foundered was the fundamental difference
between Southern Rhodesia's approach to African development and that
of the northern territories. This apparently insuperable problem
was supposedly circumvented by Benson, with the aid of officials
from the territorial governments. In their report on central Africa's
various African populations, Benson and his associates seemed to have
reconciled the irreconcilable. This illusion was achieved by denying
that the differences between Southern Rhodesia's African policy and
that of the northern territories were as large, in practice and
intent, as had been claimed or at first appeared. The report, claimed
that the differences which remained had been receding for some time
A8
and would, given time, disappear altogether. That this report
went largely unchallenged and was indeed subsequently used as an
argument for dismissing legitimate African fears, indicates that
there was a widespread desire amongst the European communities and
governments involved for the creation of some form of central African
bloc, although they had reservations about any particular scheme.
The driving force behind this support for closer association in
central Africa was the fear of South Africa absorbing all, or part,
of the region. This fear aided Cohen and Baxter in their attempts
to create the impression of united support for federation in central
Africa. Their policy succeeded in that the Federation of the
Rhodesias and Nyasaland was established in 1953, but in the long run
it also failed. It failed because the Federation was built on one
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illusion of unity and a denial of differences with the result that
no section of central African society would give it more than
cursory support.
Cohen and Baxter were able to produce their unanimous support for
federation in central Africa because the delegates attending the
conference were all convinced about the imminence of the South
African threat. While omitting it from the published report, to
avoid embarrassing their respective governments, the officials left
no doubt that Afrikaner immigration and fear of absorption were
their central reasons for proposing closer association for central
Africa. This over-riding argument for federation was forwarded to
the officials'respective governments in a secret minute agreed
jointly at the end of the conference.
Cohen and Baxter presented their copy of the minute to their respec¬
tive Secretaries of State at the start of April. As it was on the
basis of their arguments that the British Government, for the first
time, sought to actively foster political union in central Africa,
we must examine these arguments carefully. It should be noted at the
outset, however, that all the arguments for federation presented in
the minutes had been raised on numerous occasions since the events
in 1948 which re-activated a widely perceived demand for closer
association. What was new was the force and detail given to these
views and also that all the separate arguments for closer association
had been drawn together into one single entity, strongly urging the
early federation of central Africa by means of a specified scheme.
In advocating specific proposals for a federation, the minutes also
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presented the arguments for the various other possible forms
closer association might take and rexplained why they had been
rejected. The single over-riding concern of the conference minutes
was to convince the respective governments of the need to act
speedily to produce a federal structure for central Africa.
In the Conference minutes it was argued that justification for
closer association based on economic factors, best utilisation of
resources and improved communications,had long been recognised as
carrying a great measure of validity.
"The force of these considerations has been felt
for many years, but Central Africa is now exposed
to a special danger which, in the view of the
Conference, makes it of compelling urgency that
the three territories should combine in defence
of their way of life. The danger lies in the
extension of Union influence over the Rhodesias.
The expansionist aims of certain Union politicians
are well known. Allied with the alarming increase
of Arfikaner immigration in recent years into
Southern and Northern Rhodesia they are felt to
constitute a serious and immiment threat to the
independent existence of the two territories".A9
The officials' minutes acknowledged that not all the immigrants
posed a danger, but emphasised the large numbers that refused to
assimilate and instead formed concentrations of Afrikaner families,
producing areas in both the Rhodesias where the Boer was in the
majority. To gauge accurately the truelevels of Afrikaner immi¬
gration a way had to be found to discount non-Boer immigration from
South Africa and those Afrikaners who intended to return soon to
the Union. Using membership of the Dutch Reformed Church as a fairly
reliable guide, the Afrikaner population in Northern Rhodesia was
estimated at over 18%, and in Southern Rhodesia at around 16?o.
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These levels were seen as being dangerously high, particularly as
it was claimed that organisations in the Union were encouraging
committed Afrikaner Nationalists to emigrate to the Rhodesias. In
concentrating on this issue the draftees of the minutes were bringing
to a head the concern that had been growing in government circles,
particularly in Northern Rhodesia and the Colonial Office for over
a year.^^ A central African Federation was seen as being essential
if Afrikaner immigration was to be effectively controlled.
"If a guota system is to be adapted for dealing with
this matter in Central Africa, it will be much more
effective if operated on a federal basis for the whole
area than if each territorial government has to oper¬
ate it separately. First, a single guota structure is
easier to operate than three separate systems.
Secondly, it is useless for the Southern or Northern
Rhodesian Government to limit Afrikaner immigration
if the other Government is not taking the same action,
since movement between the territories is not easy to
control. Thirdly, since Union-born immigrants cannot
be excluded altogether, the operation of a single
Central African guota would make it easier to reduce
the influx of Afrikaners into these parts of the
territories where further settlement is not desired
by counting against the full guota those Afrikaners
at present essential to the economy of certain limited
areas. For example, a certain number of Union-born
miners are essential at present to the working of the
copperbelt; this necessary immigration counting against
a limited quota should of itself do much to cut down
the number of Union-born immigrants to be admitted to
other parts of Central Africa. Fourthly, it would be
easier politically for a Central African Federation
Government to impose and operate a quota system than
for Colonial Governments in respect of which His Majesty's
Government in the United Kingdom still exercise
full responsibility. Finally, Northern Rhodesia
alone should have great difficulty in operating a
quota system against Afrikaners in view of their
increasing influence in that territory".31
The minutes showed a conviction that unless the growth of the Afrikaner
element in the Rhodesias was at least slowed down, then all the
-174-
economic, cultural and political advancement of the Africans that
had occurred in the territories would soon be undermined and
lost.
It can be convincingly argued that the progress in the position
of the Africans claimed by the three central African territories
was grossly exaggerated. It was not necessary, however, to accept all
the supposed benefits for the Africans under the status quo to be
convinced that their position would be infinitely worse under an
apartheid framework of government for the region. The Southern
Rhodesian 'native policy', in particular, was not the undervalued
liberal achievement which the Comparative Survey of Native Policy
claimed but neither was it as far beyond the pale as some of
federation's opponents in the United Kingdom claimed.
The conference minutes also raised the spectre of South African
economic pressure being applied and emphasised the vulnerability of
the separate territories to this pressure. The minutes also dwelt
on the danger of Southern Rhodesia opting into the Union if it
experienced a sustained economic depression. This potential problem
- and the preventive of a larger unit which could diffuse any econ¬
omic pressure from the Union and, because it had a wider based
economy, resist the onset of recession in any particular area - had,
as we have seen, already been forcefully impressed upon the British
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Government by Huggins. A further argument supporting the urgent
need for the rapid establishment of a British bloc in central
Africa was the supposed imminent retirement of Huggins as Prime
Minister of Southern Rhodesia. Any successor, it was argued, would
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be far less liberal than Huggins, lessening the chances of agree¬
ment for political union in central Africa and increasing the possibil¬
ity of Southern Rhodesia eventually turning to the Union. Again this
prognosis was not new, having been stated repeatedly by the Governor
of Southern Rhodesia.Any delay, the officials warned, would
most probably result in the opportunity for the creation of a
federation in central Africa being lost for good.
The case for the formation of a federation of the Rhodesias and
Nyasaland was further advanced in separate notes by Baxter and Cohen
during April. Baxter warned that Southern Rhodesia had made major
concessions over the proposed federal constitution, whereas the ground
given up by the British Government over responsibility for the northern
territories' African populations consisted of "changes of form
rather than of substance". As a result, Baxter concluded that there
was very little room for manoeuvre or alteration to the proposals.^
In response to doubts enamating from Colby as to the extent that a
federated central Africa would be able to resist pressure from South
Africa, Cohen sought to overwhelm the remaining reservations of
Griffiths and Dugdale, the Minister for Colonial Affairs. In mid-
April, following talks with the Secretary and the Minister of State
on two consecutive days,~^ Cohen produced a further extensive memoran¬
dum in support of federation for central Africa. In it he stressed
the reasons why it was required, other than the specific danger of
Afrikaner immigration dealt with at such length in the memorandum of
31 March.
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Cohen argued that resistence to the spreading influence of South
African ideas, propaganda and philosophy within Southern Rhodesia
was dependent on the continued development of the more liberal
elements and ideas within the territory. This would prove to be
particularly important after Huggins' retirement and, in Cohen's view
was dependent upon Southern Rhodesia being federated with the northern
territories.
"It is, I believe, generally realised in Southern
Rhodesia that they must either look north or
south; they are too small to carry on alone.
If they cannot look north, those who want to
look south will inevitably gain influence ..."
As for Northern Rhodesia, Cohen explicitly accepted that the Northern
Rhodesian Government could not advance the development of the
African population in the manner, or at the pace, they would have
wished because it, of necessity, had to work in tandem and by agree¬
ment with the European community. Of far more importance was Cohen's
implicit acknowledgment that the government in Northern Rhodesia
had to avoid a major constitutional crisis with the European
settlers because of the likelihood that their appeals for support
to the Union would not go unheeded. Cohen was, in effect, arguing
that federation would make no difference, in practice, to the
regular compromises the Northern Rhodesian Government had to make to
retain its authority over the territory. Whatever the theoretical
position, federation would not adversely affect government in Northern
Rhodesia as it was administered in actuality and it would gain the
clear advantage of decisively lessening the danger of Southern
Rhodesia turning to the south. However, if the federal scheme was
177-
not implemented, and soon, the consequences would be severe for
the whole of central Africa.
"The economic and other links between the two
Rhodesias are already so close that if Southern
Rhodesia succumbed Northern Rhodesia would, I
am sure, succumb sooner or later. In that
event Nyasaland would, I believe, follow suit.
All her links are with the south and, although
theoretically she could link up with East
Africa, the distance from Zomba to the nerve
centres of East Africa is so great that I am
extremely sceptical of such a development".58
Cohen was seeking to show that if the territories of central Africa
remained separate they would eventually be swallowed up piecemeal
by the Union. Colby's notion, that the Rhodesias would be incor¬
porated whatever the framework of government in central Africa and
that Nyasaland could only be saved by it remaining outwith the
proposed federation and linked to east Africa instead, was dis¬
missed .
"Given a willingness on the part of His Majesty's
Government to agree to closer association and to
entrust increased powers, although over a
limited range of subjects, to a federal Central
African Government and Legislature, I believe
that we could certainly count on such a Govern¬
ment being firmly attached to the British con¬
nection and on its providing an effective counter
to the influence of the Union".59
The only concession Cohen made to the existence and aspirations of
the vast majority of central Africa's inhabitants was by arguing
that only by the close linking of the Rhodesias could Southern
Rhodesia's African policy be continued along a liberal line. Only
if Southern Rhodesia supported the progressive advance of its
African inhabitants could a similar policy be fully implemented in
Northern Rhodesia.
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Thus, Cohen argued that the African inhabitants of the region would
benefit both economically and in terms of political development,
from federation, particularly if the threat of absorbtion by the
Union were removed.
For all Cohen's persuasiveness Griffiths remained determined to take
no precipitory action over the Officials' recommendations. In his
reluctance to move over the federal issue, the Secretary of State
was strongly supported by Dugdale, who disliked both the Officials'
scheme and the concept of federation in central Africa as such.^
He was not, however, supported by Gordon Walker and indeed one of the
main features of the debate on federation in the period from the
Officials' conference to the Labour Party's loss of office, was the
growing division between Gordon Walker - supported not only by his
Officials at the Commonwealth Relations Office but also by the
majority at the Colonial Office - and Griffiths.^
As we have seen Gordon Walker had moved progressively from the
position he held when he took charge of the CRO as Secretary of
State, namely, opposing either amalgamation or federation for central
Africa, to a stance, in April 1951, that totally endorsed the Cohen/
Baxter arguments for federation. Without question the argument
which produced this dramatic alteration in the Secretary of State's
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opinion was that of the Afrikaner threat from the Union. As a
result Gordon Walker was determined to vigorously pursue the Officials'
proposals and sought recommendation of them by the British Government.
The Commonwealth Relations Secretary was convinced that the British
Government's endorsement of the Officials' scheme was an essential
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pre-requisite if the proposed conference for later in the year was
to succeed in establishing a federated central Africa.
When it became clear, during April, that Griffiths was not pre¬
pared to endorse the proposals,^ and that members of the Cabinet
held reservations about the feasibility of the scheme, believing the
European population to be insufficient,^ Gordon Walker sought to
gain Attlee's support before the issue was discussed at Cabinet again
on 31 May 1951. At their two meetings on 23 and 25 May, Gordon Walker
emphasised to Attlee that Huggins was keen for the British Government
to endorse the Officials' scheme in order to enable him to take a
positive line on the proposals in Southern Rhodesia.^ Lambert and
Lloyd were at the same time pressing Griffiths along similar lines.^
"Sir Godfrey Huggins' letter of 17 May shows
plainly that he sets great store on HMG's
commendation of the report being forthcoming.
Unless HMG do at least give a lead which will
ensure that the report receives full and fair
consideration everywhere there can be little
hope of its being accepted. If it is not
accepted, then Southern Rhodesia is virtually
certain to turn towards South Africa and a
great opportunity will have been lost". 67
Griffiths, however, resisted these arguments and pursued a policy
in which the United Kingdom, whilst recommending that all interested
persons and parties studied the Officials' proposals very carefully,
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retained a position of studied neutrality. The Colonial Secretary
accepted in Cabinet, on 31 May, all the arguments presented in the
Officials' report for the creation of a federal state and stated his
belief that the constitutional safeguards for the African inhabitants
were adequate. Nonetheless, Griffiths emphasised that no plan for
federation could succeed unless the Africans could be convinced that
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it would offer them effective protection. As African opinion
remained to be convinced on this point he felt that the proposed
central African conference should be concerned only with the further
consideration of the Officials' scheme because it could not reach
final conclusions. Gordon Walker in the end reluctantly conceded to
this position and was persuaded that the British Government's public
announcement should not include a recommendation of the Officials'
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scheme. Although disappointed, Gordon Walker at least had the
satisfaction of knowing that the Minister of Defence and Joint Chiefs
of Staff were also now in favour of closer association in central
Africa,^ albeit at Cohen's prompting.^ Although Gordon Walker
failed to get the Officials' proposals endorsed he did manage to
ensure that the British Government's announcement went as far as it
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was possible to go short of endorsement.
What emerges most clearly is that if it had not been for Griffiths,
supported by Dugdale, the Attlee Government would, in all probability,
have sought to establish federation in central Africa in 1951.
The Colonial Secretary's opposition to any precipitant moves over
federation was based on the principled position that the African popu¬
lations of the northern territories must be at least consulted before
any decisive action was commenced. Indeed, had it not been for
Griffiths' adamant insistence, no promise to consult with the African
populations would have been forthcoming from the Labour Government.
Gordon Walker and Morrison, who had only recently succeeded Bevin as
Foreign Secretary, were strongly opposed to any such commitment.^
Griffiths' refusal to overlook the views of central Africa's indigenous
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people resulted in a further clash with Gordon Walker on 4 June.
The Secretary for Commonwealth Relations pressed Griffiths to accept,
in the government's announcement of the central African Ministers'
conference, the expression of the hope that the conference would
result in an agreed scheme being placed before Parliament. The
Colonial Secretary maintained the position he had adopted in Cabinet,
that the conference was a mechanism to enable the interested parties
to air their views on the Officials' report and that the conference
would not take any quanta tative decisions. He argued that impressions
to the contrary must not be conveyed as this would lead the local
communities in central Africa, particularly the Africans of Nyasaland
and Northern Rhodesia, to conclude that the Secretaries of State's
visit was to gain an endorsement for the Officials' scheme, rather
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than to seek views and information. As with the question of whether
to commend the Officials' scheme or not, it was Griffiths' view which
was adopted by the Cabinet.
One factor that greatly aided the Colonial Secretary's success in
carrying his policy in Cabinet and resisting the pressure from his
Officials, was the high regard in which he was held by his Cabinet
colleagues and the Prime Minister. Griffiths' tenure at the Ministry
of National Insurance was widely acknowledged to have been a definite
success and Attlee had even considered him as an alternative to
Morrison as Bevin's successor at the Foreign Office in early March
1951. ^ Undoubtedly another consideration that weighed in Griffiths'
favour was that the Government was keen to avoid any further serious
divisions in the wake of Bevan and Wilson's resignation from the
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Cabinet on 23 April. Griffiths' initial support of Bevan against
Gaitskell and Shinwell over increased defence expenditure, however
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indecisive, would not have been forgotten, and the possibility
of Griffiths renewing this support from the back benches, if he resigned
over the issue of federation, could not be ignored. These arguments
should not be over-emphasised for the federal issue was, after all,
minor compared to Labour's pressing problems elsewhere. Nonetheless,
these factors contributed to Griffiths' success in maintaining his
position on the federation issue as the Government's policy. It-
has been argued that the Labour Government's decision not to recommend
the Officials' scheme nor to present it as a beneficial policy to
the African inhabitants of the territories concerned, precluded any
chance of federation being accepted by the African populations,
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especially by those in the northern territories. Given the long
history of African opposition, in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia,
to closer association with Southern Rhodesia, it is debatable whether
even a policy of strong commitment to the Officials' scheme from
its announcement in June 1951 by the Imperial and territorial
governments would have succeeded in producing African endorsement.
The opposition of Northern Rhodesia's African population to any
possibility of association with Southern Rhodesia, had been made
abundantly clear by their response to the attempts by Gore-Browne
to win their support for the general scheme that initially emerged
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from the February 1949 Victoria Falls Conference. One immediate
consequence of Griffiths' prevention of the British Government
from commending the Officials' proposals, however, was to ensure that
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Huggins also did not endorse the scheme.He may not have intended
to commend the proposed scheme in any case, but Griffiths' stance
decided the matter. It also encouraged Huggins and his government
to distance themselves from the whole controversy and debate that
surrounded the proposed scheme in Southern Rhodesia. In his state¬
ment accompanying the publication of the Officials' Report in
Southern Rhodesia in early June, Huggins emphasised that the proposals
were not the Southern Rhodesian Government's and that the administra-
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tion had not committed itself to anything.
Between the publication of the report in June and the Secretaries
of State's visits to central Africa and the conference in September,
certain factors became increasingly clear. Perhaps the most important
was that Huggins and the United Party remained committed to seeking
the amalgamation of central Africa. The United Party Executive met
at Gwelo on 9 August and re-asserted its policy of pressing for
amalgamation, yet it also held out hope for Gordon Walker, Baxter
and Cohen, in that it conceded that if amalgamation proved impossible
to attain then the federal scheme would be accepted, providing certain
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modifications were made to it. The modifications that the
Southern Rhodesian Government visualised, however, were of a fairly
fundamental nature and were connected with a series of severe
criticisms of the Officials' proposals by members of the United
Party Cabinet.
In August both Tredgold and Beadle presented radical revisions of the
proposed scheme for discussion in the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet.
Both the Ministers' proposed changes would result in the federal
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scheme being transformed into virtual amalgamation. It is also worth
noting that Tredgold's memorandum exposed many of the superficial
claims and inaccuracies within the Comparative Survey of Native
Policy and flatly contradicted its central thesis, that the African
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policies of the three territories were drawing closer together.
There existed the strong belief amongst many of Southern Rhodesia's
leading political figures, amongst them Tredgold, Beadle, Greenfield,
Winterton and Fletcher, that the Officials' proposals were unworkable.
Several features of the scheme that were particularly harshly criticised
were the presence of nominated members in the proposed Federal Assembly,
t(ie position and role of the Minister for African Interests, the
postponement of full Dominion status and especially the division of
functions between the Federal and Territorial Authorities which
entailed all major matters affecting African interests being retained
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as Territorial responsibilities.
The opponents and their criticisms of the Officials' Report were
formidable, but London remained confident that if Huggins gave a
strong lead on the issue an agreement could still be reached on the
basis of the March proposals. The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister
was not prepared to commit himself, however, until Britain had not
only publicly supported the federal scheme, but had also agreed
to abide by any recommendations that were forthcoming from the
September conference in central Africa. As the conference approached,
it also became increasingly apparent that Huggins shared many of the
criticisms of the scheme held by his Ministers and that he too
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wanted the Report's recommendations radically revised. Another
-185-
factor which encouraged Huggins to remain inactive and withdrawn
from the federation controversy was his growing concern about a
possible split in his Cabinet and United Party over the issue.
Halsted, J R Dendy Young, and a handful of discontented United Party
MPs were seriously considering during these months breaking away and,
together with certain of the Liberal members, forming themselves into
a stronger opposition.^
With amalgamation clearly an unrealistic goal whilst the Labour
Party remained in Office and in the light of the unofficials in the
northern territories opposition to a unitary form of government for
central Africa, Huggins adopted a similar attitude to the prospect
of a federal state emerging along the lines of the Officials' pro¬
posals as he had done to the CAC. If federation proved an unsuit¬
able vehicle for progressing towards an amalgamated, fully independent
unit, then its failure could be used to provide convincing proof
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of the need for such a state. This viewpoint did not prevent
him from seeking significant concessions from the British Government
over the terms for federation. The general consensus within the
Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices during 1951 was that
some sort of accommodation was possible with the Southern Rhodesians
over federation. Griffiths again appears as a solitary voice
insisting that African aspirations had to be considered and be
accorded a position of egual importance with those of Southern
Rhodesia.^
The views of both Griffiths and Gordon Walker, on federation, were
strongly reinforced by their visits to their respective parts of
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central Africa. Griffiths was greatly impressed at the extent
and depth of African opposition, in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia,
to closer association of any sort or form with Southern Rhodesia.
Whilst accepting that this opposition was organised and orchestrated
by the Congress in each territory, the Colonial Secretary found
African opinion united in opposing federation. Griffiths realised
that this opposition permeated African society and was not just the
view of the educated minority. As a result he returned to London
convinced that the United Kingdom could not and should not impose
federation in the face of such total opposition, but would need to
allay African fears and win them away from the complete rejection
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of any form of political association with Southern Rhodesia.
Gordon Walker was surprised by the strength of support for amalgama¬
tion that he encountered in 'responsible guarters' in Southern
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Rhodesia. He should have been fore-warned since Liesching had
returned from a visit to Southern Rhodesia, in July, convinced
that many of the prominent figures opposed to the federal scheme were
determined to extend Southern Rhodesia's 'native policy' to the
northern territories, preferably by amalgamation, but failing that,
by means of the federal government gaining responsibility for African
91
affairs. The main impact on Gordon Walker of his visit, however,
was to confirm to him the extent of the Afrikaner danger.
"I am more alarmed than ever that Southern
Rhodesia will go to the Union if we cut her
off from the north". 92
As the date for the opening of the central Africa conference neared,
Griffiths experienced great difficulties in persuading African
representatives to attend. His speech to the Nyasaland Protectorate
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Council on 1 September failed to gain their agreement to send a dele¬
gation. This problem of overwhelming African opposition to federa¬
tion, an extreme reluctance to discuss the issue and a refusal to
attend the Secretaries of State's conference, combined with reports
of Huggins' attitude as to the alterations he wanted in the proposed
scheme, led Griffiths, at the start of September, to seek to have
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the conference postponed. His proposed four-month postponement
was flatly rejected by Gordon Walker who suggested that Griffiths
should emphasise to the African leaders that the conference was only
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to discuss proposals and not to reach any final decisions.
It was only after the Colonial Secretary promised that federation
would only be discussed not endorsed, and that absolutely no
decisions would be taken at the Victoria Falls Conference, that the
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Nyasaland Protectorate Council (NPC) agreed to send two delegates.
With Nyasaland's Africans having been persuaded to attend the con¬
ference and in the light of Huggins' new suggestion - that the
conference be cancelled and replaced by talks between himself, the
Secretaries of State and the northern territories' Governors in
order to agree on the details of the scheme, including amendments -
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Griffiths dropped his call for the conference's postponement. In
Northern Rhodesia the African Representative Council agreed to send
representatives to the conference, but its members completely
rejected Griffiths' attempts to persuade them to consider the
federal proposals.
The Victoria Falls Conference of 18 and 21 September 1951, on closer
association in central Africa achieved very little as the British
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Governrnent had intended. Before the convening of the conference was
even announced, the British Cabinet had agreed that its function
would be to act as a forum for the expression of views and hope¬
fully to identify some common ground. Any greater achievements
would have been totally undermined by Griffiths' concessions to the
NPC and in any case both the Northern Rhodesian unofficials and
Southern Rhodesian delegations were fully aware of the limited scope
of the conference's remit prior to its commencement. The Southern
Rhodesian Ministers accepted, or so Gordon Walker believed, that
the September conference could not be the concluding one, "but
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merely a stage in the process of discussion". Griffiths had,
moreover, informed the Northern Rhodesian unofficials during their
discussions on 12 September, that as he favoured federation he wanted
to avoid the United Kingdom Government having to face the dilemma of
whether or not to impose federation in the face of total African
opposition in the northern territories. Accordingly, the Colonial
Secretary agreed that the task for the Victoria Falls Conference
would be to avoid a breakdown, secure an adjournment and have the
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talks re-convened in London in mid-1952.
The Southern Rhodesian Government may well have accepted that further
conferences would be necessary, but it intended that specific amend¬
ments to the scheme would still be discussed. Huggins organised a
meeting between representatives from his own and the two opposition
parties on 3 September, to see if a common position could be estab¬
lished. Agreement was duly reached by Greenfield, A R W Stumbles and
H H Davies, on a joint position for the Secretaries of State's
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conference later in the month, which included two Houses of Assembly,
the abolition of the African Affairs Board, the termination of the
Congo Basin Treaties, a federal government veto on all constitutional
changes, whether federal or territorial, all four governments to
be responsible to the Commonwealth Secretary and not the Colonial
Secretary, and Southern Rhodesia to retain the right to secede for
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the first ten years. Clearly Greenfield had been forced to com¬
promise Huggins' position on certain points, most notably the second
chamber, in order to obtain agreement. However, the option of
Southern Rhodesian secession from a federated central Africa at
any stage of its first ten years, would have fitted Huggins'
strategy - as he had adopted a similar attitude to federation as he
had to the CAC. Whatever the amount of compromise in the agreement,
what it did show was that Southern Rhodesian expectations for the
September conference were far higher than what actually occurred.
When Attlee announced the date for a general election the day after
the conference opened, Gordon Walker and Griffiths' limited goals
for the conference were reduced even further. Keen to return to
the UK as quickly as possible, the Secretaries of State's main new
aim for the truncated conference was to achieve the agreement of all
participants to attend when it was re-convened the following year.
Nevertheless some progress was made. All those attending the
conference appeared to have accepted a new policy of partnership
for central Africa. Moreover, the assurance from J S Moffat,
Northern Rhodesia's nominated member for African interests, that
Northern Rhodesia's Africans would consider federation if a policy
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of partnership was defined and implemented, held out some hope of
gaining African support for the scheme. Also, Huggins, Welensky and
Gordon Walker were all agreed on the grave danger of 'Krugerism' and
of the probability of Southern Rhodesia entering the Union if federal
tion was not implemented.
Federation might have been essential to these men but C R Kumbikano,
on behalf of the NPC claimed that federation would act as the thin
end of the amalgamationist wedge. The refusal of Kumbikano, D L Yamba
and the other African representatives^^ to even discuss federation
irked the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister who had also been greatly
annoyed by the timing of Attlee's election announcement. Huggins gave
vent to his frustration by calling for the expulsion of the African
delegates so that federation could be discussed. Welensky supported
him in this demand and a major confrontation ensued between Griffiths
and Huggins. When the Colonial Secretary's ultimatum,that if the
African delegates were requested to leave, then the British Govern¬
ment's representatives would withdraw as well, was supported by
Gordon Walker, albeit in more placatory language, and by Barrow's
declaration that the Nyasaland unofficials would follow suit, Huggins
allowed the matter to drop. The heated nature of the exchange
between Huggins/Welensky and Griffiths were doubtless fueled, in
part, by Welensky's awareness of Griffiths' general lack of support
for Gordon Walker's attempts at the early establishment of a federa-
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tion in central Africa. The break up of the conference was avoided,
but the deep resentment the confrontation engendered was to have
serious consequences for the formation of federation, as we will see.
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Nonetheless, having weathered the crisis, the conference did manage
to agree on a number of measures which brought the prospect of
federation nearer. It was agreed that the protectorate status of
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be preserved under any federal
scheme, that amalgamation would only be introduced if a majority of
the inhabitants in all three Territories desired it, that land and
land settlement questions and the political advancement of all the
peoples of the northern territories would remain the responsibility of
their Territorial Governments, and not subject to any federal authority.
These assurances represented substantial concessions by Huggins and
his fellow Southern Rhodesian representatives and apparently con¬
firmed his conversion to federation from alamgamation. With the
imminent prospect of the return of the Conservative Party to office
in the UK however, it is debatable how far Huggins was committed to
these assurances. Certainly his vigorous re-assertion of the
advantages of amalgamation over federation in January 1952, would
seem to indicate that he had no intention of treating these agree¬
ments as binding.
Griffiths and Gordon Walker returned to London with the Labour
Government committed to the policy of federation for central Africa,
as in the Conference's final communique, which had however also noted
African opposition. The problem of whether or not federation should
be imposed against the wishes of the African peoples had been avoided,
in part, because it was hoped that the discussions on the introduction
of a policy of partnership would resolve the dilemma by producing some
measure of African acquiescence. This hope of the Secretary of State
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was not unrealistic as both Moffat and Welensky remained confident
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that some African support would emerge, and Colby and Rennie had
given assurances that, providing the British Government strongly
endorsed the federal scheme, there was the distinct chance that by
the middle of 1932 the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia
would be adopting a less negative approach.It may reasonably
be assumed, however, that a factor of at least egual importance in
determining Griffiths' and Gordon Walker's avoidance of the guestion
of imposing federation, was the knowledge that after the election it
might well no longer be their problem. At Attlee's request the
Secretaries of State compiled a joint Cabinet memorandum for immediate
circulation, but not to be considered by the Cabinet until after the
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election. This memorandum in which Cohen's hand is easily
discernable,never was considered by a Labour Cabinet, but it
remains, nonetheless, of great importance because it was central to
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the attitude adopted by the succeeding Conservative Administration.
Griffiths' and Gordon Walker's Cabinet memorandum made a number of
recommendations, including one that the British Government publicly
endorse the conclusions of the September Victoria Falls Conference
and support the principle of federation in central Africa along the
general lines of the proposals of the London conference of Officials.
The question of imposition was, in part, still avoided by the
confident hope that the acknowledged African opposition would recon¬
sider its stance in the light of the assurances agreed at the Victoria
Falls in September. The main thrust of the document, however,
concerned the danger posed by South Africa.
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"Important as the economic arguments in favour
of federation are, we are convinced on the
basis of our recent experience in Central
Africa that the political arguments are still
stronger."108
Griffiths and Gordon Walker expressed particular concern at the
level of immigration from the Union into the Rhodesias, especially
as they claimed to have "definite evidence that Afrikaner immigra¬
tion is being officially inspired". They had found the situation in
Southern Rhodesia worrying and felt that the formation of an
Afrikaner Nationalist Party in the territory on 9 September particu-
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larly disquieting. It was Northern Rhodesia, however, that
gave real cause for concern, with its considerably smaller European
population and the dependence of the mining industry on white South
African labour. Afrikaners were expected to gain five of the ten
European seats on the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council at the
next general election in 1933 and the fear common to both Rhodesias
was that Afrikaners would gain control of Northern Rhodesia resulting
in Southern Rhodesia being squeezed from the north and south. After
their visit to the territories the Secretaries of State had moved to
a position of full agreement with the fears Huggins and Welensky had
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strongly impressed upon them in April and May 1950. The Cabinet
memorandum warned that if the Rhodesias were absorbed into or domin¬
ated by, the Union, then Nyasaland would inevitably succumb.
"We are faced in Central Africa with pressure by a
country far stronger economically and industrially
than any of the Central African territories, led
by a militant Nationalist Party with expansionist
aims, anxious to strengthen its influence in the
north. This pressure can be countered only by an
equally firm policy of resistance to it both in
the political and economic spheres - a policy
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which must have the support of both the European
and African populations of the Central African
territories, and which in our view has little
chance of succeeding unless we can establish a
British bloc of territories in Central Africa
knit together by constitutional ties."111
Griffiths and Gordon Walker felt that the South African threat to
central Africa could not be over emphasised, but, in finally facing
up to the issue of whether or not federation should be imposed over
the emphatic opposition of the African inhabitants, the Secretaries
of State stated:
"The Afrikaner pressure, moreover, makes early
action urgent: but we should be strongly
opposed to any attempt to force the federa¬
tion proposals through in the face of the
present solid African opposition."112
Gordon Walker had finally gained the endorsement of the Officials'
federal scheme which he had been seeking since April, but at a price!
Admittedly, Griffiths and Gordon Walker held out high hopes of being
able to persuade African representatives to adopt a more conciliatory
line on the basis of the safeguards given at the Victoria Falls
Conference in September and providing Britain publicly promoted
federation. Moreover, the wording of the Secretaries of State's
opposition to the imposition of federation left the way open for this
view to be reversed in the event of even limited support for the
scheme being forthcoming from any sections of the African population.
Nonetheless, Griffiths and Gordon Walker had committed themselves to
opposing federation whilst African opposition was total, even though
they were convinced that if federation failed to materialise South
Africa would gain control of the region. Although other factors
undoubtedly intervened - most notably Huggins' fierce personal attack
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on Griffiths - and although Gordon Walker's commitment to opposing
imposition was lukewarm, it was this commitment, circulated to, but
not discussed by, the Cabinet that determined the Labour Party's




Huqqins' continued support Tor Amalgamation
The new Government lost no time in pursuing the federal issue.
By 30 October Griffiths and Gordon Walker had, on request, given
permission for the new Secretaries of State to see their memorandum
of 12 October and by the following day Lyttelton had accepted in
general its recommendations. Thus Churchill's administration, like
2
Attlee's before it, accepted both the economic argument and, more
importantly, the threat of incorporation by the Union, as the basis
for establishing a federation in central Africa.^ At the Cabinet
meeting on 13 November a memorandum compiled by Ismay, Lyttelton,
4
Salisbury and Woolton was discussed. In the memorandum it was
argued that the case for federation in British Central Africa was
based, partly on the three territories' economic inter-dependence,
but mainly on the need to create a stronger unit of government,
better able to resist the infiltration of Afrikaners, and their
ideas, from the Union of South Africa.^
Within a fortnight of the Conservative Party taking office, Huggins
proposed that he visit London for informal talks on federation.^
His initiative was welcomed by officials at the Colonial and
Commonwealth Relations Offices, partly because they were concerned
by reports reaching them which indicated that Huggins was experien¬
cing some difficulties in uniting his party in support of federation,
rather than amalgamation, and were alarmed at the possibility of an
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open split in the United Party occurring over the issue. It was
felt that the Financial Ministers' meeting in mid-January "would
g
provide good 'cover' for Sir Godfrey Huggins' visit."
However, in late October, Parry remained convinced that Huggins and
his Government had still not given up their hopes of forcing the
British Government into accepting some form of amalgamation. In
order to forestall such an attempt, Welensky and Beckett, at Parry's
urging, met with Huggins at Salisbury on 2 November, and stated
categorically that Northern Rhodesia's European population would
not accept amalgamation or any guasi-amalagamation scheme, but only
federation. As a result of this meeting Huggins agreed to con¬
cessions to facilitate an agreement with the British Government
over a federal scheme and persuaded his Cabinet to agree not to pursue
9
the alternative of amalgamation "for the time being". Thus, in
early November Huggins finally adopted Welensky's position on
closer association, namely, that amalgamation was not politically
feasible.
Although the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister continued to insist
that amalgamation remained the best form of closer association, he
sought to convince his Cabinet and party that federation must now be
accepted as the only realistic policy. This position, which he
maintained throughout November, was undermined by the fluent argu¬
ments of Tredgold and Beadle. These concentrated on the racial
prejudice and fears of Rhodesia's white minority and emphasised
10
constitutional developments in the Gold Coast. The difficulties
Huggins encountered in advancing this change in policy were a
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significant factor in his decision to raise the amalgamation issue with
London once more.
In December, Sir Godfrey informed Ismay that he would be re-opening the
amalgamation conundrum during their January 1952 discussions. Huggins
explained to the Commonwealth Secretary that his decision to press the
case for amalgamation yet again was to satisfy local opinion that every
effort had been made to attain amalgamation. He accepted that if and
when the British Government rejected his arguments for amalgamation the
talks could then turn to a detailed examination of the amendments he would
be seeking for the federal scheme."'""'" This was, no doubt, a sincere appraisal
of his motives at the time, when the talks commenced on 22 January. However,
contemporary evidence, which we will now review, suggests that Huggins'
was pressing the case for amalgamation in earnest and not merely doing
so for the benefit of the Southern Rhodesian electorate.
Sir Godfrey had made no secret of the fact that he believed amalgamation
12
to be the best method of uniting the three Territories. He had finally
and reluctantly dropped his support for amalgamation in favour of federation
after the Salisbury meeting had underlined the opposition he had encountered,
during the Victoria Falls Conference, from the northern territories
unofficials and their Governors. Another factor in the change was Rennie's
and Colby's belief that some measure of African acquiescence would be
forthcoming, if the federal scheme was strongly backed by the British
Government and their representatives in central Africa. Their assessment,
if accurate and accepted by Britain - which would be very reluctant to
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iritroduce closer association of any description if African opposi¬
tion was going to be total - would result in the federal scheme
becoming accepted as the only possible method of closer association
in central Africa.
However, Huggins was, no doubt, concerned by the extent of the
opposition he encountered to the proposals for federation during the
Southern Rhodesian Assembly debate on the constitition between 14 and
22 November. Some members rejected the Prime Minister's argument
that the only option for closer association was some form of
federation. More alarming, was the clear indication that many
Southern Rhodesians would prefer "nothing" to federation "even if
13
this ultimately meant a form of association with the Union", and
that members of his own party as well as the opposition were
14
receptive to the notion of union with South Africa. The extent
of opposition to the federal proposals within the Assembly caused
Huggins to reconsider his decision to publicly drop amalgamation as
being unrealistic. He sought to appease popular feeling in Southern
Rhodesia, and avoid antagonising his allies in Northern Rhodesia by
publicly reviewing the case for amalgamation and, simultaneously,
stressing to Ismay and Welensky the domestic necessity for his
actions and accepting, in advance, that his arguments would be
rejected. As we shall see, Huggins failed in his efforts to soothe
the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials' disquiet at his resurrection of
the case for amalgamation. Moreover, his own full commitment to
amalgamation was re-activated by disclosures at the CAC meeting of
28 December.
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Well before the December Council meeting concern was being expressed,
both in central Africa and London, at the continuing solidarity of the
Northern territories' Africans' opposition to federation. At the
end of October, Cohen was advising Lloyd that "it is clearly neces¬
sary to make a further vigorous attempt to bring African opinion
round to a true realisation of their own interests with regard to
15
the scheme". Then, at the CAC meeting in Salisbury, Colby and
Rennie declared categorically that African opposition was solid and
that there was absolutely no possibility of it altering or being
significantly influenced within the next twelve months, at least.
This was a reversal of their earlier belief which had swayed
Huggins in his decision to drop amalgamation in favour of federa¬
tion. The two Governors were convinced that if federation were to
be introduced it would have to be imposed from London, over the opposi¬
tion of the African inhabitants of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia.
Rennie and Colby's view was strongly endorsed by their respective
Secretaries for Native Affairs, R P Bush and V Fox-Strangeways:
the latter had only recently completed a tour of Nyasaland testing
the extent and strength of African opposition to federation.
Huggins was obviously unhappy at the repudiation of the main
reason for agreeing to postpone the September conference on closer
association until mid-1952. Nonetheless, as the general view now
was that any scheme for closer association in central Africa would
have to be imposed by the British Government over African opposition,
he felt that one of the strongest reasons for the United Kingdom
preferring federation to amalgamation had been removed. It was this
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belief, coupled with his concern at the depth of opposition to the
federal scheme within Southern Rhodesia that caused Huggins to aban¬
don his tactical support for federation and advocate in London what
16
he truly wanted, the amalgamation of British Central Africa.
Huggins may have felt that the case for amalgamation had been signifi¬
cantly strengthened by Rennie and Colby's announcement at the December
Council meeting, but his resurrection of the amalgamation issue pro¬
duced its own problems. These started to manifest themselves when,
on 2 December, Welensky first raised the possibility of his joining
Huggins and Whitehead in London for the January talks. This request
appears to have arisen as a direct result of the unease felt by
Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials with the line of argument Huggins
indicated he was going to pursue in London. At a meeting in Ndola
on 2 December, Huggins and Northern Rhodesia's elected members of
the Legislative Council discussed the federal proposals and debated
17
what amendments should be sought from the British Government.
Huggins stressed that opinion in Southern Rhodesia was hardening
against the federal proposals and increasingly frequent objections
were being made to the inclusion of Nyasaland in the scheme. Although
Huggins was pursuing federation rather than amalgamation, it was
evident that clear differences remained between his ideas on the
composition of the proposed federal state and those envisaged by the
Northern Rhodesian Unofficials. Huggins was particularly opposed to
the continuation of the northern territories as British Protectorates
after any federal constitution was implemented. Welensky and his
colleagues felt that the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was
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exaggerating the importance of Protectorate status. They were con¬
fident that they coiuld effectively counter any excessive pressure from
the Colonial Office, but in any case the Protectorate status of
Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would just have to be accepted as
a fact of life, albeit an unpleasant one, as the Imperial Government
had made it plain this responsibility would only be repealed with
African consent.
One issue upon which all those present were in full agreement, was
the need to present a united front to London for the forthcoming
discussions. To strengthen this process it was agreed that Welensky
would seek to be present at the January talks, in addition to Huggins
and Whitehead, and that the Southern Rhodesian Government would for¬
ward to their Northern Rhodesian allies, as soon as possible, a note
of its proposed modifications to the federal scheme. After Southern
Rhodesia's proposed amendments had been studied by the Northern
Rhodesian elected members further talks would be held to form a
basis for the adoption of a common position for their future dealings
18
with the British Government.
Welensky raised the topic of his attending the January talks with
Rennie on 2 December and again on the 4th, indicating his desire to
be in London, even if unofficially, so that he was, at the very least,
19
available for informal discussions. He dropped his proposal,
however, when the Governor explained that Welensky's presence in
London along with Huggins' would cause the British Government embar¬
rassment. Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials would have been content to
let the matter rest there, had Huggins not raised the question of
amalgamation once more.
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The Northern Rhodesian elected members were so concerned by the
change of stance contained in Sir Godfrey's telegram to Ismay of
13 December, indicating his intention to present the case for
amalgamation in January, that on the 14th they again demanded
20
Welensky's attendance at the London talks. Welensky wrote to
Huggins on the same day, announcing his intention to attend the
21
January talks, unofficially if necessary. The Northern Rhodesian
Unofficials' disquiet over Huggins' revival of pressure for amalgama¬
tion was exacerbated by Southern Rhodesia's failure to produce, by
22
that time, any written criticisms of the federal proposals.
Northern Rhodesia's Chief Secretary, R C 5 S Stanley, moved quickly
in an attempt to reassure Welensky over Huggins' resurrection of the
amalgamation issue. Stanley, who was a committed supporter of
23
federation for central Africa argued that a compromise should be
possible with Sir Godfrey over his new proposals, and assured
Welensky that the British Government would definitely not accept
amalgamation, but remained well disposed towards federation. Northern
Rhodesia's Chief Secretary also stressed to Welensky that his presence
in London in January at the same time as Huggins' would only serve
to strengthen the hands of opponents of federation in the United
Kingdom, in and out of Parliament, and make the Government's task of
implementing a federal scheme "more difficult - perhaps even
24
impossible". Nonetheless, Welensky and his colleagues continued
23
to insist that he should attend the London talks.
It was not until the CAC meeting on 28 December that Northern
Rhodesia's Unofficials accepted that Welensky's presence in London
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in January was not viable in the face of the British Government's
resolute opposition. Nevertheless, the elected members of Northern
Rhodesia were determined that their territory would have a voice at
the forthcoming talks. Amalgamation was unacceptable to them and
Huggins could not be relied on to represent the differing interests
of both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. An implicit condition,
therefore, for the dropping of demands for Welensky's presence in
London, was that the Governor represented Northern Rhodesia at the
discussions. Rennie's Officials supported Welensky's proposal at
the Council meeting that the Governor attend the talks, as they were
equally convinced that no Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia could
be trusted to safeguard Northern Rhodesia's interests in any agree¬
ment over closer association.26
At a meeting on 31 December, Northern Rhodesia's elected members
2
strongly pressed Rennie once more to attend the January discussions.
Not only were Welensky, Beckett, and their followers uneasy about
Huggins' intentions for central Africa, they were also very con¬
cerned that, unless agreement on a specific federal constitution
was reached soon, the growing trend towards the rejection of
federation, in both Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, would become
28
unstoppable.
At the CAC meeting on the 29th Huggins had finally produced a memor¬
andum of Southern Rhodesia's objections and proposed amendments to
the Officials' scheme. Sir Godfrey suggested that both the Minister
for African Affairs and the nominated members to the federal assembly
be dropped. In addition he proposed the introduction of concurrent
legislation, clearly aimed at preventing any of the territorial
-205-
governments from introducing universal suffrage or any other
electoral constitutional changes disliked by the federal government.
On the first two points there existed a fair measure of agreement
within the Council, but the issue of concurrent legislation was a
29
much more contentious and divisive matter.
As we have already seen, Sir Godfrey was greatly irked by the northern
Governors' announcement at the Council meeting that no campaign would
alter the opposition of their African populations. Nonetheless,
with Welensky accepting that "there is no prospect of changing present
African opinion either in this territory or Nyasaland in favour of
Federation",a position endorsed by Gore-Browne,"^ the agenda
for the London talks was clearly going to centre on the twin issues
of whether or not the British Government would impose a federal
scheme and, if it did, what concessions would be offered to Southern
Rhodesia. Huggins may have had no real hope of gaining the Imperial
Government's support for amalgamation, but he was determined that the
federal authority would be the dominating element in any federation.
The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister's expectations of reaching
agreement with the British Government were not high, yet he remained
convinced that a strongly centralised British Central Africa was
essential for Southern Rhodesia's future. He was opposed to
Southern Rhodesia linking up with the Union, was convinced that
Southern Rhodesia could not survive as a dominion on its own, and
disliked the independence the three territorial governments would
retain under a federal system. Huggins, therefore, began to
seriously consider the possibilities of the amalgamation of the
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Rhodesias without the approval of the British Government.
Sir Godfrey had raised the matter with Welensky for serious con¬
sideration at their meeting on 2 December. He pressed Welensky to
express what his attitude would be to any plan for the> unilateral
amalgamation of the Rhodesias. Welensky refused to be drawn over
what steps Northern Rhodesia's elected members would be prepared to
32
consider in the event of a federation failing to materialise.
Although non-committal, he certainly did not rule out unconstitutional,
unilateral action to secure union if conventional means failed.
In a letter to Welensky of 3 January 1932, Huggins again, very
explicitly, raised the issue of unilateral action. Sir Godfrey
wanted to know if Welensky and his colleagues would be prepared to
accept amalgamation if no agreement would be reached on a federal
solution, if the British Government would not impose federation over
African opposition or if the Southern Rhodesian electorate
rejected the federal scheme at the referendum. Huggins asked
Welensky whether, under any of these circumstances, "would your
members accept amalgamation forced on the Colonial Office (after
all the Colonial Office could not stop it)?" The Southern Rhodesian
Prime Minister made it clear that he did not intend to use this
information as a lever during the January talks in London, but in
order to make contingency plans in case federation failed to emerge.
It is clear that Huggins was examining the practical prospects for
the achievement of amalgamation of the Rhodesias by unconstitutional
means if federation was not established. As the matter was to
remain confidential between Huggins and Welensky, it does not appear
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to have been a move to prepare the ground for an attempt to black¬
mail the Government of the United Kingdom to gain concessions in the
terms of the proposed federal scheme. Nor was it an academic
exercise since Huggins, unlike Welensky, was far from convinced
that a federal solution could be agreed upon by all the parties
34
concerned. It was with serious intention to implement the scheme
that the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was examining the possi¬
bilities for unilateral action and pressing the Northern Rhodesian
Unofficials' leader to commit himself.
Welensky, however, was extremely careful to avoid doing that very
thing. In replying to Huggins on 12 January, the leader of Northern
Rhodesia's Unofficials reiterated his belief that the British and
Southern Rhodesian Governments would reach agreement on such modi-
factions as the federal proposals reguired and emphasised that he
would reguire further talks with Sir Godfrey before committing
himself to any contingency plans. Nonetheless, Welensky clearly
indicated what he saw as the probable outcome of such talks by
arguing that, if federation was rejected, for whatever reason, then
a large section of Northern Rhodesia's European population would
"look to South Africa for succour. There is also a large section
of the community, and I would say they are in the majority, who
feel as I do and they would turn even more forcibly towards Southern
Rhodesia. The question as you put it almost conveys to me the
suggestion of a 'Boston tea-party'. If the Federal proposals fail
I think there is quite a possibility of the matter being taken out
33
of my hands and that a 'Boston tea-party' could happen."
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This issue was, doubtless, one of the items covered during extensive
discussions between Huggins and Welensky at Livingstone on 15 January,
immediately prior to the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister's departure
for London for talks on closer association. The bulk of the
Livingstone dialogue, however, would have been concerned with the
clear differences which remained between the two Rhodesias' positions
on union in central Africa. Welensky was particularly concerned
that every effort be made to retain Nyasaland in the proposed Federal
state and was concerned lest political pressure in Southern Rhodesia
was eroding the support Huggins had given to this position at the
September Victoria Falls Conference.
During the January discussions in London and for the rest of 1952,
the crucial question was still whether or not the United Kingdom
Government would impose federation in British central Africa over
the opposition of the African populations of Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia. Fears that London would baulk at such a step ensured
that consideration of illegal methods to establish union in central
Africa continued throughout the year.
Welensky asserted, in early April, that if that month's conference
in London failed to produce a definite scheme which would assuredly
be implemented, then unconstitutional methods would have to be
considered.During the April conference itself, Welensky raised
the notion of unconstitutional action and its value as a threat if
nothing else, in a letter to his fellow members of the Legislative
38
Council in Northern Rhodesia. As..late as 2 October, Beckett
believed that Northern Rhodesia's European population "may now
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have to adopt unconstitutional methods" in order to achieve
39
federation. As it turned out the Conservative Administration did
impose federation over African opposition and so ensured that any
thoughts of unconstitutional action by the Rhodesias' European
political leaders remained only speculation. The UDI in Southern
Rhodesia in 1965 shows that it would be unwise to underestimate the
seriousness with which alternative means of achieving union in




and between the Rhodesias
In bowing to the united pressure of Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials and
Officials to have Rennie included in the January talks in London, the
Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices ensnared themselves in a dilemma.
With both Rhodesias now being represented in London normal practice demanded
that the Governor of Nyasaland also be invited. The Commonwealth Relations
Office had no objections, but officials at the Colonial Office were very
reluctant for Colby to be present at the discussions,"'" because he had
been opposed to the proposal of federation throughout 1951.
In May, Colby had bluntly informed Cohen that he understood the federal
proposals to be "the first step towards ultimate fusion and the creation
of a Central African Dominion". He argued that this would inevitably
involve the establishment of a unitary tax system, resulting in higher
taxation in Nyasaland and causing its development to be arrested. Colby
insisted, therefore, that Nyasaland could not consider entering any
2
federation under the proposed financial arrangements. In November Colby
added a political dimension to his argument that Nyasaland could not,
and should not enter any federation with the Rhodesias:
"It is my considered opinion that there is no
(repeat no) possibility, in the next 12 months, of
getting Africans to change their attitude towards
federation and consequently that there is nothing
to be gained, and much to be l°s^/ by endeavouring
to make them change their minds"
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The Governor reported a recent and marked deterioration in the
political situation in Nyasaland and laid the blame squarely on
the unease generated by the Victoria Falls Conference on federation
and subsequent official attempts to produce a measure of concord for
the scheme amongst the African population. Colby continued:
"If my assessment of African opinion is right,
I feel very strongly that we should take the
initiative and pull out. To leave the
initiative to Congress, and to allow them to
claim, in due course, they were responsible
for Nyasaland rejecting federation, would be
politically disastrous."4
Cohen and the Colonial Office took Colby's announcement very
seriously and responded immediately by reminding Nyasaland's
Governor of the "broader political reasons" for federation, i.e.,
to resist South African pressure and expansionist aims. Cohen
reiterated the gist of the agreement reached at September's
Victoria Falls Conference that concerted action would be undertaken
to persuade the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to
accept federation. As a preliminary step in this programme
the United Kingdom Government had publicly announced its support for
the necessity of early establishment of federation,^ and, as
Cohen emphasised, to halt the campaign now was politically impossible.
The Colonial Office remained convinced that "it would have disastrous
consequences if Nyasaland were to pull out at this stage".^ Cohen
and senior officials at the Colonial Office were determined to retain
Nyasaland in any scheme for closer association in central Africa,
because they had no intentions of giving up their voice in the shaping
of policy within Northern Rhodesia. It was believed that the best
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means of guaranteeing the continuation of the Colonial Office central
role in Northern Rhodesia after federation was the inclusion of
Nyasaland in any association.^ The highest echelons of the Colonial
Office were convinced of the need for federation for the reasons
already covered, but they were determined to prevent Southern
Rhodesia from gaining control of its northern neighbour, a goal which
Southern Rhodesia would find significantly easier if the linking
involved only these states.
The Colonial Office's view, that Colby's presence would not facili¬
tate agreement with Huggins and Rennie on the federal proposals, was
reinforced early in January when Nyasaland's Governor reiterated his
conviction that Southern Rhodesia sought control over the northern
0
territories rather than the partnership of federation. Colby,
moreover, chose to ignore Lloyd's tactful attempt to persuade him to
9
remain in Nyasaland and to accept Rennie's attendance in London.
Colby's position, that if Northern Rhodesia was represented then
Nyasaland must be as well, was mirrored by the arguments adopted by
10
Leisching at the Commonwealth Relations Office. With Colby and
the Commonwealth Relations Office concurring on the necessity of
Nyasaland being represented along with Northern Rhodesia, the
Colonial Office quickly conceded and invited the Governors of both
11
territories to the talks. That the attempt was made to prevent
Colby's attendance at the January discussions, gives some indication,
however, of the strength of the support, amongst senior Colonial Office
officials, for federation in British central Africa.
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Rennie and Colby's conviction that the opposition of the Africans
of the northern territories to federation could not be altered
within the foreseeable future, endowed the January 1952 discussions
with a new and urgent significance. It should be noted that the
Governors' stand on African opposition was not the manifestation
of imagined Colonial Office prejudice against central Africa's
European settlers. As we have seen, both Welensky and Gore-Brown
concurred with the Governors' appraisal of the situation and recog¬
nised its importance. No lonqer could the difficult problem of
African opposition be conveniently side-stepped with the expression
of confident predictions of its early reversal. The question of
whether or not to impose a federal scheme on British central Africa
and the probable consequences of either decision now had to be faced,
or so the relevant officials in London believed. Leisching, amongst
others, was convinced that if there was no firm aqreement for a
federation reached during the January talks, then the Baxter/Cohen
scheme for a central African Federation would have "foundered for
12
good and there will be no mid-summer conference." This outlook
was shared by Beckett, who was convinced that, unless a definite
federal scheme was agreed on within the first three months of 1952,
13
"the whole hope of federation may go by default."
At a wide-ranginq meetinq on 7 January, representatives from the
two offices endeavoured to reach a joint position for the forth-
cominq talks and aqree on what advice to offer their respective
Secretaries of State over the dilemma of whether or not to impose a
federal solution. As with the CAC meetinq of 28 December, no real
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difficulties were expected in reaching a compromise with Huggins
on his demands for the dropping of nominated members and the Minister
for African Affairs. On Sir Godfrey's proposals for concurrent legis¬
lation a clear division existed between the Colonial and Commonwealth
Relations Offices. Within the Commonwealth Relations Office a fair
measure of support existed for Huggins' position. The Colonial Office
position, however, as outlined by Lloyd, was categorical that "no
proposal which involved any element of supervision of the territorial
governments by the federal authority could be entertained," a position
determined by the Colonial Office's firm intention of maintaining
14
decisive influence in Northern Rhodesia after federation.
On the question of whether or not to recommend the imposition of a
federal government for British central Africa, both Baxter and Lloyd
emphasised the dangers of both Southern and Northern Rhodesia
entering the Union cf South Africa if federation was not established.
Gorrell-Barnes and Lambert, in contrast, placed a great deal of
weight on fears that the imposition of federation would result in
general industrial, commercial and social disruption by the African
populations of the northern territories, including strikes and riots.
A decision on what advice to offer was postponed until Colby and
Rennie could be consulted about the likelihood and extent of dis¬
ruption which the imposition of federation would cause in their
respective territories.
On one point there was uniform agreement, "that everything possible
should be done to avoid making the federal proposals the subject of
a party conflict in this country". To further this end it was agreed
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to consult with Griffiths and Gordon Walker after the discussions with
Huggins, to try to avoid a front bench dispute in Parliament if federation
was imposed."^ Baxter, for one, was determined that central African
federation would be achieved despite the views of the African populations,
and Colby, or any other difficulty. When the London talks began on
the morning of Friday 18 January 1952, with a meeting between the relevant
British and Southern Rhodesian civil servants, T S Gisborne advocated
amalgamation as the correct solution. This argument was reiterated by
Huggins in the afternoon when he and the Governors of Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia joined the officials in their deliberations.The official -
18
discussions commenced on 22 January, and at the opening session, Sir
Godfrey repeatedly advocated the case for amalgamating British central
Africa, but this was persistently rejected by the British Seretaries of
State, supported by their civil servants and the Governors of Nyasaland
and Northern Rhodesia. With no support for the case of amalgamation
forthcoming, Sir Godfrey made it absolutely clear that in continuing with
the discussions he was not committing himself and his Government to anything.
It was recognised by all that any decisions agreed would not be binding.
In responding not only to Huggins' arguments for amalgamation, but also to his
proposed amendments to the federal scheme, the representatives of the United
Kingdom Government were supported by Welensky's advice, that the closer they
adhered to the Officials' proposals, the better the chances were of achieving
19
federation. Welensky may have been prevented from attending the talks,but he
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had, nevertheless, made efforts to ensure that any agreement that
emerged would be acceptable to the unofficials of Northern Rhodesia
and in particular to himself, their leader.
Definite progress towards a specific agreement was made during the
eight days of discussions, but not all the problems were resolved.
At the sixth meeting, on 29 January, Huggins raised the possibility
of Nyasaland being excluded from the proposed federation. As we
have seen, such a proposal was totally unacceptable to the Colonial
Office, but in any case, Rennie scotched the suggestion by stating
correctly,that such a move would be opposed by Northern Rhodesia's
20
unofficials, a fact of which Huggins was well aware. It was decided
however despite the vigorous objections of Colby, to dispense with
the proposed post of Minister of African Affairs. After prolonged
discussion, the composition of the African Affairs Board was agreed,
although Rennie vehemently protested at the dilution of its powers
and reduction in its size. The question of whether or not to invite
African representatives to the conference on closer association when
it re-convened in mid-1952, if they continued to refuse to accept
the principle of federation, was debated but no decision was
reached.
21
At Rennie's instigation, it was agreed to bring forward the
re-convened conference on closer association to April in order to
prevent African opposition to federation from hardening, and to
attempt to hinder the growth of campaigns by Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia's Congress advocating independence rather than federation.
This move also reduced the time available for European opponents of
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federatiori in Southern Rhodesia to unite and organise an effective
22
campaign against the proposals. In the meantime, it was accepted
that discussions would take place between the three governments in
central Africa to reach consensus on the outstanding differences,
and a working party in London would prepare a draft scheme for the
April conference.^
Since full agreement had not been reached, the crucial question of
whether or not to impose federation was left largely untouched.
As we shall see, the British Government were eager to delay any
decision on this issue for as long as possible in the hope that
some indications of African support would emerge and, if possible,
to avoid a clash with the Opposition. In British central Africa,
however, the continued uncertainty over the implementation of any
federal arrangement did not aid the territorial governments in
their search for agreement on the division of powers between them¬
selves and the proposed federal authority.
During the discussions in London sharp differences between the
Governments of Northern and Southern Rhodesia had clearly emerged,
fuelled by the personal tensions which existed between Rennie on
the one side and Huggins and Whitehead on the other. Rennie was
particularly incensed by Whitehead's implied threat that Southern
Rhodesia would bring economic pressure to bear on Northern Rhodesia
by restricting her supply of coal.^
The long-standing resentments of Northern Rhodesia's European popu¬
lation, towards what was seen as Southern Rhodesia's superior and
domineering attitude, were further exacerbated in February during
25
an informal CAC meeting in Salisbury. MacLeman reported to
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London that:
"the Southern Rhodesians gave some offense to the
representatives of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland
by making it clear that they were out to get any
concessions which would strengthen the Federal
Government as against the territories, and made no
secret of their hope that Southern Rhodesia
would dominate a Federal Government."26
Parry independently confirmed this view:
"My impression is that both official and unofficial
opinion in the north is getting more than a
little restive at the indications there have
recently been that Southern Rhodesia is only
likely to be interested in federation on its
own terms and that this means the projection into
federation of the present Southern Rhodesian
political and administrative set up.
Unfortunately little attempt was made by the
Southern Rhodesian team to disguise this belief
during the recent talks, and while the tactics
adopted may have been logical from the Southern
Rhodesian point of view, I doubt if they were
wise. At any rate by not concealing their
ambitions better they now stand little chance
of persuading Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland
to throw more into the federal kitty."27
This attitude of Huggins and his fellow Southern Rhodesians,
resulted in persistent and vigorous clashes between Sir Godfrey and
Renriie at the Council meeting, with Welensky trying desperately to
28
moderate in the disputes and pacify the protagonists.^ The
gathering was not a formal meeting of the CAC because the Southern
Rhodesian Government had refused to attend, if it was held under the
auspices of the Council. Parry was convinced that this represented
pari of a strategy by the Southern Rhodesian Administration to
supplant the Council's secretariat with their own Cabinet Office for
the purpose of supervising inter-territorial proceedings in the
period between the formal decision to establish federation and it
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coming into being. The motive behind this strategy, Parry was
convinced, was to ensure that "the federal government should be
as little different as possible from the present Southern Rhodesian
29
Government".
This incident served to reinforce the officials of the northern
territories in the view held by many Northern Rhodesian Europeans,
that the continuing negotiations concerning federation were com¬
pletely dominated by the need to placate the prejudices of the
Southern Rhodesian electorate,and counter their reluctance to
abandon the policy of amalgamation. It is certainly true that
Huggins was pressing the United Kingdom Government for further
concessions, as much to demonstrate to his own supporters that he
was making every effort to gain amalgamation or a close approxima¬
tion of it, as in the belief that the Conservative Administration
might concede them.
Huggins remained determined to produce as powerful a federal govern¬
ment as possible for the proposed central African Federation. To
this end the Southern Rhodesian Government proposed, in early March,
that a simple two-thirds majority in the federal assembly, without
further recourse to the British Government, should suffice for any
and all constitutional changes in the envisaged federation.
Officials at the Colonial Office, however, recognised the intent
behind the proposition and opposed it.
"The effect of conceding this point would be that
the federation could, by act of the federal
legislature, be converted into a virtual
amalgamation . . . this we cannot allow."
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The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was al3o pressinq for the
creation of a combined federal civil service to supersede the
separate territorial administrations after federation, and the
transfers of European Aqriculture and Marketinq, Police and Public
32
Health from territorial to federal government aqency. At the
informal Council meetinq at the end of February, Southern Rhodesia's
deleqation presented the case for forming united federal units for
the European elements in these functions. The representatives of
the northern governments, however, not only resisted Southern
Rhodesia's proposals, insisting that these areas continued under
territorial control, but argued for attempts at racial integration
to be made within these services.
The meeting failed to resolve the differences between the two sides
and Colby showed his determination not to compromise over the issues
by immediately informing Lyttelton that the Nyasaland Government
rejected each and every one of the Southern Rhodesian Government's
proposals.Nyasaland's Governor was prepared to accept the
removal of the Minister for African Interests from the provisional
plan, but only if the African Affairs Board, and particularly the
position of its chairman, was strengthened to compensate for the loss.
In addition, Colby was adamant that each territorial government should
be responsible for the method of electing its representatives to the
federal assembly.
This last demand by the Nyasaland Governor caused severe problems for
the British Government. During the discussions in London in January,
Hugqins had insisted upon a prior meetinq between himself and Whitehead
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with Ismay and Lyttelton, at which no civil servants were present.
During the wide-ranging discussions that took place, the two Rhodesians
argued vigorously that unless Nyasaland made significant concessions
over its policy of nominating rather than electing members it would
have to be excluded from the proposed CAF."^ The British
Secretaries of State flatly rejected this ultimatum because they had
been confidently hoping that a compromise solution would be forth¬
coming. However, the hard line Colby adopted concerning nominated
members greatly reduced the scope for compromise.
A virtual impasse, therefore, existed between the Southern Rhodesian
Government and its northern counterparts. The extent of this became
apparent in March during inter-governmental meetings called in an
attempt to resolve their differences. Repeatedly the representatives
of the northern governments would agree to the arguments of economy
and efficiency put forward by the Southern Rhodesian delegate for the
unification of various departments, but then go on to reject the
proposition on the basis of national interests, such as the probable
conseguences upon the African population or workforce. This pattern
was clearly illustrated at a meeting, on 12 March, debating Southern
Rhodesia's proposal that Police and Prisons should become a federal
function. The whole meeting accepted the cost and efficiency argu¬
ment for a unified force but the officials from Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia still rejected the move on the grounds that they
"could not contemplate handing over the enforcement
of territorial law and order to any organisation^
which was not under direct territorial control".
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Such an attitude, if it were maintained, would severely undermine
any federation which did emerge, since its over-riding concern was
to retain territorial control over territorial matters, leaving
extremely little to be federated. This unco-operative stand was
prevalent amongst the northern territories' officials because they
were convinced that Southern Rhodesia sought domination, by means
of the control of the federal authority, rather than partnership.
The attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government's representatives
in their dealings with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia did nothing
to alleviate this impression, but rather served to reinforce it.
Moreover, although the elected members of Northern Rhodesia's
European population were more committed to federation and prepared
to concede more to achieve it, nevertheless, they shared their
officials' opinion of Southern Rhodesia's intentions and also
opposed it.
Many of Nyasalard and Northern Rhodesia's officials had supported
the idea of a strengthened CAC rather than federation in 1949-50.
Such senior Colonial Service figures as Ronald P Bush, Northern
Rhodesia's Secretary for Native Affairs, and Commander Thomas
Fox-Pitt, Provincial Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia's Eastern
Province, were convinced that if Southern Rhodesia had agreed to
their preference for closer association - a strong CAC - the recent
drastic deterioration in government-African relations would have
37'
been avoided. While this did not prevent the northern terri¬
tories' officials from conscientiously fulfilling the government's
policy of seeking African confidence in, and support for, federation,
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the federal scheme itself did not have their personal support.
The central argument for federation, that otherwise Southern, and then
Northern Rhodesia, and possibly Nyasaland, would be sucked into
the Union, was well known to them but they still had doubts about
whether or not the federal scheme was in the best interests of
39
central Africa's indigenous population. The attitude of the
Southern Rhodesian Government and its representatives served to
heighten these doubts.
The case for Police and Prisons remaining a territorial responsibility
with no attempt at unification was finally clinched by statements
made by both Nyasaland's and Northern Rhodesia's Commissioners of
Police. They asserted that the loyalty of the African ranks could
not be guaranteed if, in the near future, they were told that they
were to become members of a federal force. Although some progress
was achieved over Public Health and European Agriculture and Market¬
ing between the Rhodesias, the Nyasaland Government refused to be
committed to any of the tentative agreements^ This lack of pro¬
gress served to increase Huggins' annoyance by further convincing
him that the northern territories' governments were adopting an unco¬
operative and obstructionist policy towards federation.
Huggins had tended, from the end of 1951, to adopt a very pessimistic
attitude towards the chances of federation being established, with
Welensky seeking to encourage him and emphasising the positive
aspects. Increasingly, however, Welensky attempted to impose a
moderating influence over Huggins' demands for the envisaged federal
41
constitution. After the open clashes between Huggins and Rennie
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at the informal CAC meeting of 26 February, Welensky endeavoured to
maintain a delicate balance by encouraging Sir Godfrey to accept that
federation remained feasible, while, at the same time, seeking to
reduce in number and magnitude the concessions that the Southern
Rhodesian Prime Minister was demanding over the proposed consti-
. .. 42
tution.
By the end of March, Huggins was incensed because Rennie and the
Northern Rhodesian Government were not only resisting any extension
of the proposed federal government's authority, but were actually
seeking to expand the jurisdiction of the territorial administra-
43
tions. This was true, but nonetheless Rennie at least remained
in favour of the principle of federation, as did some of his
officials and most of Northern Rhodesia's unofficials. In Nyasaland
not only did Colby and his civil servants oppose Nyasaland's
inclusion in federation with the Rhodesias, but also the small
European community was far from keen on the venture, unless it
44
gained the support of the African population. Prospects for
definite progress being achieved at the April conference were
bleak.
In an effort to break the deadlock Rennie, in early April, sounded
out Welensky about whether or not he would be prepared to accept
Nyasaland being dropped from the federal scheme, if closer associa¬
tion could not otherwise be achieved. Welensky indicated that he
was prepared to accept such a development as a last resort, but he
stressed that it would inevitably raise the whole issue of represen¬
tation in the federal parliament once more and that Southern
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Rhodesia's inherent numerical superiority would be unpopular with
45
Northern Rhodesia's European populace. Moreover, although such
a move would be supported by the Governments of Southern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, the Colonial Office, as has been shown, were totally
opposed.
At the April conference on closer association at Lancaster House,
the divisions between the positions and aims of Southern Rhodesia
46
and the northern territories were highlighted once more. Disputes
raised at the January talks which had been left unresolved by the
intervening inter-governmental discussions, were re-examined and new
ones raised, as the Southern Rhodesian Government sought to gain
further concessions. Efforts by the Southern Rhodesian delegation,
by Eastwood in particular, to have the African Affairs Board abolished,
47
were successfully resisted by Colby, Rennie, Haddow and Welensky.
Rennie's arguments for stronger safeguards for territorial independ¬
ence under the federal constitution, illustrated the conviction of
the northern territories' officials and unofficials, that Southern
Rhodesia still sought amalgamation and would seek to dominate
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia through the federation's administra¬
tive machinery. Alan Lennox-Boyd, on behalf of the United Kingdom
Government, rejected Rennie's thesis and insisted that the proposed
48
safeguards were adequate. However Northern Rhodesian officials,
and Unsworth in particular, remained unconvinced and at the next
session expressed his concern that federation might result in pro-
49
viding Southern Rhodesia with "a backdoor to amalgamation".
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Some progress was made. While Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia
remained totally opposed to the formation of a federal police force,
they did agree to a centralised initial training period of six
months for European officers. As Moffat pointed out, this was a
major concession as it departed from the northern territories'
existing policy of African and European officers training together.
In agreeing on a compromise over responsibility for agriculture in
which European agriculture was to be a federal function and African
agriculture a territorial concern, Beckett and Barrow were concerned
lest federation produce "a federal Government for whites and a State
Government for Africans". To this Huggins could only retort: "We
51
should have amalgamation if that is the trouble!"
Although all these disputes and more were raised at the April con¬
ference, enough compromises were patched together to enable a draft
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federal scheme to be prepared and published on 18 June 1952. Three
commissions were established to report later in the year on the
areas upon which no agreement could be reached.^ Throughout the
conference the clash of views between Southern Rhodesia and its
northern neighbours on African development, underlay most of the
altercations over specific issues.^ The northern territories'
policy of progressive integration, whatever its rate of implementa¬
tion and level of success, was in direct conflict with Southern
Rhodesia's twin pyramid philosophy, with its commitment to theoreti¬
cally equal but separate development of the two races. The disputes
concerning Agriculture, Police, Health and Education, amongst other
topics, all rested on this basic difference in approaching the problem
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of a multi-racial society. It was the existence of these two
mutually exclusive philosophies that rendered many of the differences
intractable, whatever the CACs African report may have claimed."'"'
The fundamental conflict in outlook between Southern Rhodesia and
the northern territories concerning not only the long term role of
the African majority in society, but also the nature and goal of
closer association were abundantly clear, yet in spite of this
federation was implemented.
The central African federation was constituted for wider political
considerations rather than internal requirements. It was for this
reason that the Official Report in 1951 glossed over and dismissed
the gulf which existed in African policy between Southern Rhodesia
and the northern territories, rather than starkly confronting the
issue. That the federation was deeply flawed and divided from its
inception was largely due to the inability or unwillingness of
successive British Governments to pay the political price of
imposing one of British central Africa's opposing racial policies
throughout the region, to the exclusion of the other. As a result,
the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was an artificial contri¬
vance which, when constituted, contained numerous unresolved disputes
between the Federal Government and Southern Rhodesia, on the one
hand, and Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia on the other. These
differences tended to be further entrenched because the establish¬
ment of federation soured other areas of possible co-operation and
coloured all dealings between the composite parts. The attempt to
deny, or paper over, the fundamental nature of the differences in
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outlook which formed the basis of these disputes, helped to harden
further the intransigent attitude of all the parties concerned.
The north's tendency to non-co-operation was fuelled by suspicions
of Southern Rhodesia's aspirations and ambivalence toward federation:
the south's unco-operativeness was based on dissatisfaction with
federation when they preferred amalgamation, and a desire for domina¬
tion rather than partnership.
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CHAPTER 8
The Imposition of Federation
under the Conservatives
From the moment of its election the Conservative Administration under
Churchill was committed to the federation of British Central Africa,
although the Prime Minister himself took no real interest in the
1
matter. From the outset, however, the government had two inter¬
locking priorities to maintain, while pressing for the federal option.
Supported by senior civil servants, the Conservative Secretaries of
State sought to maintain the parliamentary consensus in favour of
federation in central Africa and, as a prerequisite to this, to
obtain some measure of African support for the federal scheme. Apart
from the general concern, that if an important piece of colonial
policy failed to receive cross party support its effectiveness would
be severely undermined because a change in government might result in
efforts to reverse or undo it, there was also the worry that the
House of Lords would significantly amend, or even reject, a politi¬
cally contentious colonial policy bill. With a significant number
of Liberal Peers in the Lords and given that parliamentary discipline
is less easy to enforce in the Upper Chamber, this latter concern
was a very real one.
In his first statement to the House of Commons on colonial policy,
therefore, Lyttelton adopted a moderate conciliatory line.
"Certain broad lines of policy are accepted by
all sections of the House as being above Party
politics. These have been clearly stated by
my predecessors from both the main Parties.
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"Two of them are fundamental. First, we all aim
at helping the colonial territories to attain
self-government within the British Commonwealth.
To that end we are seeking as rapidly as possible
to build up in each territory the institutions
which its circumstances require. Second, we are
all determined to pursue the economic and social
development of the colonial territories so that
it keeps pace with their political development.
I should like to make it plain at the outset that
His Majesty's Government intend no chanqe in these
aims. We desire to see successful constitutional
development both in those territories which are
less advanced towards self-government and in those
with more advanced constitutions. His Majesty's
Government will do their utmost to help Colonial
Governments and Legislators to foster the health,
wealth and happiness of the colonial people.
I hope, therefore, that however much there may
from time to time be disagreement between us on
details, all parties will be with me in agree¬
ing on these ends."^
The sentiments expressed may have been admired and widely accepted
by the Opposition. The Secretary of State himself, however, was
far less acceptable. Lyttelton's reputation amongst the Parlia¬
mentary Labour Party of being insensitive and inflexible, more a
business man than a politician, exacerbated the fierce parliamentary
disputes over colonial policy during his term in Office. These
arguments commenced almost immediately in December 1931, with the
Labour Opposition objecting to aspects of Lyttelton's tougher mili¬
tary approach to the Malayan problem. The extent to which the
Colonial Secretary's personality contributed to the controversies
during his tenure is hard to gauge. Whether Lyttelton did indeed,
as he believed,"^ preside over the abandonment of Britian's bi-partisan
colonial policy is a moot point. Certainly there were disputes
and friction between the Government and the Opposition within the
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colonial sphere, particularly over the nature of the measures taken to
resolve the Kenyan Mau Mau and British Guiana crises. On one of these
issues, however, did the Conservative Administration face a Parliamentary
Labour Party united in their opposit.ioin, or agreed upon an alternative.
Indeed, a strong case can and has been made that the dispute over the
central African federation was an abberation in the continuance of a
bi-partisan colonial policy albeit one that was placed under considerable
4
strain on occasion. Certainly there was no difference on colonial policy
between the Attlee and Churchill administrations in relation to the UNO.
Both the Labour and Conservative governments were determined to prevent
the United Nations from extending its responsibilities to cover the
administration of non-self-governing territories. Whilst observing the
UN charter and co-operating with its specialised agencies the committees,
the United Kingdom allowed no intervention or interference in its colonies.^
Lyttelton's relative success or failure as secretary of state for the
Colonies is a debatable issue. It is certainly true that he faced a series
of difficult and challenging problems which would have taxed any Colonial
Secretary. It is worth noting, however, that by 1953 the conviction within
the Labour Party and Fabian Colonial Bureau that Lyttelton should be replaced
was shared by such traditional allies of Conservative Government as the
Times and the Economist, although they presented their preferred solution
in a more diluted and guarded form.^ That, however, lay ahead. In 1951
no one, least of all Lyttelton, when he reluctantly accepted his Cabinet
responsibilities,^ could have anticipated the traumas which lay in wait.
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The Conservative Administration's hopes of maintaining Labour
support for Imperial policy in central Africa were based on the
assumption that some African support would be forthcoming. As the
Labour party supported federation - with this one condition - and had
agreed measures at the September Victoria Falls Conference to produce,
at the very least, African acquiescence, the chances of the new
Conservative Government achieving this objective seemed promising.
Ismay and Lyttelton were confident of persuading African opinion
to accept, if not support, federation, by giving a firm lead from
the United Kingdom and territorial governments. The Colonial and
Commonwealth Secretaries were, in early March, quite prepared to adopt
the previous Labour administration's federal scheme unaltered,
including the retention of the Minister for African Affairs, in order
g
to ensure all party support for the measure. Rennie and Colby's
announcement, at the CAC on 28 December, that African opinion was
hard set against federation changed everything.
The memorandum from previous Labour Secretaries of State, in
9
September, had emphasised that federation was only to be pursued
after some measure of African support had been secured. Griffiths
had been confident, at the conclusion of the September 1951
Victoria Falls Conference, that African opposition could be won over
if their fears on the three crucial points could be met. These
points were European ambitions, African political advancement, and
10
land rights. In his statements before and after the memorandum of
12 September, Griffiths had stressed Labour's opposition to the
imposition of a federal scheme against united African opposition.
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The Conservative Government was acutely aware that if no public
endorsement of federation was forthcoming from some element within
the African populations of the northern territories, Parliament
would divide along party lines. In addition, the effects imposition
would have on British-South African relations, particularly in
relation to the Union's long-standing claims to the High Commission
Territories, had to be considered.
While in office, both Griffiths and Gordon Walker had repeatedly
stressed to everyone interested in African rights and political
advance, the great danger of British central Africa being absorbed
by South Africa unless federation was achieved. In 1931, the main
organisation concerned with this area was the Fabian Colonial
Bureau. By April it was already gravely concerned by the level of
Afrikaner immigration into British central Africa and Northern
11
Rhodesia in particular. In a letter to the Bureau's Secretary,
Marjorie Nicholson, in early June, Griffiths assured her that both
he and Rennie ware well aware of the Afrikaner problem and of the
12
need to take "urgent steps to deal with it". In a number of
private meetings in June and July both Griffiths and Gordon Walker
sought to gain Fabian Colonial Bureau support for the officials'
federal proposals, by insisting that the Rhodesias, and possibly also
Nyasaland, would be incorporated by the Union unless the scheme was
13
implemented. Griffiths rejected the FCBs preference for Nyasaland
and Northern Rhodesia linking up with east Africa, on the grounds
that east Africa's political future could be endangered by introducing
the strong Afrikaner elements in Northern Rhodesia into its
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framework. Nonetheless, this option remained the FCBs favourite
policy and, while not opposed to the principle of closer associa¬
tion, in central Africa, it rejected the officials' proposed scheme
partly because the Bureau believed that no federal constitution would
be acceptable to both the northern territories' African population
15
and Southern Rhodesia's European settlers.
However, the argument of the Secretaries of State and their officials
that federation was required to prevent Afrikaner expansion,
steadily became more widely known and accepted. Griffiths and
Gordon Walker's Conservative successors were therefore aware that
this argument would be unlikely to increase Labour support for the
imposition of federation. The Labour party's opposition to the
imposition of the federal scheme over and against united African
opposition had been reached after full consideration of the probable
consequences of not securing federation in British central Africa.
Most leading Conservative politicians, however, were convinced
that the Labour Party's opposition to the federal proposals was based
on opportunism and the failure of Attlee and Griffiths to withstand
16
emotive back-bench pressure, a view largely shared by the Economist
and the Times. Nonetheless, whatever the reasons for the Parliament¬
ary Labour Party adopting this position, some sort of African
endorsement of federation was essential if the issue was not going
to divide Parliament along party lines. Some degree of African
support would also be very helpful in the international arena, to
counter accusations of racialism and broken promises and, more
specifically, to ensure that South Africa could not cite the
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imposition of federation as a precedent for the arbitary absorption
of the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and
Swaziland into the Union.
Quite apart from the consequences of imposing federation in British
central Africa, Attlee's second administration had been worried, in
June 1951, that Malan's Afrikaner Government might try to force the
transfer of the High Commission Territories prior to the emergence
of federation. The matter was considered sufficiently serious for
an extensive examination to be made of the economic sanctions the
South African Government might employ to try to force the transfer,
17
and what response Britain should make in such an eventuality.
Concern over the mounting pressure within the Union for the trans¬
fer of the High Commission Territories was an important element in
the British Cabinet's decision not to allow ?£retse Khama to return
to Bechuanaland in June 1951, and in the British Government's
refusal to recognise him as the territory's legal leader in January
1950.18
The United Kingdom's relations with South Africa were already under
a certain amount of strain since Malan and leading members of the
Union's Parliament and press had made it very clear that they
opposed the federation of British central Africa because it would
be detrimental to European interests in the region. Even more
friction, however, was caused by the growing awareness within South
Africa that it was used as a bogey to increase support for federa-
19
tion in central Africa. This realisation was forcibly strength¬
ened by Griffiths in early January and by the speeches of numerous
-236-
MPs during the debate on federation of 4 March 1932. Speaker
after speaker presented the Afrikaner threat as the major reason
20
for proceeding with federation in central Africa. Moreover,
Griffiths had revealed in public, in an address at Chatham House,
that the main reason for the officials' recommendation of federation
in March 1951 was not an economic one but was the fear of South
21
African expansion. The Conservatives failed to convince the Oppo¬
sition that the only alternative to federation was incorporation by
the Union, and in the process heightened the tensions between the
United Kingdom and South African Governments concerning the future
of central Africa.
The Parliamentary Labour Party's Policy on Federation
22
Although some Labour MPs, such as Gordon Walker and Tom Reid, were
prepared to accept that the Rhodesias must either join together or be
23
incorporated by the Union, others, notably A Fenner Brockway, were
convinced that the South African threat could be contained by other
means. At the same time James Johnson and many more believed that
the Afrikaner expansionist argument was a form of "political black-
24
mail". By and large, the Labour party maintained its position of
refusing to support the imposition of federation over and against
complete African opposition, no matter what the merits of the case
for federation or the probable conseguences of its non-implementa¬
tion.
This is not to suggest that the Parliamentary Labour Party remained
united over the issue of Federation. We have already noted the
divisions within it on the issue and the tensions between Griffiths
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and Gordon Walker on this topic while they were in Office, have also
been examined. On their return to Opposition, these differences
were accentuated further. Deep and bitter divisions within the
Labour Opposition were not uncommon, but the split over the question
of the central African federation was remarkable in that it was not
the usual dissension by a left-wing Bevanite minority, as had emerged
before over issues such as German re-armament or the British Guiana
crisis. On this occasion the vast majority of Labour MPs were united
behind Griffiths' policy of rejecting the imposition of any federal
scheme over the solid opposition of the African inhabitants of
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The dissenters, known as the 'Keep
Right Group' rallied behind Gordon Walker.
Undoubtedly the Labour Leadership was pleased that its position
allowed for a full spectrum of views on the merits or otherwise of
the principle of federation and the specific scheme proposed, but it
25
did not adopt the policy principally to maintain party unity.
The Government may have felt that Griffiths was an example of poli¬
tical opportunism, sacrificing bi-partisan politics on Colonial
26
policy in an attempt to maintain party unity, but this would have
been to ignore the clear pattern of continuity in Griffiths' position
dating from his time as Secretary of State. Lyttelton, at least,
must have been fully aware of Griffiths' determination to oppose
imposition. It was clearly stated in the latter's joint memorandum




Nonetheless, the Manchester Guardian considered that the main appeal
for the Labour Party in opposing the imposition of federation, was
that it presented an opportunity for them to confront the Government
almost completely united behind a cause which most of them strongly
28
believed was right. The Daily Telegraph went further and argued
that the Labour Party was attacking its own scheme in an attempt to
unite its "innumerable sguabbling factions" in one single, over-
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riefing campaign of hostility, but no substance.
As we shall see, many people, both inside and outside Parliament and
the Labour Party, were highly critical of Griffiths' concentration on
the issue of imposition, rather than the inherent problems and dangers
of federation itself. Nonetheless, the only element within the
Parliamentary Labour Party to take a stand against the official
policy of refusing to impose any federal scheme over united African
opposition, was the 'Keep Right Group'. This body consisted of a
small number of pro-Federation Labour MPs who met in private and who
lined up behind Gordon Walker.Although its membership did not
exceed twenty, it contained some influential figures and was viewed
with approval, if not with open support, by at least a further thirty
31
Labour MPs. Apart from Gordon Walker, there were four other
ex-Ministers in the Group - George Brown, Richard Stokes, Sir
Hartley Shawcross and Maurice Webb - a former member of the Colonial
Service, Thomas Reid, and the two Labour members of the British
Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association's delegation to
32
central Africa in August 1931, Stanley Evans and William Coldrick.
The 'Keep Right' group's existence produced two important conseguences
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during 1932, one for the Government and one for the Opposition.
The consequence which affected the Government will be considered
first.
Griffiths had forced a division on the Government's approach to the
Federation issue at the conclusion of the debate on 4 March.
Although only two Labour MPs - Evans and Coldrick - broke ranks on
34
that occasion, the Labour leadership feared a much greater
rebellion should a division occur at the next major debate on the
topic on 29 April.^ As a result Griffiths did not push the House,
either then or after a subsequent debate on 24 July,"^ into taking
a vote. The stated reasons, as one would expect, did not refer to
the threat of a disunited Opposition and were plausible. On 29 April
Griffiths proferred the presence of two Southern Rhodesian Africans
at the Federation Conference and the fact that the Conference's
conclusions were, as yet, unknown, as the Labour Party's reasons for
not dividing the House. On 24 July Lyttelton's assurance that
Parliament would be consulted before any definite steps were taken
on Federation, and the announcement of the postponement of the next
conference on Federation from October to January, were Griffiths'
justifications for not forcing a vote. However, Lyttelton had offered
an even bigger concession durinq the debate on 4 March, with the
38
specific intention of avoiding a division. On that occasion, it
would appear that Griffiths felt that the announcement of a further
conference on Federation, to be held in October, was insufficient
reason not to push his motion to a vote. The real unstated reason
why the House failed to divide on the latter two debates, therefore,
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was Labour's disinclination to put to the test the extent of support
for the 'Keep Right' group's argument that Federation was necessary
39
and might have to be imposed.
The extent to which the Parliamentary Labour Party would oppose the
imposition of Federation remained unclear during most of 1952. This
was most clearly demonstrated by Gordon Walker's speeches when he was
opening or concluding Labour's case during the Parliamentary debates
on the issue. It was particularly obvious on 24 July when he pres¬
ented an impassioned advocacy of federation, with the idea that
African consent was required, tagged on almost as an afterthought.^
Attlee appears to have striven to avoid taking one side against the
other. His personal convictions would have tended to place him on
Gordon Walker's side, but he could not ignore Griffiths' popularity
within the Party, both within Parliament and outside. Griffiths'
position could only have been strengthened when he was the only non-
Bevanite to be elected by the constituency parties on to the National
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Executive Council in 1952 and in 1953. Nonetheless, Gordon Walker
and his associates did prevent Griffiths from leading the Parlia¬
mentary Labour Party into full-blooded opposition to Conservative
policy in British central Africa during 1952.
The significance for the British Government of the emergence of the
'Keep Right' group was, partly that it held out the hope of eventual
Labour acquiescence in the imposition of Federation and the contin¬
uance of a bi-partisan policy for the Colonies concerned. More
importantly, the Conservative administration was convinced that
Gordon Walker's group represented the views of a much larger number
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of Labour MPs than its membership suggested. This belief served
to strengthen the Government's resolve to pursue its central African
policy, including the imposition of Federation if necessary. Given
that significant Labour support existed for this line of action, its
policy, although no longer strictly bi-partisan, was no longer a
matter for a straight inter-party dispute. Moreover, as Amery
explained to Welensky, the existence of significant Labour support
for Federation, even if this was mostly convert, did afford "some
assurance that there would be no attempt to undo the Federation, even
43
if the Labour Party did come back to power at the next election."
While the Conservatives welcomed the emergence of the 'Keep Right'
group, Welensky positively encouraged it through his close and
44
regular contact with two of its leading members - Evans and Reid.
Welensky aimed at splitting the Parliamentary Labour Party over the
Federation and the question if its imposition, and the second line of
his strategy was to re-inforce Attlee's personal preference for a
federated British central Africa. To this end Welensky and Beckett
addressed a joint meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party and
43
the Fabian Colonial Bureau on 8 May on the topic of Federation.
Then, on 13 May, Welensky dined with Attlee and George Hall, and
went on to hold a prolonged tete-a-tete with the leader of the
Labour Party after the ex-Colonial Secretary had left. Welensky
later informed Huggins that they had established a great deal of
common ground during the course of the evening and that he had
46 47
invited Attlee, along with Clement Davies and Beverley Baxter,
48
to visit Northern Rhodesia later in the year, at his own expense.
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Welenskv assured Huggins that the trip, costing two thousand pounds,
would be a sound investment and urged the Southern Rhodesian Prime
Minister to extend the invitation to include both Rhodesias. The
three guests duly visited Northern Rhodesia during August and
September of 1952.
In a letter to Martin Visagie of 4 June, Welensky makes it clear
that his intention in inviting Attlee to visit Northern Rhodesia was
to persuade him to support the setting up of the Federation and thus
greatly strengthen the influence of Evans and the small group of
Labour MPs "who now firmly believe that Federation is necessary."
By this tactic Welensky hoped to foster a split in the Parliamentary
Labour Party over federation and so aid the Conservative Administra¬
tion in its attempt to prevent the House of Commons dividing on
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strictly party lines over the proposed scheme.
Attlee's attitude to the federation of the British central African
territories was that although he was in favour of the concept, he
was not committed to the Conservative Administration's specific
scheme.Reid believed that Attlee wanted to bring the Labour
Party around to supporting Federation but was not in a strong
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position for achieving this end. Attlee was well aware of the
dilemma posed by the issue of whether or not to impose Federation
against the wishes of the African populations of Northern Rhodesia
and Nyasaland. He believed that it was the responsibility of the
Southern Rhodesian Government to produce evidence of their good
intentions and to convince all concerned that t'hey were determined
to implement fully the policy of social and industrial 'partnership'.
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Nonetheless, during his tour of central Africa he made it clear to
his audiences, both African and European, that the Labour Party
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supported the idea of federation, primarily for economic reasons.
Welensky was pleased with Attlee's tour"^ and his hopes that the
European settler leaders and their arguments would make a favourable
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impression on the leader of the Labour Party appeared to have been
fulfilled. Attlee had not been impressed by the African representa¬
tives whom he had met, or by their fundamental reasons for opposing
federation. At least one observer was convinced that as a result of
his visit, Attlee would return to the United Kingdom firmly committed
to the support of the proposed Federation.This may have been
true at a personal level, but as leader of the Party, he had to take
influences other than personal feeling into consideration. Even
before he left for Africa, Attlee had been forcefully lobbied by
Griffiths on the whole issue, particularly the impossibility of
giving support for imposition.
Attlee revealed his thoughts in a long private talk with Welensky
on 25 September. He asserted his warm support for Federation, but
confessed to being gravely concerned about the repercussions on
"coloured opinion" throughout the Commonwealth and in the world at
large. He was also worried about the implications for South Africa's
claims on the High Commission Territories if the federal scheme was
pushed through against the clear wishes of the African populations of
the three territories. Although Attlee accepted the seriousness of
the problems which would face the territories if the federal scheme
was not implemented, Welensky remained convinced that Attlee would
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give way to Griffiths and firmly endorse a policy which totally
rejected any imposition of federation. All that Welensky could
offer Salisbury and Hopkinson as a possible means of avoiding
this development, was the suggestion that Evans and his associates
impress on Attlee the vital necessity of a federal arrangement for
the future of all three territories."^ However, as we shall see,
the Conservative regime chose to alter its position on the nature
and extent of African opposition to Federation within the terri¬
tories.
South Africa's Intentions
The Conservative Government employed the argument of South African
expansionist aims in central Africa, not only because it was a
good lever to prize out some more Labour support for Federation, but
also because they believed in the seriousness of these aims. It was
accepted in Whitehall and Salisbury, and by the Official as well as
Unofficial Legislative Council members in the Northern territories
that Malan's South Africa had designs on the British territories to
its north.
In late December, Sir J H Le Rougetel, the United Kingdom High
Commissioner in South Africa, had presented a brief, on current South
African attitudes and intentions towards British central Africa, to
Ismay.
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"Traditionally it was General Smuts who looked
forward to the day when eventually the Rhodesias,
and particularly Southern Rhodesia, would fall
within the boundaries of the Union, and it was
the Nationalists under General Hertzoq who
stressed the danger that this would give the
Union too many African subjects to digest. Today
the roles are becoming reversed. Many members of
the United Party share the dream of their late
leader, but most of them realise the obstacles
to its realisation and some welcome the prospect
of the establishment in Central Africa of a new
Dominion completely independent of the Union and
firmly based on British trade, in which they could
take refuge if the Nationalists make life in the
Union too uncomfortable for them. On the other
hand the Nationalists generally assume, with
varying degrees of certainty, that the Rhodesias
will, in due course, join the Union and their
fears that this may mean too many African sub¬
jects are, to an increasing extent, becoming
submerged by the greater fear that the alternative
may mean African self government in such parts of
Central Africa as they do not themselves absorb.
But they regard South Africa's northwards expan¬
sion as a long term possibility: they would not
favour it now while it would mean an excess of
votes for the United Party and its timing would,
in their minds, be governed by the extent to
which the proportion of Afrikaners in the white
population of the Rhodesias increases and by the
speed with which the grant by us of political
rights to Africans frightens white settlers in
the Rhodesias into seeking shelter in the Union
from black domination. Some Nationalists may
positively favour Closer Association in British
Central Africa because the proportion of Afrikaners
among the European voters in a federation would be
greater than the present proportion of Afrikaner
voters in Southern Rhodesia alone, and it might
thus be easier for them to take British central
Africa in one bite rather than several. But on the
whole the Nationalists would prefer to see no
Federation established in Central Africa, since it
would delay the moment when, in the view of most
of them, Southern Rhodesia will fall into their
lap and their newspapers have accordingly taken
pains to point out the prejudice to the status of
Southern Rhodesia which Federation would involve
and the extent to which Africans, either through
direct representation in the legislature or indirect
ly through Whitehall would have a voice in Affairs."
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Le Rougetel also emphasised that South African opposition to the
creation of a Federation of British central Africa would be signifi¬
cantly diminished if the new constitution entrenched the white
settlers in power and prevented the political advance of Africans, at
least on Federal matters. He advised that any concessions to the
Opposition's proposals to meet African objections, would greatly
increase the Union's dislike for the scheme. This knowledge served
to strengthen the Conservative Government's realisation that the
official scheme could only be altered in the direction of placating
the demands of the Southern Rhodesian Government. The belief that
South Africa remained committed to the long term intention of acquir¬
ing the Rhodesias, and the conviction that only Huggins was capable
of delivering Southern Rhodesian consent to any form of closer
association in central Africa short of simple amalgamation, ensured
that alterations to the proposed federal constitution would be made.
Conviction about South Africa's intentions were reinforced on 4 March
1952 when, in the South African Parliament, Tighy called for talks
to be initiated with the Southern Rhodesians on the proposition that
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they enter the Union of South Africa.
Alterations to the federal constitution, drafted by Baxter in March
1951, were accepted as being inevitable, despite the fact that these
changes would enable the Labour Opposition to argue not only against
imposition, but also against the proposed form of federation, because
the alterations were made to accommodate Southern Rhodesian critic¬
isms.
Within Whitehall a split now emerged between the Commonwealth Rela¬
tions Office and the Colonial Office over the issue of whether or not
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the imposition of Federation by the United Kingdom Government would
set a precedent by which the South African Government could press
for the transfer of the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland,
Basutoland and Swaziland to the Union, irrespective of the wishes
of their African inhabitants. This was a crucial point because the
British Government had accepted that the High Commission Territories
should go to South Africa as soon as their populations approved of
the transfer and London was, in theory at least, committed to pro¬
moting this outcome in these three Territories. Even if it could be
convincingly claimed that a precedent had not been set, the emergence
of a central African Federation would certainly highlight the
anachronistic situation of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland.
Given that the United Party and the Nationalists were united in
their determination to gain these territories, disagreeing only about
the timing of the transfer,^ then, if it was believed that a pre¬
cedent had been set, the Union Parliament would be united in backing
any demand from the Nationalist Government for an immediate transfer
of sovereignty.
This would place the Conservative Administration in a quandary because
they were opposed to transferring the High Commission Territories, but
loath to risk the serious deterioration in relations with the South
African Government which rejection of its demands would probably
produce. The British Government put a great deal of weight on main¬
taining good relations with Malan's administration which was not
always compatible with its historical opposition to any northward
expansion of the Union. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth
Relations summed it up in September of that year -
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"We must do all we can to preserve and strengthen
our relations with South Africa. This is import¬
ant, not only on the general ground of desirability
of maintaining our Commonwealth links, but also for
weighty strategic and economic reasons. The
Nationalist Government's willingness to co-operate,
both in Middle East defence in war-time and in anti-
Communist measures, represents a change in traditional
policy which must be encouraged. Moreover, our con¬
tinued use of the Naval Base at Simonstown is of the
utmost importance to us both in peace and war.
Further, South Africa is the source of supply for a
number of raw materials of great importance to the United
Kingdom in peace-time and vital to us in time of war.
Economically the stability of the Sterling area is
dependent on the United Kingdom obtaining a substan¬
tial part of South Africa's gold output and equally
the Union furnishes an important market for our
exports."61
Moreover, in deciding its response to any demands from the Union
Government for the High Commission Territories, the British Govern¬
ment was aware that if an agreement, satisfactory to South Africa,
was not forthcoming, Malan's Government could economically strangle
Basutoland and Swaziland and possibly also Bechuanaland by denying
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them essential facilities. As far as London was concerned, there¬
fore, it would be best if the question of transfer was not raised
and the Union Government not provoked over the matter. Therefore
the problem of whether or not the imposition of Federation estab¬
lished precedent was an important one.
In January 1952 Baxter put forward the Commonwealth Relations Office
argument that imposition would set no precedent because the Northern
Territories would remain British Protectorates even after Federation
was established, and since this would not apply to Basutoland,
Swaziland and Bechuanaland if they were transferred to the Union, a
fundamental difference existed between the two cases.^ The Colonial
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Office and particularly Gorrell-Barnes were far from convinced by
Baxter's arguments and perhaps more importantly Malan claimed to see
no difference between the two situations.^ During February 1952,
Gorrell-Barnes dismissed as irrelevant Baxter's claim that the
African inhabitants of central Africa would be advantaged by federa¬
tion whereas their counterparts in the High Commission Territories
would be disadvantaged by their transfer to South African sovereignty.
He pointed out that the previous assurances given to central Africa's
indigenous population, which would be set asidety imposing a federal
arrangement, were "at least as firm as those given in relation to
the transfer of the High Commission Territories to South Africa".
Baxter's "fundamental difference" was no more than "a bad case of
special pleading" in Gorrell-Barnes' view.^
The debate between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial
Office over whether imposition was a precedent or not, provided one
other important outcome. There was now open discussion within
Whitehall about how to counter the South African threat to British
central Africa and the extent of that threat.
W A W Clark, the ex-Chief Secretary of the Central Africa Council,
not only questioned the wisdom of attempting to "fashion a 'cordon-
sanitaire' around or to build a bulwark against the Union", he also
argued that the probable price for imposing Federation would prove
to be too high.^ He claimed, in his minute of 14 January 1952,
that the two central arguments for Federation, namely, the economic
and the Afrikaner threat, had been greatly exaggerated. - The
previous August, Garner, at the Commonwealth Relations Office, had
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questioned the degree of danger to British central Africa generally
attributed to South Africa, but had made no impression on the
official consensus of opinion on this issue. Any suggestion,
Clark claimed, that the union would resort to territorial aggression
could be 'bompletely discounted". While the United Kingdom supported
the Rhodesias any economic pressure placed on them by South Africa
could be successfully resisted and the problem of Afrikaner infiltra¬
tion could be dealt with by immigration controls "which could be
almost as adequate and effective on a territorial as on a federal
basis." Clark also raised an argument, in relation to South Africa,
which had already been marshalled in support of Federation: the iso¬
lation of South Africa would be a dis-service to its African popu¬
lation as it would tend to reinforce the racial policies of the
Union Government, and exacerbate the problems of race relations in
that country. One of the arguments used to support closer associa¬
tion in central Africa had been that by virtue of its strengthened
links, the moderate north would be able to influence Southern
Rhodesia and slowly wean it away from its negative attitudes to
African development. Federation for British central Africa was
desirable, but, Clark believed, not essential and the probable price
for imposing a federal solution over the opposition of the African
inhabitants would prove to be too high. Imposition, he argued,
would reduce the chances of African dependencies remaining well-
disposed towards the United Kingdom and, at the same time, encourage
the South African Government to demand the transfer of the High
Commission Territories. To refuse these demands, after imposing
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Federation, would seriously damage relations with the Union. To
agree to them would place the Africans of the High Commission
Territories in exactly the situation from which central Africa's
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African population was supposedly saved by Federation.
Baxter's response to Clark's arguments were not particularly con-
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vincing. Baxter suggested that Clark's antagonism to Federation
was prejudicing his judgment about the consequences of imposing it
against African opposition. He also argued that as Malan would
never agree to equivalent safeguards for the High Commission Terri¬
tories as those contained in the federation proposals, any claims that
imposition was going to set a precedent were spurious.
The British Government's dilemma was eventually resolved by the
South African Government itself. Malan rejected Tighy's call for
the Rhodesias to be invited to begin talks about entering the Union
and argued that a white-ruled central African federation would provide
a valuable buffer between the Union and black Africa.Malan's
Government's highly dubious alterations to the South African consti¬
tution, revealed in March that year, which aimed at disenfranchising
the Cape Coloureds and further advancing the creation of an apartheid
society, clearly rendered ineffectual any safeguards which could be
offered to the High Commission Territories in any planned transfer
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of sovereignty. These actions of the Union Government completely
undermined any claims it could have made that the imposition of
federation created a precedent for the transfer of Bechuanaland,
Basutoland and Swaziland. This removed one difficulty facing the
British Government in its consideration of the possibility of imposing
Federation against African opposition in central Africa.
-251-
However, Malan's actions were also detrimental to the British
Administration's cause. The Union Government's actions had demon¬
strated the ease with which constitutional safeguards could be
circumvented and so weakened the security of the safeguards offered
to the African population of the central African territories.
Apprehension in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia was greatly heightened
with the fear that their continued autonomy would be rapidly eroded
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once the Federation came into being. In addition, the Nationalist
Government's actions tarnished its reputation among the whites in
the Rhodesias. This reversed a growing trend within that community
towards support for union with South Africa. In the view of one
observer, this attitude had been fostered by the British Govern¬
ment's policy of attempting to appease the Labour Opposition in the
United Kingdom Parliament and by a wide-ranging campaign against the
federal scheme amongst the whites of the two Rhodesias.^
At the time, however, when Colby and Rennie declared that the
Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were fixed in their
total opposition to federation, the consequences of imposing the
scheme appeared so serious that the British Government delayed any
decision on the guestion until further efforts were made to gain
some measure of African support for it.
British attempts to gain African endorsement of Federation
The officers of the Colonial Administration in each of the two
northern territories continued to canvass the case for Federation
to the African people at every opportunity. In addition to this the
British Government now accepted, unofficially, the help of the
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Capricorn Africa Society in attempting to break down the unanimity
of African opinion in the two Colonial Territories against the
scheme.
On 8 February 1952, Baxter, Ismay and Lennox-Boyd met with Colonel
Stirling of the Capricorn Africa Society. He proposed that the
Society would organise "a small cadre of reliable Africans who,
after a short course of instruction in Salisbury, would be sent
out to various districts of east and central Africa to organise
meetings and demonstrations in favour of central African federation,
. . . and provide concrete evidence of African support for the
measures which would be of great value in the House of Commons,
when the Proposals were debated." The Government's representatives
at the meeting, while accepting Stirling's offer of help, insisted
that the British Government could not financially assist the plan and
that expressions of African opinion should preferably be made on
behalf of properly-constituted bodies and not simply by individ-
i 75uals.
The British Government also sought the aid of Roy Welensky in its
efforts to gain some measure of African endorsement of Federation.
At the reguest of Dodds-Parker,^ Welensky initiated, late in
February, talks with the Mining Companies and with the Mineworkers'
Union to see if Northern Rhodesia's unofficial, but mandatory,
industrial colour-bar could be circumvented.^ Welensky was not
hopeful of achieving a satisfactory outcome to these talks, but made
the attempt because if it proved successful the Conservative Party's
task of justifying the imposition of Federation would be made much
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easier. The United Kingdom Government would be able to point to
the ending of the industrial colour-bar in Northern Rhodesia as
clear evidence that the policy of partnership was producing positive
results and that African advancement could be ensured under the
federal scheme. This would undercut the impact of liberal and
African opposition to the scheme. There is no doubt such a
development would have been welcomed by the pro-federation group
within the Parliamentary Labour Party. In April, Stanley Evans
echoed Dodds-Parker's reguest to Welensky in a letter to the Mayor
of Broken Hill in which he advocated that a black Trades Union be
fostered and other efforts made to help the creation of a black
middle class.^
Welensky's initiative with the mining industry failed, but he con¬
tinued to try to provide some evidence of African support for
Federation to strengthen the Conservative Administration's case.
Although in the last weeks of 1951 Welensky had apparently accepted
the assertion made by Colby and Rennie, that African opinion in the
two territories was solidly against the federal scheme, by the end of
March 1952, he was confidently predicting that some significant pro-
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federation Africans could be produced. This show of optimism
preceded an entirely individual campaign by Welensky to produce some
show of African support for the scheme. This was the result of a
direct appeal made to him by the British Government who insisted
that he produce some evidence that African opinion was not united
against federation.^
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Late in April, at a meeting with his fellow Members of the
Legislative Council, Welensky stressed the importance of his
campaign and how necessary it was to strengthen the hand of the
British Government, as a preliminary to the imposition of Federation,
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by producing some show of African support for the scheme. Such
was Welensky's eagerness to show that African opinion was divided
that he endeavoured to stir up tribal and other sectarian differ¬
ences and to attach these to the federal issue. Welensky, at some
expense, employed teams of Africans to stir up anti-Bemba feeling
and to eguate this with opposition to the opponents of the federal
scheme. This effort was concentrated on the African urban labour
force and it enjoyed some brief success at the Mufulira mine com-
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pounds. Nevertheless, this effort to exploit latent African
sectarian tensions did not produce the reguired result of a pro-
federation African voice.
Meanwhile the Northern Rhodesian Administration had been continuing
its campaign to win over some African support for Federation. Since
the middle of 1951, District Commissioners had been instructed to
campaign vigorously on this issue. This campaign had been particu¬
larly vigorously pursued while R P Bush was on leave and N Stubbs
was acting Secretary for Native Affairs. Also R S Hudson's transfer
to London had allowed Rennie to pursue his own personal preference
for the Federation more forcefully and he had put a great deal of
pressure on chiefs in particular, to publicly endorse the proposed
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scheme. Rennie's strong personal commitment to the federal
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scheme, was not shared by a substantial number of his leading
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officials. Many of them believed that Federation would end African
political and educational advancement, and they were also gravely
concerned at the tactics that had been employed since the departure
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of Hudson to foster support for Federation among Africans. Stubbs'
activities - outlined below - had especially given rise to unease
and had produced a public commitment from John Moffat who repres¬
ented African interests in the Legislative Council and was widely
respected in Northern Rhodesia, that he would personally check any
tribal endorsement of Federation resulting from this intensive
Government drive.^
One of the key tactics employed by the Northern Rhodesian adminis¬
tration was to play on the distrust already existing between the
tribal chiefs and Congress. The emergence of the African National
Congress had been seen as a threat by many of the Northern Rhodesia's
chiefs partly because many of them occupied posts which were not
traditional but were the products of past British colonial policy.
Moreover, even those chiefs whose positions were firmly traditional,
resented the lack of respect that members of Congress tended to show
towards them and their status, and the challenge that Congress made
to their position as the leaders of and spokesmen for the African
people. Stubbs tactic was to emphasise this division between Congress
and the traditional leaders and then to go on to interpret antagonism
towards Congress as support for the proposed federation.
Initially, these tactics had produced some positive results. This
was particularly so in the Eastern Province where the economic situa¬
tion was so bad that many Africans felt that nothing could make things
worse, and that the proposed Federation might possibly improve
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matters. Even more important was the fact that the chiefs were well
aware that the Governor appointed them and paid their salaries and
could just as easily appoint and pay someone else. All the chiefs
had to give a public statement purporting to express their peoples'
support for the proposed Federation. Their situation, vis-a-vis the
Government, was such that there was enormous pressure on them simply
87to say what would please the colonial Administration. However,
the initial success, of getting the Ngoni, Chewa and Kunda tribal
authorities of the Eastern Province to issue statements in favour of
Federation, was short lived. Within a month these endorsements were
88withdrawn and African opposition again appeared as a united front.
During 1952, the Northern Rhodesian Government established the
Federal Advisory Committee. This body was to promote support for
federation but it also enabled the Government to establish a haven
for those African politicians who had been discredited, and voted out
of office in various African organisations, because of their moderate
line over federation or their support for the scheme. In March 1952,
the Northern Rhodesian Administration was reduced to producing these
individuals as evidence that African opposition in the Territory was
not united. One of these figures was Godwin Lewanika, who had also
acted on the Government's behalf in gaining the Barotse support for
federation through his influence on some key sub-groups within the
tribe, and his influence over certain of the advisers to the Paramount
pi • , 89Chief.
Despite all these efforts by the Capricorn Africa Society, by
Welensky and by the Colonial Administration, no significant African
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support for the proposed Federation was produced. This contributed
to a change in the Conservative Government's approach to the
problem of African non-endorsement of federation. Gf equal, if not
more, importance in the Government's new approach, was the failure
of the Opposition 'Keep Right' group to attract significant open
support within the Parliamentary Labour Party for the proposed
Federation, and the fact that Attlee, even after his return from
Rhodesia, continued to back Griffiths' policy of opposing imposition
of Federation over African opposition.
Intimidation and Imposition
The Conservative Government had postponed any definite decision on
imposition for as long as possible in the hope of attracting some
element of African support for the Federal proposals. At a meeting
on 13 June 1952, the Cabinet was still indecisive over whether or not
to impose Federation "if a reasonable measure of African acquiescence
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is not forthcoming". It was eventually agreed to postpone any
definite decision in the hope that delay might yet provide time
for some African and Labour support to be won.
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In the House of Commons on 18th June, Lyttelton announced the pub¬
lication of the White Paper on the proposed Federation, and also
that judicial, financial and public service commissions were to be
set up which would report later in the year. He went on to remind
MPs that a further conference would be held on the issue in October.
Under pressure from Griffiths, the Colonial Secretary agreed that
either he, or his Minister of State, would tour the territories
before any moves were started for the establishing of the new
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federal structure. On 22 June an unconfirmed report appeared in
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the Press announcing that Henry Hopkinson would tour Nyasaland and
the Rhodesias in the near future. By then, however, the Government
was beginning to be gravely concerned at the lack of progress of
the campaigns to persuade both the European and African populations
of the three territories concerned, that the proposed federation was
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in their best interests. Two days before the Hopkinson newspaper
report, Lyttelton had broadcast over the BBC to both Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia. He emphasised the range of economic benefits
Federation would bring to the African inhabitants of the area and
he also stressed the extent and the strength of the safeguards for
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their position in the scheme.
By the time the issue of Federation was again debated in the House,
on 24 July, the British Government had adopted a new strategy on how
to proceed. While still hoping for some measure of support from the
Parliamentary Labour Party and from the African inhabitants of the
territories concerned, the new approach encompassed a vigorous
advocacy of the particular form of Federation proposed, a far less
conciliatory approach to the opponents of the scheme and a deliberate
campaign to counter the claims made about total African opposition
to the scheme. Having failed to discover any credible African support
for Federation, the Conservative Government began vigorously to
challenge the consensus view that African opposition was total. The
method employed was to claim that whilst the tiny, but vocal, African
intelligentsia were opposed to Federation, primarily for reasons of
personal ambition, the overwhelming majority of Africans were both
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ignorant of, and indifferent to the actual proposals. Moreover, they
claimed, significant elements within the African population of
British central Africa were in favour of federation and still more
were eager to discover the real facts and to discuss them and their
implications with the local Colonial officials. Evidence of this
accurate reflection of African opinion, the Government insisted, had
proved impossible to collect because of the wisespread use of verbal
and physical intimidation by the opponents of Federation, particularly
the Congress movements.
It was apt that the change in governmental policy was signalled in
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the Times as that newspaper had been arguing for some time that
Federation should be imposed, because the vast bulk of the African
population of the three territories concerned were ignorant of the
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concept as well as of the particular proposals. The new strategy
was launched in the House of Commons on 24 July 1952 by Fyttelton
and Hopkinson. The Secretary of State's claims about widespread
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intimidation seemed to take the Opposition by surprise.
Fyttelton pressed home this advantage by announcing that Hopkinson
would leave to tour British central Africa on 29 July and that one
ofTriaprimary tasks would be to investigate the extent and signifi¬
cance of intimidation by the anti-Federation forces.
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Hopkinson took full advantage of his month-long tour in Africa to
drum home the message to his African, settler and official, audiences,
that the British Government was fully committed to the Federation pro¬
posals as they stood, and was determined to implement them.^^ He
sought to ensure that the African population in particular harboured
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no doubts about the Government's commitment and attempted to squash
any hopes they had that politically-motivated strikes or policies
of non-co-operation would cause the United Kingdom Government to
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waver.
The Conservative Government may have been making every effort to
convince their opponents that the Federation was going to be estab¬
lished, but they were also still seeking to save the issue from
becoming a straightforward party political matter in the United
Kingdom. In a letter to Welensky of 22 October, Hopkinson emphasised
the Government's eagerness to carry moderate support in Britain for
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the plan. This could only be achieved by convincing enough people
that the views ascribed to the African populations of the British
central African territories were not a true reflection, but a gross
distortion caused by ignorance and intimidation. This was the message
that Lyttelton and his aides stressed in the latter part of 1952.
Typical of this line is a speech by John Foster, Parliamentary Under
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Secretary at the Commonwealth Relations Office, on 3 November.
Foster accepted that some Africans had genuine fears of Federation
and that it was the Government's responsibility to persuade them
that these fears were groundless. Nevertheless, he argued the claim
that the African inhabitants of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias were
solidly opposed to Federation, was the false creation of agitators
seeking to undermine the territorial governments. He went on to
assert that ignorance and widespread intimidation had prevented many
chiefs and other Africans, who were fully in support of the federal
proposals, from publicly endorsing it. Such was the Government's
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concern over intimidation and their desire to gain Labour Party
acquiescence in the policy of imposition, that Hopkinson provided
Attlee with a dosier full of reports about intimidation when the
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Labour leader arrived in Blantyre on 19 August.
It is undoubtedly true that instances did occur when Congress or
its supporters used intimidation to maintain a united front against
Federation. However there appears to have been no Government con¬
cern when its representatives or other supporters of Federation,
utilised means of persuasion which fell into the same category.
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Moreover it was the view of Jim Rodger and Neil Bernard, men
with far longer and much closer experience of the African people of
Nyasaland than Hopkinson's official informants, that there was next
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to no intimidation in Nyasaland. They felt that the reports of
coercion were being exaggerated to distract attention from the con¬
tinuing solid opposition of Nyasaland Africans to federation. Rodger
108
warned Marjorie Nicholson in a letter of 18 November 1952, "I am
still afraid that the red herring - intimidation - will be used to
side track the main issue - the African opposition to Federation.
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Please be on your guard."
Doubts have also been raised about the accuracy of the reports of
intimidation in Northern Rhodesia. Strong social pressure upon
people to remain united in opposition to Federation was countered
by government influence, particularly in the case of chiefs. Many
chiefs opposed Federation, but since they were dependent upon the
Government for their continuation in office, they were reluctant to
say so publicly. Nonetheless pressure from Government officials
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to have them openly endorse the Federal proposals was, on the
whole, successfully resisted. Increasingly the chiefs eluded
their dilemma by excusing their lack of public support, saying
that they feared reprisals from anti-federal elements within their
own communities."'""^ This excuse was usually accepted at its face
value by the District Commissioners and led to a largely unquestioned
acceptance of the fact of widespread intimidation. Once the British
Government had switched its policy from attempting to persuade
people to change their minds to emphasising ignorance and
intimidation there was no incentive to probe the accuracy of these
excuses. The main thrust of the Government's revised position,
as expounded by Lyttelton, Hopkinson and Foster, was to prepare
the British electorate for the acceptance of the imposition of
Federation as necessary and inevitable, if not particularly pleasant.
If such a climate of public opinion could be created, then it
was hoped that the Labour Party would at least not press its
opposition to imposition too strongly, even if it would not openly
concede to the Government's policy. A second aim was to convince
the African population of British central Africa that federation
was going to be implemented and that any effort at opposition
on their part would be futile and therefore not worth attempting.
In spite of the policy and campaigns the Conservative Government-
remained concerned about some of the possible consequences of
imposing federation on central Africa. The Conservative
Administration felt that it had Britain's reputation as "a champion of Liberal
Western civilisation"'""'""'" to maintain and was concerned that this
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image was not tarnished by imposition, not only in the United Nations
and before domestic public opinion but, more importantly, within it3
colonies.
Hopkinson's report on the level of intimidation in the northern
territories, particularly Nyasaland, alarmed the Cabinet and pro¬
duced a great deal of pressure for an immediate decision committing
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the Government to imposing the federal scheme. There remained,
however, a certain reluctance to proceed, because of the anticipated
level of opposition to such a course in both the United Kingdom and
in central Africa. Furthermore, although Malan's Government had
destroyed its case for the transfer of the High Commission Terri¬
tories by its manipulation of the South African Constitution, the
danger could not be entirely dismissed that South Africa would try
to force the incorporation of these territories, through economic
pressure, if Britain were to impose Federation over African opposi¬
tion. The Conservative Administration, moreover, were inhibited, to
a certain extent, by their wish to avoid a situation arising in
British central Africa that would lead to calls for UN intervention.
The United Kingdom Government sought, therefore, to avoid any dis-
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cussion of federation at the UN until after it had been established.
The decision to implement the Federal scheme, despite strong opposi¬
tion from the Labour Party, the Churches, specialised organisations
and various ad hoc lobbies, and the vocal rejection of it by the
African population of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias, was taken by the
British Cabinet on 22 December at the recommendation of Salisbury,
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Swinton and Lyttelton. Their arguments in favour of imposition
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had beengiven a timely boost by the latest despatches from the
Governors of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Rennie warned that
the imposition of the federal scheme held the danger of producing
strikes and campaigns of non-co-operation and of the non-payment of
taxes among the African population. He stressed however, that this
opposition could not be maintained for long. He emphasised that no
chiefs were expected to act unlawfully and that a resolute stance by
the territorial Government would increase respect for it among the
African population "particularly if the situation is firmly handled
from the outset." The strongest argument that Rennie produced in
favour of imposition was that if the Federal proposals were abandoned
Congress' prestige would be vastly increased as it would gain the
credit for this "victory" over the Government: the European popu¬
lation would be greatly disheartened and a rapid deterioration in race
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relations would result.
It was not surprising that Northern Rhodesia's Governor supported
imposition. Although he continued to hold reservations and objec¬
tions about certain detailed aspects of the proposals, he had always
personally been openly committed to the idea in principle. What was
surprising was that the Governor of Nyasaland also came out strongly
in favour of imposition.
Given Codby's record of opposition to the inclusion of Nyasaland in
the proposed Federation, his sudden conversion to support for the
imposition of the proposals, at first glance, appears guite remark¬
able.^^ In fact there was a certain consistency in his position.
Late in 1951 Colby had argued in favour of Nyasaland's early with-
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drawal from any proposed scheme of federation because of the African
opposition to it. This would enable the Territorial Government to claim,
that it had instigated opposition to moves towards closer association
and so pre-empt any claims by Nyasaland African National Congress that
its pressure had produced this result. By December 1952, however, Colby
was convinced that the worst possible decision by the British Government
would be to delay or cancel the introduction of the Federation of the
three territories. He considered that any such action, at that particular
time, would undoubtedly greatly bolster the position of the Nyasaland
African National Congress. This would be particularly dangerous because
of Congress' recent instigation of a campaign seeking to undermine
confidence in the Protectorate administration, its officials and the
whole European population, and because of its new vigorous advocacy of
full independence for the Protectorate. Colby claimed that Congress
had switched its tactics and greatly increased the use of threats and
intimidation because the Government had been enjoying some measure of
success in countering the anti-Federation propaganda of Congress,
particularly after Hopkinson's visit. The Governor of Nyasaland, like
his counterpart in Northern Rhodesia, felt that Congress would oppose
the introduction of Federation through strikes, demonstrations, withholding
of taxes and a general policy of non-co-operation, yet he still strongly
recommended the imposition of Federation.
Undoubtedly the outbreak of the Mau Mau 'oathings' and violence in Kenya
in October had influenced the views of both Colby and the
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United Kingdom Government. They wished to maintain law and order
and they feared the possibility of similar activities occurring in
central Africa. It is worth noting that there had also been violence
in both South Africa and Bechuanaland that year. The Mau Mau affair
must also have dampened Colby's long-held support for Nyasaland join¬
ing an east African federation. The Kenyan Emergency not only lent
weight to the Government view that the indigenous inhabitants of east
and central Africa remained too irresponsible and backward to decide
for themselves on important issues like federation, it also drew
attention away from central Africa and the issue of imposition.
All those factors played a part but the fundamental reason why the
Conservative Government agreed, in December 1952, to impose federa¬
tion, was that the problems and difficulties that would result from
failing to do so, far outweighed those which might be incurred by
proceeding. Salisbury, Swinton, Lyttelton, Hopkinson, Rennie and
Colby were unanimous on this point and on the vital importance of
making this decision. It was felt that failure to implement the
Federal proposals would result in moderate African opinion being
submerged in extreme African nationalism, widespread loss of con¬
fidence in the United Kingdom Government in east, central and
southern Africa, an acceleration of already deteriorating race
relations in British central Africa and an increase in social and
political unrest. Also "Southern Rhodesia, soured and isolated, will
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be drawn increasingly into the orbit of the Union" of South Africa.
This was the argument stressed by Swinton in the vital Cabinet meeting
of 22 December -
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"If we were now to retreat on this issue, the
days of British administration in Africa would
be numbered and there was every likelihood
that Southern Rhodesia would join the Union
of South Africa".118
The British Government accepted that it would encounter wide¬
spread criticism and determined opposition in the United Kingdom
to its decision to impose a Federal constitution on central Africa,
but drew strength from the belief "that the more responsible elements
in the Labour Party accepted the case for Federation, provided that
119
adeguate safeguards for African interests were retained." It was
this consideration coupled with the continuing reservations and con¬
cerns of the Northern territories' officials and unofficials that
acted as a brake, and limited the concessions that Southern Rhodesia
was able to acquire at the final Constitutional Conference of January
1953.
The Carlton House Terrace Conference
The Carlton House Terrace Conference, in January 1953, was intended
to fashion the final compromises, between the various Governmental
and settler factions, that would enable the Federation of central
Africa to be achieved. The Conference was plagued by the same
rivalries, tensions and distrust which had for long hampered progress,
particularly since Huggins' resurrection of the case for amalgama-
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tion in November 1951. From the outset the Southern Rhodesian
Prime Minister's main concern appears to have been to placate the
prejudices of his own country's delegation rather than to persuade
or influence other conference members. Indeed the uncompromising
content and tone of Huggins' opening speech, immediately following
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upon the rigid contributions of his fellow Southern Rhodesians -
Stockil, Keller, Eastwood and Munro - jeopardised the Conference's
chances of success on the opening day. Welensky, in fact, believed
that Huggins had risked aborting the Conference before even the
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opening statements of all the members had been completed.
In his speech, Stockil warned the Conference that the Federal
scheme would be rejected by the Southern Rhodesian electorate, who
would then turn to South Africa, unless the constitution was
radically altered. Although this threat was a real one, it is probable
that Stockil was motivated as much by the desire to extract further
concession for the Southern Rhodesian position as by fears of a
move towards South Africa. His tactic had minimal effect on the
delegations from the Governments of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia
who more or less maintained their positions on constitutional issues
such as the control of the Police force. On this issue Unsworth led
the two Northern Government delegations in firmly rejecting
Greenfield's proposal, which had the support of Huggins, that policing
should be a federal matter.
The problems facing the United Kingdom Government delegation and its
officials, in trying to hammer out the compromises necessary to
create an agreed constitution, were well illustrated by the diffi¬
culties over European Agriculture. The Southern Rhodesian delegation
proposed that European Agriculture, with all its service industries,
such as marketing, price control and research, be centralised under
federal auspices. This suggestion was flatly rejected by Colby and
Rennie on behalf of their respective governments. Although the dis¬
pute centred on European Agriculture, much of the problem lay with
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the service functions. In the Northern territories, marketing, price
control and research were operated from within departments other
than Agriculture. As a result these different departments resisted
the transfer of part of their function to the Federal Government.
The general tendency was for the territorial departments to guard
jealously all their interests in order to maintain their positions
relative to the other territorial departments. Embryonic Federal
departments were viewed as either potential supplanters or as rivals,
not as allies.
This pattern of bureaucratic power games was further complicated by
the desire to uphold national prestige and widespread distrust, in
the two northern administrations, of the Southern Rhodesian inten¬
tions. This lack of trust, coupled with the tone employed by the
Southern Rhodesian delegation, forced Rennie, on at least one occa¬
sion, to remind Huggins that the Federal Government was not simply
going to be an extension or projection of the Southern Rhodesian
model. Rennie emphasised that the views of the northern adminis¬
trations would have to be taken into consideration and accommodated.
Throughout the Conference Unsworth played a leading role in Nyasaland
and Northern Rhodesia's rejection of many of the proposals emanating
from the Southern Rhodesian team. This was particularly clear in
the matter of the police, as we have noted, and also in opposing
Welensky's and Huggins1 plan to bring the African Affairs Board
within the federal Parliamentary framework. Indeed, Unsworth's
implicit distrust of Southern Rhodesian good faith became
122
embarrassingly explicit during the sessions on 8 and 9 January.
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0n Thursday 8 January, Unsworth and Moffat argued that the Terri¬
torial Governments should remain autonomous and in no way sub¬
ordinate to the Federal Authorities. They argued, therefore,that
any Federal Bill seeking to alter the balance of responsibilities
between the territorial and federal legislatures and the concurrent
list, would reguire the support of two-thirds of each of the three
territorial legislatures, in addition to the assent of the Federal
Assembly. Moreover, Unsworth and Moffat proposed that African
land rights should be guaranteed to remain a territorial responsi¬
bility by placing them outside the jurisdiction even of constitutional
federal bills. They maintained that African land rights should only
be capable of amendment through an Order in Council from the United
Kingdom Government. When he was pressed during the subseguent debate,
the full extent of Unsworth's distrust of Southern Rhodesia was
revealed.
Unsworth was concerned that even the British Government's veto would
not prove adeguate protection for the continuing autonomy of the
northern territories, because, he argued, neither the Southern
Rhodesian Government nor certain other influential figures in central
Africa, were really committed to Federation. Indeed, Unsworth went
so far as to predict that relatively early in the life of the
Federal Parliament, a bill would be introduced seeking to amend the
constitution, by transferring all territorial functions and powers
to the federal Government. It would not only be debated, he claimed,
it would succeed because it would not be possible for the United
Kingdom Government to prevent the early transformation of the
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Federation into a unitary state unless the requirement of two-thirds
majorities in the territorial Legislatives, as well as the Federal
Assembly majority, had been established.
Predictably, Welensky expressed outrage at Unsworth's implicit and
explicit claims that he and Fluggins would seek "to twist the federa¬
tion into an amalgamation". The following day, Beckett went further
and accused Unsworth and Moffat of attempting to scupper the federation
insisting on constraints in the federal Constitution that would be
unacceptable to the Southern Rhodesian electorate. This may very
well have been a consideration in Unsworth's strategy for the
Conference. Whether it was or not there is definite evidence to
indicate that his analysis of Southern Rhodesian intentions was not
the unjustified allegation that Huggins and Welensky claimed it to be.
Huggins and his close associates appear to have been convinced that
once federation was established, the United Kingdom Government
would not interfere in its internal working and even if they attempted
to do so, their efforts would prove ineffectual. He considered that
the Conservative Government was constrained to offer only a federa¬
tion rather than a unitary system of government, but believed that
once the federal system was in operation London would not stand in
the way of Southern Rhodesia gaining complete dominance and moulding
123 ; •
the federation into a virtual amalgamation. tord Aitrinehar.l
certainly encouraged Huggins in this interpretation of the situa¬
tion:
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My own feeling, as you know, is that the people of
Rhodesia will be one thousand times wise to get
federation through, whatever strings may be
attached to it in the first instance. Once
Federation is through, the future will be in
their hands. No one on earth can stop it,
whatever the conditions attached. And the
future must be in their hands if the British
way in Africa is to prevail.124
Whether or not the British Ministers at the Carlton House Terrace
Conference viewed the issue in the same light is largely immaterial,
because Unsworth and Moffat's arguments of 8 January showed the
strength of conviction, within Governmental circles in the northern
territories, that domination was the Southern Rhodesian aim and it
showed too their determination to thwart these ambitions. The com¬
promise solution to this stalemate between the delegations was
first suggested by Lyttelton on 9 January; he proposed a consti¬
tutional review after ten years. This was formally introduced by
Swinton after the weekend recess, on 12 January, and finally agreed
by the Conference on 14 January. By freezing the responsibilities
and scope of the Federal and Territorial Governments, and the
functions on the concurrent list for ten years, the British
Ministers hoped to reassure the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian
Government delegations that Southern Rhodesia would not be able to
gain control of the Federation before that time. Huggins and
Welensky concurred with this solution because of the implicit under¬
standing that at that review, to be held seven to ten years after the
inauguration of the Federation, full independence for the Federation
was virtually guaranteed. After independence it could develop as
it saw fit. Such a position could only be adopted because of the
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confident expectation that African fears concerning Federation would
have been proved groundless by then, and as a result African opposi¬
tion would have faded away.
The Parliamentary Labour Party's failure to maintain united
opposition to the Imposition of Federation
The extent of the disquiet within the Parliamentary Labour Party over
Griffiths' position on the issue of Federation never fully emerged
into the open. Partly this was because Griffiths had, by late 1952, .
gained the support of Attlee, and partly it was due to the astute
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prevention, by Morgan Phillips, of a debate on the specific issue
of federation at the Labour Party Conferences of 1952 and 1953. Attlee
hatf/ waited in vain for the Southern Rhodesian Government to produce
evidence that it intended to implement "partnership" in the Crown
Colony. As a result he withdrew his conditional support for Federa¬
tion and threw his weight behind those in the Parliamentary Party who
126
opposed imposition. This did not occur until 1953 and goes some
way in explaining Attlee's failure to speak during the first five
major debates on Federation. The equivocal nature of his support,
as leader of the Party, for Griffiths' rejection of imposition was
determined by his personal belief in the need for a British bloc
in central Africa. While both Griffiths and Gordon Walker shared
his belief, the former was convinced that African consent was an
essential pre-requisite to the introduction of Federation, whereas
the latter concluded that the establishment of Federation over¬
rode any consideration of African opposition. Attlee's discomfort
in defending Griffiths' policy led to his adopting a very low pro¬
file on the question of imposition. It is worth noting that the
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Labour Party leader's most important contribution to the debate on
Federation on 6 May 1953, was the commitment he gave, on his own
Party's behalf, to work for the success of the central African
127
Federation experiment once it was legally established. The
fragile nature of the Party leader's support for Party policy on
Federation made it imperative that the question was not extensively
or thoroughly debated.
At the 1953 Labour Party Conference, the agenda never reached Colonial
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Policy, while at Morecambe in October 1952, Phillips attached
the Federation issue to that of South Africa and general African
matters, submerging the issue and making it virtually impossible
to debate in detail Griffiths' opposition to the implementation of
the Government scheme. The Composite Resolution to Conference, moved
by Dr B Cardew, opposed the transfer of the High Commission Territories
to South Africa unless their African inhabitants consented, rejected
the imposition of the Federation in central Africa over and against
the clear opposition of its African population, held up the Gold
Coast Constitution as the model by which the British African Colonies
should rapidly progress to full Independence, condemned South
Africa's apartheid policies and urged the United Kingdom Government
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to raise the issue at the United Nations. In the event the
resolution, with its explicit endorsement of the Griffiths' line,
was remitted by Conference to the National Executive Committee
without a vote being necessary, but not before Dugdale had announced
from the platform that in his opinion the central African Federation
130
was completely and absolutely unnecessary.
-275-
With the Party superficially united behind Griffiths' opposition to
the imposition of the federal scheme, Attlee led a delegation from
the National Executive Committee to the Colonial Office on 12 December
131
1952. The delegation, which included Griffiths, Phillips and
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White, presented its case to Lyttelton, Swinton, Salisbury and Foster.
The purpose of the visit was to stress to the Government Ministers
the Labour Party's strong reservations about the federal scheme and
its opposition to its imposition before the final constitutional
conference of January 1953. It was unusual for the leader of the
Opposition to make representations in such a fashion, but the impact
of this move on the Government was reduced by the fact that Attlee's
leadership of the delegation was seen as being merely formal. It was
Griffiths who took the major role and who delivered the message of
the opposition of the Labour party, the Trades Union Council, and
the International Federation of Trade Unions to the imposition of
Federation over the united opposition of the African people.
The Conservatives also, as we have seen, took comfort and encourage¬
ment from the knowledge that significant support for the concept of
federation and for their particular proposals, existed inside the
Parliamentary Labour Party, even though no open division had, as yet,
resulted from the Labour party's official endorsement of Griffiths'
position.
By February 1953 the extent of the differences between Griffiths
and his supporters and Gordon Walker and his group could no longer
be hidden. The total rejection of Griffiths' position on federation
was advocated at meetings of the Labour Party's Commonwealth and
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Colonial Group and then at successive meetings of the Parliamentary Labour
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Party on 24 February and 4 March. At a meeting on 24 February,
Griffiths' opposition to the imposition of the federal scheme over the
united African opposition, was countered by Gordon Walker, who sternly
warned that, unless federation was implemented in central Africa, all
three territories would fall under the power of Dr Malan's South Africa.
Although a show of hands indicated that only about one-fifth of those
present were in favour of Gordon Walker's position, Attlee chose to adjourn
the discussion for a future meeting, before making any decision. When
Griffiths again achieved overwhelming support in the Parliamentary Labour
Party on 4 March, complete opposition to the imposition of any federal
scheme on central Africa was confirmed as official Labour Party policy.
In endorsing Griffiths' policy, the Parliamentary Labour Party rejected
calls from the "Keep Right" group, and others, seeking to avoid public
134
splits over the federation issue, for a free vote on the Government-
proposals. As we shall see, however, this was not the end of attempts
to secure abstainance for pro-Federation Labour MPs without appearing
to break standing orders. The Labour Party leaders had to find such
a device because they were aware that by allowing the small group of
mainly right-wing MPs to flout standing orders would make it much more
difficult to enforce these orders against a prospective Bevanite revolt.
The outcome of the Parliamentary Labour Party meeting of 4 March was
generally considered to be a decisive victory for Griffiths over Gordon
Walker. Until then Gordon Walker had always opened or closed
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for the Opposition on any debate on federation in the House: he
did not do so again after the Parliamentary Labour Party meeting of
4 March. From that time the Labour Opposition mounted a vigorous
Parliamentary campaign against the Enabling Bill in the Chamber and
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throughout the Committee stage. Griffiths and the Parliamentary-
Labour Party even sought, in vain, to have a Select Committee estab¬
lished to examine two petitions presented by the Chiefs and people
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of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, in which they expressed their fears
and their opposition towards Federation. Finally, the Parliamentary
13
Labour Party even opposed the Federation Order in Council on 27 July.
Despite this vigorous campaign of opposition at every stage of the
Parlaimentary process, Attlee was, at all times, quite insistent
that once the Bill became law, the Labour Party would accept the fact
138
and seek to make the Federation a success.
In determining the grounds for the Labour Party's opposition to the
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Enabling Bill, Griffiths had
been particularly careful to avoid any rejection of the principle of
federation for British central Africa. The arguments proferred for
opposing that Bill were that imposition over united African opposi¬
tion was unjustifiable and that the safeguards of African interests
had been diluted to the point of total inadequacy. It was hoped
that by concentrating on these issues the dissident views of Gordon
Walker and his "Keep Right" group could be accommodated, and they
were also consistent with Griffiths' personal views and previous
statements on Federation. This proved to be wishful thinking by
Griffiths, but adopting any other position would have led to further
weakening of Attlee's support for his policy.
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Attlee had, initially, favoured only a two-line whip for the
Federation debate on 24 March. The main argument presented in
favour of this at the Parliamentary Committee meeting was that it
would enable Gordon Walker's group inconspicuously to abstain. This
proposal was only withdrawn in favour of a three-line whip on Bevan's
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insistence that the central African Federation was a major issue.
Attlee, nonetheless, showed the extent of the ambiguity of his
support for Griffiths' position and his own personal sympathy for
Gordon Walker's arguments, by ignoring the Party's Standing Orders
and announcing at the meeting of the Parlaimentary Labour Party on
19 March, that those with conscientious objections to the issue of
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Federation could abstain. After this announcement it is hardly
surprising that the main ratification debate on 24 March failed to
produce the expected strong and convincing attack on the Government's
proposals.
On the day of the debate, the Labour Party attempted to give the
appearance of bitter opposition to the imposition of federation but,
although Gordon Walker, seated in splendid isolation, kept a low
141
profile, Stanley Evans gave a powerful speech in favour of
142
federation which severely dented the Labour Party's position.
The announcement of Queen Mary's death also somewhat deflated the
importance of the debate. - At the end of the debate, despite a last
143
minute appeal by Griffiths and Sir Frank Soskice, Gordon Walker
and fifteen like-minded Labour MPs defied the three-line whip and
abstained on the vote. This gave the Government a majority of 44




It has been argued that the dissidents did not seriously affect
the cohesion or impact of the Labour Party's parliamentary opposition
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to the implementation of federation, and it is true that the
number involved was small, but the emergence of a division in the
Parliamentary Labour Party's ranks was, nonetheless, important.
It was important, as we have seen, because of the encouragement and
sense of moral justification it gave to the Conservative Government.
That the abstainers included four ex-Ministers of the Crown''^ tended
to increase the impact of their views, in Government eyes at least.
Ultimately, however, whether the Labour rebels abstained or succumbed
to Griffiths' and Soskice's last ditch persuasion, was not of over¬
riding importance. It was the knowledge that substantial support
for Federation and disguiet about Griffiths' position existed within
the Parliamentary Labour Party that strengthened the Government's
resolve to proceed. In their view the sixteen Labour rebels were
indicative of a substantial minority of dissent within the Labour
Party.
SECTION 3
THE UNITED CENTRAL AFRICA ASSOCIATION
AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO




to Federation in the United Kingdom
Before examining the British extra-parliamentary opposition to
federation it is useful to briefly recap the Government's position
on the federation issue.
Griffiths felt that the only circumstances which would impede the
Conservative Administration in imposing their federation scheme
were a united parliamentary opposition to federation adn the Nyasaland
Protectorate African leaders producing alternative proposals for
closer association in central Africa."^ However, that such
circumstances would arise was a hope based more on wishful thinking
than reality. The clear differences over federation between Griffiths
and Gordon Walker while in office, indicated the negligible prospects
of the Labour Party in opposition uniting behind a single policy
for British central Africa. From the outset the new Conservative
Government was aware of support for its position on federation from
within the ranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party. Even if Griffiths
had succeeded in preventing the breach from becoming open, the
knowledge of its existence would have encouraged Churchill's
Administration. Furthermore, Griffiths must have been well aware
that while the governments of Britain, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia
would have been prepared to consider, even welcome, alternative
proposals, the Southern Rhodesian Administration would not and could
not accept anything less than a strong federal authority. Nontheless,
Griffiths made every effort to
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maintain disciplined Parliamentary support for his stand in opposi¬
tion to the imposition of federation against the wishes of central
Africa's African inhabitants, while also seeking to persuade the
latter to propose alternative plans.
As we have seen, Griffiths could not, even if he had so wished,
oppose the principle of federation for British central Africa. In
succumbing to Cohen's pressure for an Officials Conference, Griffiths
became identified with the policy of Federation. More importantly,
there was no possibility of the Parliamentary Labour Party remaining
united on a platform that rejected federation for Nyasaland and the
Rhodesias. Thus the policy of opposing the imposition of federation
evolved as the only means of both remaining consistent with previous
statements and actions, and avoiding the party dividing over the
issue. Griffiths achieved some success in sustaining the party
line during the 1952 Parliamentary debates, with Gordon Walker
ostensibly backing his policy, although he showed his awareness of
the tenuous nature of the party's unity by putting it to the test
of a vote on only one occasion. Griffiths' position was helped by
the amount of support his stand on federation received from within
2
the Fabian Colonial Bureau, particularly in relation to his
attempts to persuade the African leaders of Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia to produce alternatives to the government's federation
plans.
Formed in October 1940 by Rita Hinden and Creech-Jones, the Fabian
Colonial Bureau had by 1945 become the best known and most influential
non-government agency dealing with British colonial matters. Its
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close ties with the Labour Party inevitably resulted in frequent
and close liaison with the Attlee Administration, particularly
while Creech-Jones was at the Colonial Office. Even before Labour
came to power, however, the Bureau had established good working
relations, including close personal contacts,^ with the Colonial
Office and its Officials. The quality of these formal and informal
links can be estimated from the fact that on at least one occasion
the Colonial Office formed an internal committee to study Fabian
Colonial Bureau proposals. The committee's findings were subse-
4
quantly discussed in detail with Bureau representatives. The Fabian
Colonial Bureau was active across the whole spectrum of Colonial
issues, but, we are concerned only with its role in the debate over
Central African Federation.
The Fabian Colonial Bureau had opposed the idea of federation when
Labour was in power and had rejected the specific scheme that
emerged from the Officials Conference of March 1951, despite the
efforts made by Gordon Walker to convince it that if federation did
not emerge soon, Southern Rhodesia would link up with South Africa.''
The Bureau would have preferred to have seen the Central African
Council retained and developed into something similar to the East
African High Commission. However, as Southern Rhodesia had rejected
the extension of the Council, the Fabian Colonial Bureau proposed
that Northern Rhodesia and Nysasland be associated with east Africa
in an expanded High Commission framework.^ At a meeting with a
Fabian Colonial Bureau delegation on 2 July 1951, Griffiths rejected
such a scheme out of hand, on the grounds that East Africa's
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political future might be endangered by the entry of such a strong
Afrikaner presence within the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland
European populations.^
The Fabian Colonial Bureau did not dismiss the validity of the
South African threat, indeed it was the Bureau that had taken the
initiative in raising with Griffiths, at a meeting on 13th April
g
1951, the danger posed by high Afrikaner immigration into Northern
Rhodesia. It was highly critical, however, of the failure of the
Officials' Report of March 1951, to produce specific evidence of
the threat of South African pressure on British central Africa
and of the likelihood of Southern Rhodesia entering the Union.
The Fabian Colonial Bureau found no detailed evidence of substantial
changes since 1938 - as the Officials claimed - to justify the
rejection of the Bledisloe Commission. The Bureau argued ruther
that "If there is a strong economic case in favour of federation,
it is not presented convincingly in the Report". The nub of the
Fabian Colonial Bureau's opposition to the Officials' federal scheme,
however, was that it remained convinced that only a strong central
government would satisfy Southern Rhodesia which had ambitions
9
to change the federation into something very different.
The Fabian Colonial Bureau was, therefore, convinced that federation was not
in the best interests of the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia
especially as it was uniformly opposed by the indigenous populations
of these territories. In rejecting the Officials' federal scheme the
Bureau made it clear that it was not opposed to the principle of
closer association in British central
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Africa, but believed that no proposals would be acceptable to both
the northern territories' African and Southern Rhodesia's settler
10
populations. Furthermore, the Fabian Colonial Bureau dismissed
the Officials' claim that scant differences existed between the
'native' policies of Southern Rhodesia and those of its two northern
11
neighbours.
For these reasons the Bureau sought assurances from Griffiths, on
9 July 1951, that he was not going to British central Africa to
force the African inhabitants to accept the federal scheme, and
that African opinion would be the decisive factor in determining the
12
final decision on federation. Having gained these assurances, the
Bureau made every effort to encourage African organisations in
Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia not to boycott the Secretary of
13
State's visit and to try to ensure that the visit was a success.
Although the Fabian Colonial Bureau opposed federation but not closer
association, for central Africa, and had rejected the specific plan
proposed by the Officials' Conference, in March 1951, the Bureau
became closely aligned with Griffiths' policy of opposing imposition
rather than federation itself. This was, in some ways, not a sur¬
prising occurrence, given that the three outgoing Colonial Office
Ministers - Griffiths, Dugdale and Thomas Cook - joined Creech-
Jones on the Fabian Colonial Bureau's advisory committee at the end
14
of 1951. The decision to concentrate more on opposing the imposi¬
tion of federation against united African opposition, rather than to
oppose the whole idea of federation and the specific federal propos¬
als, was, however, an issue that was hotly disputed within the Fabian
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Colonial Bureau and one that was never unquestioningly or whole¬
heartedly pursued. Senior members of the advisory committee, such as
Hinden, Nicholson, Greenidge and Faringdon, argued strongly that
the Bureau was severely weakening its case by abandoning a position
in which it directly challenged the government to produce convincing
arguments proving that federation would not result in the halting
of African political advancement.
There was, moreover, as much support for a policy of total rejection
of federation in central Africa amongst the Labour MPs on the
advisory committee, as there was for toeing Griffiths' line.
Dugdale, who had not hidden his animosity toward federation while
in office, gained the support of White, Sorenson, Driberg and, to a
lesser extent, Creech-Jones, in pressing for the Bureau to adopt a
position totally rejecting federation. Griffiths and Cook did not
remain long on the Advisory Committee and it was left to John Hynd,
James Johnson, Frederick Skinnard and John Rankin to try to uphold
the official Labour Party policy within the Fabian Colonial Bureau.
This deep division, over the tactics the Bureau should employ in
seeking to prevent the establishment of federation, was never
properly resolved. As a result, the impact of the Fabian Colonial
Bureau was frequently diminished in the campaign to prevent the
implementation of federation. Its arguments were diffused and the
momentum of its opposition campaign diluted by its inability to
discard one of the alternative strategies and concentrate on the
other. As late as 12 March 1953, when a deputation from the Fabian
Colonial Bureau pressed Hopkinson not to implement the federal scheme,
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the internal debate within the Bureau remained unresolved. Virtually
half of the Advisory Committee and its delegation disagreed with the
line adopted at the meeting. They felt that the counter arguments
employed by Hopkinson justified their view that it was basically
unsound simply to oppose the imposition of federation but not federa¬
tion itself.^
The advantages of Griffiths' position opposing imposition, but not
federation - Parliamentary considerations apart - was that it enjoyed
a much broader popular appeal than either opposing the federal con¬
cept or simply the proposed constitution. Its great weakness was
that it was based on only a few arguments, none of which were par¬
ticularly convincing, and the government had a strong counter argument
that it was acting on behalf of the African populations and in their
best interests as their legal trustees.
The Fabian Colonial Bureau was in full and united agreement on
the second element in Griffiths' position over imposition, namely,
that the African people should propose alternatives to federation.
When Labour we»S in power, the Bureau, while supporting the Africans
of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in their rejection of federation,
was concerned that the opposition in central Africa to a federal
constitution was too negative. The Bureau felt that the African
opponents of federation needed to counter the specific arguments in
favour of federation and offer alternative arrangements for closer
16
association in central Africa. The alternative proposals the
Fabian Colonial Bureau would have favoured was for a High Commission
on east African lines. When no initiative was forthcoming from the
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Africans of the northern Protectorates, the Bureau itself pressed
both Griffiths and Lyttelton for such an arrangement to be con¬
sidered.^
While the Fabian Colonial Bureau canvassed for a High Commission in
central Africa during Griffiths' time as Colonial Secretary because
they favoured closer association for the region, short of federation,
the reasons offered for this solution during Lyttelton's tenure as
Secretary of State were rather different. African leaders, such as
Chinyama, President of Nyasaland African National Congress, and his
associate Orton Chirwa, were informed that unless they produced
constructive alternatives the Conservative Administration, faced with
a straight choice between imposing the proposed federal constitution
or abandoning closer association altogether, would definitely opt
for the former. Furthermore, Griffiths and his supporters' ability to
maintain a Labour Party fairly united in opposition to the intro¬
duction of federation for central Africa against the wishes of its
18
indigenous population, would be endangered. Not surprisingly,
therefore, Griffiths too was keen that the African leaders should
offer alternative proposals to federation, "to give the Party some¬
thing to fight on". Alongside direct requests to the African
nationalist leaders, the best endeavours of Commander Thomas Fox-
Pitt and Jim Rodgers were sought in an effort to persuade Nyasaland
19
and Northern Rhodesia's African leaders to co-operate on this issue.
Griffiths and the Fabian Colonial Bureau were so eager for the
African leaders in the north to produce an alternative form of
closer association in central Africa because they believed that the
chance of success of their policy depended on it to a large extent.
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The Bureau and the Labour Party leadership were convinced that their
agreed strategy could succeed but only if the Conservative Administra¬
tion could be portrayed as not only over-ruling the opposition of
the African inhabitants of central Africa, but also rejecting their
reasonable proposals for an acceptable alternative. It would then
be the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments, not the
Africans, who would be seen as being unreasonable and intransigent
in their insistence on a federal format for closer association in
central Africa.
The chiefs and Congress leaders in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia
could safely present alternative plans in the knowledge that they
would certainly be rejected by the Southern Rhodesian Government.
There was no danger of them being accepted, but if they were made
they would place the British Administration on the defensive,
strengthening the Labour Party's resolve and at least weaken the
unity of the Conservative Party, even if splits did not occur.
Such plans would also have forced the Northern Rhodesian Administra¬
tion to officially recognise and confer with the African opposition.
The leaders of the African communities in the northern Protectorates,
however, were totally opposed to any links with Southern Rhodesia
and were simply not prepared to propose the formation of such con¬
nections, even as a good tactical ploy. Nor were they prepared to
be connected even by association, to such schemes, and so they con¬
sistently boycotted the closer association conferences convened by
the Conservative Administration. In this, as with the guestion of
alternative proposals, the African leaders of Nyasaland and Northern
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Rhodesia were at odds with their allies in the United Kingdom.
The Fabian Colonial Bureau, Griffiths and Creech-Jones, all tried
to persuade the Africans to attend the April and October 1952 London
Conferences. It is hardly surprising that their efforts at per-
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suasion proved unsuccessful; the reason why Creech-Jones,
Griffiths and the Bureau itself wanted the African delegation to
attend was to ensure the opportunity to present alternative schemes
to the federal plan. Marjorie Nicholson, on behalf of the Fabian
Colonial Bureau, argued that no blame could be directed at Lyttelton
21
concerning the African boycotts of the federation conferences.
However, annoyance at the Africans' refusal to take the advice being
offered them from Britain, led to elements within the Advisory
Committee concluding that there was little point in any further
delegation from central Africa coming to London, as they would
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inevitably boycott the January 1953 Conference as well.
The Fabian Colonial Bureau had tried to persuade Griffiths and the
Colonial Office to oppose all moves towards federation during the
term of the Attlee Administration. The Labour Government committed
itself to no specific proposals for a federal arrangement in central
Africa, but the Bureau failed to prevent Griffiths, Gordon Walker
and Attlee all becoming personally committed to the principle of
federation for the region, albeit with different positions and
reservations. Once Lyttelton had committed the new Conservative
Government to the early implementation of the Officials' federal
scheme, the Fabian Colonial Bureau increasingly tended to place less
emphasis on the rejection of federation as such, and more on stressing
the unacceptableness of the United Kingdom, as the Imperial power,
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imposing a federal framework of government onto British central
Africa against the clear wishes of an overwhelming majority of its
African inhabitants. The Bureau progressively adopted this strategy
partly because of its close ties with the Labour Party, but also to
encourage a united and broad-based opposition campaign.
Nonetheless, many leading figures within the Advisory Committee were
extremely concerned by the manner in which the campaign developed.
The change in emphasis of the Bureau's opposition to federation
occurred against the better judgments of many within the organisa¬
tion. Likewise, there was widespread frustration at the Bureau's
inability to persuade Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia's African
representatives to produce proposals for an alternative scheme to
federation. There was, in addition, disapproval of some of Banda's
more virulent attacks on federation, and central Africa's European
settlers, and pressure for the Bureau to be publicly disassociated
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from them. This general increase was exacerbated by the rapid
emergency of a number of new organisations intended, like the Fabian
Colonial Bureau, to influence British Colonial policy, and the
re-organisation of some bodies of longer standing, which brought them
more directly into areas which the Bureau had long considered to be
their own exclusive domain.
From its inception, the Fabian Colonial Bureau had worked diligently
to establish contacts with a wide range of organisations generally
concerned with the welfare of colonial peoples. Links were formed
with such diverse bodies as the West African Students' Union, the
League of Coloured Peoples, the Royal Empire Society and the Anti-
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Slavery Society. The Fabian Colonial Bureau's close ties with the
Anti-Slavery Society were hardly surprising, since Creech-Jones had
been a member of its Executive Committee since 1938, and relations
were further cemented with the appointment of its Secretary, Charles
W W Greenidge, onto the Bureau's Advisory Committee in 1941. In
all these cases, however, there were clear demarcations between the
different organisations' different roles, interests and perspectives.
They could all be collated under a general interest in some aspect,
or part, of the British Colonial Empire, but their specific interests
tended only to overlap in fairly peripheral areas. Each agency's
fundamental concern was different from those of the others. The
Bureau's attitude towards co-operation with other bodies began to
be re-examined when, starting in 1950 - but particularly from early
1952 - this cosy situation began to break down.
One of the relationships which was revised was that between the Fabian
Colonial Bureau and the Union of Democratic Control. The Union of
Democratic Control was, at its formation in 1914 by E D Morel, a
body concerned primarily with the defence of human rights around
the world. It was intended to be a non-party organisation and over
the years had led campaigns on such wide-ranging issues as support for the
Spanish REpublic and opposition to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. At its
Annual General Meeting in December 1950, however, it was agreed to
dramatically reduce the range of issues with which the Union would involve
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itself and its whole purpose was re-examined. The Union's Annual General
Meeting accepted a
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recommendation from the Executive Committee that it narrow its
areas of concern to Africa and, in particular, British Colonies in
Africa. Some work would continue in the general field of seeking
to lessen the danger of war, but the Union's efforts would be concen¬
trated on Africa. An African sub-committee was established to ensure
that the new priority was pursued.
The Union of Denocratic Control's claims to non-party status had been
undermined by 1950, by the preponderance of left-wing Labour MPs
within the Executive Committee. Nonetheless, long-standing finan¬
cial donations from individuals in the United States were still
forthcoming and enabled the Union of Democratic Control to carry out
research and plan for other schemes in Africa. Just prior to the
Annual General Meeting in October, the Union had organised a success¬
ful conference at Elfinsward on "The Crisis in Africa" at which the
economic, political and international problems facing Africa, and
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its potential to overcome them, were examined.
Both at the conference and at the Annual General Meeting, the Union
of Democratic Control endorsed its complete support for the rapid
achievement of full self-government for all colonial territories in
Africa. As such the Union of Democratic Control was in direct con¬
flict with the majority view of the Eabian Colonial Bureau, which
favoured a gradual development to independence for colonial Africa.
More importantly, the Union of Democratic Control was becoming
involved, to the exclusion of almost everything else, in a topic that
comprised a major part of the Bureau's activities.
The Union of Democratic Control continued in this vein, with the
publication of a pamphlet by Michael Scott, "A Shadow over Africa"
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■and, in June 1952, organised a large conference on South Africa.
Thus, between 1950 and 1952 the union of Democratic Control was
transformed into an organisation which could begin to rival the Fabian
Colonial Bureau's dominant position as the main extra-parliamentary
voice on colonial affairs, for Africa at least. With India having
gained independence, the long-running issue of South Africa, its
internal policies and its role in Namibia, was beginning to emerge
as the colonial issue. This, coupled with the Kenyan Mau Mau and
British Guiana crises, and the continuing controversy over federation
for British central Africa, ensured that Africa was very much to
the fore in colonial issues. The arrival of the Union of Democratic
Control into this area was, as far as the Bureau was concerned, a
most unwelcome development.
1952 also saw the final emergence of a new organisation concerned
with colonial affairs, one which was to surpass the Union of Democratic
Control in its impact, but which the Fabian Colonial Bureau found
it much easier to accommodate. The beginnings of this organisation,
the Africa Bureau, can be traced to the informal meetings and
discussions of a group of people in 1950. The regular members of
this group were the Reverend Michael Scott, David Astor, Colin Legum,
Arthur Lewis, Martin Wright, Margory Perham, Creech-Jones, John McCallum
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Scott, and Elizabeth Pakenham. Their interest and ideas developed
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into a book Attitude to Africa, a loosely co-ordinated action over
the Seretse Khama affiar. The success of the book, the experience
gained during the Khama campaign, and the financial .commitment of
David Astor, all served to encourage this informal grouping to move
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towards establishing a formal agency. However, the impetus which
finally produced the official launch of the Africa Bureau in March
1952, was the central African Federation controversy.
The African Bureau, as its name implies, was concerned only with
the continent of Africa. Its early activities, moreover, were
concentrated on central African Federation and South Africa,
particularly the Union's involvement in Namibia and demands for the
transfer of the High Commission Territories. That these issues were
the Africa Bureau's priorities was determined partly by events, but
also because of the personal commitment to these topics of its Director,
the Reverend Michael Scott. The emergence of the Africa Bureau
illustrates the growing importance of Africa's position in British
Colonial affairs in the eyes of United Kingdom liberals. It also
meant that a second British organisation was now engaged wholly or
primarily in attempting to influence government colonial policy for
Africa, publicising events in Africa in the United Kingdom, arranging
platforms on which leading African figures could address, interest
and educate the British public, and furthering the political and
economic development of that continent, mainly through educational
activities.
Two further bodies became heavily involved in African colonial questions
at around the same time. The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection
Society had been in existence for about one hundred years. Its original
aims had been the abolition of slavery, in all its forms, and justice
for aboriginal native races, but these had been extended to include
the abolition of labour systems analogous to slavery and the advocacy
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of common citizenship on a common standard of civilisation. As a
result, the Anti-Slavery Society had become increasingly involved
in the issue of how and when colonies should achieve self-government
and independence. Moreover, by defining apartheid as falling within
the definition of a labour system analogous to slavery, the Anti-
Slavery Society concentrated much of its time and energy on South
Africa and the surrounding territories to which the Union laid claim.
This heavy involvement in Southern Africa increased during C W W
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Greenidge's time as Secretary of the Society and included
co-operation with the Fabian Colonial Bureau and Africa Bureau in
their campaigns to prevent the imposition of federation during 1952
and early 1953.
Racial Unity, by contrast, was formed only at the start of 1952,
with the specific purpose of working to secure that the United
Nations Declaration of Human Rights was implemented and upheld
around the world. Although over 2,000 people attended its founding
meeting, pressing financial difficulties ensured that its first two
months of existence were occupied with proposals to amalgamate with
other groups.^ At meetings on 14 and 23 January, and on 24 February,
the possibility of joining with the Racial Relations Group and the
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African Relations Council were closely examined. Once the
organisation got going, however, it rapidly became heavily involved
in the campaigns to prevent the implementation of the government's
federal proposals in British central Africa.
Given Racial Unity's stated aim, this would, at first glance, appear
to have been a rather unlikely issue for it to have adopted. Upon
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reflection, however, it can be seen that Racial Unity was almost
certainly going to be heavily involved with the controversies of
White-ruled Africa. Racial Unity was, after all, founded by Mary
Attlee on her return to the United Kingdom after thirty-five years
working with and amongst the coloured community of South Africa's
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Eastern Cape. Moreover, its chairman was Canon John Collins, so
it was inevitable that its interest in the Declaration of Human
Rights was primarily in relation to Southern Africa. Any organisa¬
tion with such a wide remit is likely to establish priorities and with
Racial Unity the priority was Colonial and Southern Africa. This
tendency to concentrate on Southern Africa was reinforced when
Thomas Fox-Pitt succeeded Peggy Cripps as Secretary at the end of
1952."^ As far as political lobbying was concerned, Racial Unity
sought to establish good relations with the Labour Party through
Griffiths' and Wilson's presence on its General Council, but it also
hoped for beneficial contact with the Conservatives via Lord
Hailsham.
In June 1948, the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism was
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formed in Paris with Fenner Brockway as its international chairman.
The organisation was concentrated mainly in Europe and its United
Kingdom section, of which Brockway was Vice-Chairman, never really
gained much support or influence in itself. The primary function
of the British section of the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism
soon evolved into disseminating information about and from the
numerous colonial nationalist movements affiliated to it. The
Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism's interests and activities
were thus largely determined by the nature of its affiliates which
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were predominantly African nationalist movements, such as Nkrumah's
Convention Peoples Party, Azikiwe's National Council of Nigeria
and the Cameroons, Kenyatta's Kenya African union and the African
Congresses of Uganda, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Britain's colonial
policy in Africa therefore was its main concern and this inevitably
included the central African Federation, although the crisis in
British Guiana and particularly the Mau Mau upheaval in Kenya
took precedence.
As we shall see, the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism did
at one stage attempt to co-ordinate the campaign activities of
all the British groups opposed to dederation, but without much
success. It was hardly surprising that the Fabian Colonial Bureau,
in particular, rebuffed this initiative, given that the Congress
of Peoples Against Imperialism explicitly excluded Fabian Colonial
Bureau personnel from attending conferences. Nonetheless, the
Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism was not wit-hough influence,
particularly within the Labour Party, twenty-three of whose MPs
were also members of the organisation. The Congress of Peoples
Against Imperialism's influence on British colonial policy may
have been, at best, peripheral, but its role within the opposition
to federation within the United Kingdom cannot be so easily
dismissed. For the Fabian Colonial Bureau the emergence of the
Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism, and its attempt to lead
British opposition to federation, was one further example of the
disturbing trend of proliferation of organisations involved in
colonial affairs.
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According to Marjorie Nicholson, the reason for the Fabian
Colonial Bureau's unhappiness at these developments was the belief
that they would lead to numerous organisations dealing with the
same issues from a similar perspective. This would result in a
proliferation of publications, meetings and campaigns aimed at the
same general audience for which they would be competing for finan¬
cial and other support. This in turn would lead to more diffuse
pressure and less effective campaigns.Another factor which
caused the Bureau's disquiet was that they now had two specific
rivals for the support of Labour MPs interested in colonial matters
in the Union of Democratic Control and the Congress of Peoples
Against Imperialism.
A further cause for concern was the Fabian Colonial Bureau's rather
precarious financial situation. Initially reliant on its two
founders, Rita Hinden and Creech-Jones, for financial backing, the
Bureau had rapidly evolved to a system of members' subscriptions
providing the bulk of its finances. Due to the expansion of its
activities, particularly in relation to research projects, the
Fabian Colonial Bureau was in some financial difficulty by 1950."^
Although the situation had improved somewhat by 1952, the outlook
remained uncertain and so the prospect of direct competition for
the limited pool of human and financial resources available was not
welcomed. Nonetheless, it became increasingly apparent to all
concerned that some sort of working arrangement between the various
organisations would have to be found.
Reaching agreement over such an arrangement was no easy task, however.
A significant minority within the Fabian Colonial Bureau was reluctant
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to be associated in any way with the more overtly socialist
organisations opposing federation, such as the Union of Democratic
Control and the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism."^ This
attitude had surfaced two years earlier, when the Bureau had rejected
an offer of close co-operation and financial support for the
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Fabian Colonial Bureau from the General Secretary of the Union
of Democratic Control, Basil Davidson. Another difficulty that
soon emerged in the attempt to get a measure of co-ordination
between the various bodies, was the difference in attitude between
the Bureau and the other organisations over the best means of apply¬
ing pressure to alter government policy.
The Fabian Colonial Bureau came under pressure to change its tactics
and adopt a more forceful political line in its opposition to
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federation. Kenneth MacKenzie, the Edinburgh World Church Group
and the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism urged the Bureau to
stage public protest meetings, organise campaigns of letters to the
Press and step up its parliamentary action.^ The Fabian Colonial
Bureau, however, resisted this pressure because it did not feel able
or equipped to alter its strategy of a gradual approach of trying
to change British Government policy for central Africa primarily
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through private persuasion. Thus, any attempt at co-ordinating
the efforts of the various British bodies campaigning against the
imposition of federation would have to overcome wide differences
concerning politics and tactics, quite apart from the antipathy within
the Fabian Colonial Bureau towards the new arrivals.
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At the end of May 1932, the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism
attempted to unite all the numerous efforts into one co-ordinated
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campaign. This attempt, however, was regarded by the Fabian
Colonial Bureau and the Africa Bureau as an attempt by the Congress
of Peoples Against Imperialism to attain dominance over bodies
active in opposing federation, and was shunned accordingly.^ Apart
from possible prejudice, the main reason underlying the Fabian
Colonial Bureau's and Africa Bureau's attitude was the conviction
that it would be disastrous for any anti-federation campaign to be
seen to be controlled by bodies with close ties with the British
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Communist Party.
From the outset the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism's
attempt to establish a co-ordinating committee was surrounded in
controversy. Fenner Brockway, the driving force behind the effort
to unite all the disparate campaigns, claimed, at a meeting of
interested parties on 26 May, that the Congress of Peoples Against
Imperialism had initially proposed that the Africa Bureau act as
the unifying body and had only taken on the task itself when the
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Africa Bureau declined and suggested they take the initiative.
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This account of events was flatly rejected by the Africa Bureau,
whose Secretary, Mary Benson, wrote to all the other organisations
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informing them that Fenner Brockway's claim was completely untrue.
Despite this set-back, the response from those organisations repre¬
sented at the meeting on 26 May, and a subsequent one on 10 June,
was encouraging. As International Chairman of the Congress of
Peoples Against Imperialism and a member of the Union of Democratic
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Control's Africa sub-committee, Fenner Brockway worked assiduously
to promote the establishment of a co-ordinating committee. At a
Union of Democratic Control Africa sub-committee meeting on 8 July
he proposed that the Union of Democratic Control be represented
on the Central Africa Committee being organised by the Congress
of Peoples Against Imperialism. A resolution to that effect was
duly passed to the Executive Committee in the full knowledge that
the Fabian Colonial Bureau and Africa Bureau were determined to have
48
no contact with the embryonic Central Africa Committee. It was,
in the end, the Union of Democratic Control and the Congress of
Peoples Against Imperialism that formed the basis of the Central
Africa Committee. Although many of the organisations represented
at the two initial meetings of the Central Africa Committee were
affiliated to it, they were, for the most part, not primarily con¬
cerned with Central African Federation. The two exceptions were the
National Peace Council and Racial Unity, both of which co-operated
closely with the Central Africa Committee on a number of ventures,
including the publication of a pamphlet entitled "Our Trust in
Central Africa".
As we have seen during the first half of 1952, Racial Unity was
experiencing both financial and publicity problems in its attempt
to become an established organisation. Racial Unity's support for
the Central Africa Committee and the anti-federation campaign may well
have been cemented by the knowledge that the nation-wide activities
envisaged for this campaign could only aid its quest for financial
security and political credibility. Whatever the reasons, Racial
-302-
Unity's Chairman, Canon L John Collins, was an active and influential
figure within the Central Africa Committee and its activities which
centred on organising meetings on the federation issue and raising
guestions in the House of Commons through its Labour MP members.
The Central Africa Committee's campaign opposing federation culminated
in a deputation to both Secretaries of State on 27 March 1953, which
presented a memorandum arguing for a reconsideration of the federal
proposals.^
The Fabian Colonial Bureau, while shunning the Central Africa
Committee, agreed to co-operate with the campaign against federa¬
tion sponsored by the Africa Bureau. It was felt that the Africa
Bureau enjoyed a wide spectrum of support concentrated within the
churches, which did not coincide with the Fabian Colonial Bureau's
traditional areas of patronage. It was recognised that both bodies
and the anti-federation cause could only benefit from such a colla¬
boration. The Fabian Colonial Bureau did not attempt to prevent its
individual members from working in the Central Africa Committee's
campaign, but argued that it would be detrimental for the Bureau,
or the Africans' anti-federation cause, to be associated with
what they considered to be extremists in the United Kingdom.^
Nonetheless, some contact was inevitable while the Bureau's Vice-
Chairman, Reginald W Sorenson, MP, and Tom Driberg, MP, remained
active on both the Union of Democratic Control's Executive Committee
and the Bureau's Advisory Committee.
The Fabian Colonial Bureau worked closely with the newly formed
Africa Bureau, the churches and Michael Scott in particular, in
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particular, in making the necessary arrangements to maximise
the impact and publicity of the visit by the Nyasaland and Northern
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Rhodesian African delegations during April and May 1932. The
success of those efforts were followed by joint planning and close
communication, to avoid any overlap in the publication of pamphlets,
duplication of letters to the press or clashes of dates for public
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meetings. It was agreed, for example, that it would be the Fabian
Colonial Bureau which would organise a meeting on central African
federation at the Labour Party Conference later in the year. While
the two agencies continued to co-operate, and Creech Jones' and
Professor W Arthur Lewis' memberships of both the Fabian Colonial
Bureau's Advisory Committee and the Africa Bureau's Executive
Committee ensured the maintenance of close contact, each organisa¬
tion still tended to pursue its own campaign against federation.
The Africa Bureau sought as wide a base as possible for its campaign
against the imposition of federation. Although it had members from
the three major political parties its attempts to broaden the scope
of its support within the Conservative Party did not meet with much
success. Its main concentrations of support were within the
Churches and Universities. It was towards this market that the
Africa Bureau's monthly journal Africa Digest was primarily aimed,
as were its other publications"^ and this tended to colour the
methods by which it campaigned.
One of the Africa Bureau's first important ventures was a large
conference on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 3 May
1952. Building partly on the success of this occasion, the Africa
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Bureau tended to concentrate its efforts on similar formal events.
From early 1953, however, this imbalance was counteracted to some
extent, by the activities of the growing numbers of largely autono¬
mous local Councils for African Affairs. These bodies - of which
the Manchester Council for African Affairs (MCAA) and the Scottish
Council for African Questions (SCAQ) became the most active and
influential - were the result of interest awakened by the United
Kingdom tour of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian chiefs in early
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1953. The impact of this tour, which was organised by Scott and
the Africa Bureau, with the help of other interested parties, was
reinforced with the publication in January of the chief's petition
to HM The Queen.
The Manchester Council for African Affairs was formed by Max Gluckman
and the Dean of Manchester, Bishop Wilson, who became its first
Chairman, in January 1953. It had the specific goal of preventing
the United Kingdom Government's federal constitution for central
Africa being imposed upon the African people of the region. The
Council successfully organised a large conference on the issue of
imposition on 19 March 1953. At the conference resolutions calling
on the British Government to refrain from implementing any consti¬
tutional changes in central Africa, in the absence of African
approval and support, were overwhelmingly approved. The Council
tried to reinforce the strength of its requests to the Government
by a personal meeting with the Colonial Secretary, but Lyttelton
refused to meet them. Frustrated on this front, Gluckman instigated
a campaign within the Council, to apply pressure to MPs with small
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majorities to persuade them to oppose the Administration in its
intention to impose federation.^ The adopted tactic was to organ¬
ise groups of people resident in marginal constitiQencies, primarily
through the Churches and associated bodies, to lobby their MPs,
directly and by correspondence, to oppose the implementation of the
federal constitution. The hope was that if these MPs threatened to
oppose federation, some reduction in support for the Government's
scheme would occur within Parliament. Whatever the merits of
Gluckman's idea, it produced no real returns. What the Council did
achieve was the maintenance of the question of the imposition of
federation as a topical political issue within the Manchester area.
The Africa Bureau's primary aim in its campaign against the imposition
of federation, as with all its other enterprises, was to create
the platforms and means by which Africans could present their own
case to the British public and, to a lesser extent, the British
Government. This was the philosophy behind the establishment of
the Africa Digest and the motivation for establishing the African
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Protectorates Trust and the African Development Trust. The
African Protectorates Trust was established to provide opportunities
and facilities for higher education and technical training for
Africans from the Protectorates of Southern Africa and was to be
complemented by the more general economic activities of the African
Development Trust. As such the goals, methods and support base of
the Africa Bureau contrasted starkly with those of the Fabian
Colonial Bureau, particularly in relation to its campaign
activities.
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The Fabian Colonial Bureau's preferred method of opposition was to
raise matters either in Parliament, through the good auspices of a
small group of Labour MPs, or directly with Colonial Office officials
and Ministers in private meetings. These traditional methods by
which the Fabian Colonial Bureau sought to exert influence became
increasingly ineffectual during 1932. The very close ties the
Bureau had enjoyed with the war-time Coalition Government, and
especially with the post-war Attlee Administration, were greatly
weakened during Lyttelton's time at the Colonial Office. Lyttelton
only received one deputation from the Fabian Colonial Bureau con¬
cerning federation throughout 1952, which compares unfavourably with
the four Griffiths entertained in 1951. Of equal importance was
the dramatic reduction in the number of informal meetings between
Colonial Office Officials and Fabian Colonial Bureau representatives.
These had been a consistent feature since the Bureau's establishment
in 1940.
The decrease in contact between the Bureau and Colonial Office
Officials can, at least in part, be attributed to the strain placed
on their relations by the severe criticisms made by the Fabian
Colonial Bureau of the Officials' Report of March 1951, which
favoured the early establishment of federation. Another contributing
factor, however, was undoubtedly Cohen's departure to Uganda in early
1952, since he had played a leading part in the continual development
of the Colonial Office-Fabian Colonial Bureau interaction.
The decline in the special relationship between the Fabian Colonial
Bureau and the Colonial Office cannot be explained entirely by the
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attitude and policies of the Conservative Administration. The
Bureau itself came to question the worth of sending deputations to
Lyttelton as it became apparent that the decision to introduce
federation had already been made and that the Colonial Secretary
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was inflexible on the whole issue. This assessment prompted
leading figures within the Fabian Colonial Bureau to conclude that
until the African leaders of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were
prepared to offer alternatives to federation, there was little the
Fabian Colonial Bureau could effectively discuss with the Colonial
Office concerning the federal scheme.
This realisation, as we have seen, encouraged the Fabian Colonial
Bureau to press the nationalist leaders of central Africa to make
some sort of counter offer to the federal proposals. It also
strengthened the faction with the Fabian Colonial Bureau's leader¬
ship that wanted to concentrate resources on opposing the imposition
of the federal scheme, rather than the federal scheme itself. As a
result, efforts were made through correspondence and at the meeting
of 18 February, to gain assurances from Lyttelton that federation
would not be imposed without African consent.^ The Bureau failed
to obtain any such assurances and became resigned to the inevitability
of some form of closer association being forced upon central
Africa.
Nonetheless, opinion with the Fabian Colonial Bureau was divided
over whether or not the Conservative Administration would impose
the federal constitution. Marjorie Nicholson, for example, was
confident that the Government, faced with united African opposition
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in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and vociferous campaigns against
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imposition at home, would not proceed. John Lodge did not share
such optimism and was convinced that the United Kingdom Government
wanted to give as much support and independence to the European
settlers of central Africa as they could manage. Lodge felt that
the Conservative Administration would be influenced far more by the
opinions of its own MPs than by the views of the Churches and other
interested bodies. With this in mind, Lodge was strongly lobbying
two Conservative MPs, Hamilton Kerr and Douglas Marshall, who were
known to be uneasy about possible government intentions for central
Africa and, as members of the Anti-Slavery Society, open to arguments
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in favour of an alternative to federation.
There were also some indications that a significant group of
Conservative back-bench MPs were unhappy with the Government's
policy of forcing the implementation of federation against strong
Parliamentary and public opposition, and without any support from
the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and that the
Government itself was concerned.^ On the assumption that these
indications were accurate, the Fabian Colonial Bureau advocated
that any decision on federation be postponed for two to three years
and a High Commission on east African lines be introduced in the
meantime. Their hope was that if these proposals were adopted, then,
before federation was introduced, the success or otherwise of the
interim High Commission would have to be examined, the provisions
for safeguarding African interests in the federal proposals could
be substantially strengthened and African consent would be forth¬
coming.^
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The defensive, even defeatist, nature of the Fabian Colonial
Bureau's opposition to the imposition of federation during 1932 was
accentuated further in early 1953. After its unsuccessful meeting
with Hopkinson on 12 March, the Fabian Colonial Bureau concentrated
its efforts on seeking concessions from Lyttelton over amendments to
the Northern Rhodesian constitution. A stream of correspondence
combined with private meetings on 2 and 20 July produced no signifi¬
cant successes for the Bureau.^
The publication in October 1953, of the Fabian Colonial Bureau's
pamphlet Central African Federation ; What Now?, prepared by Creech
Jones, marked the end of the Bureau's fight against the introduction
of federation into British central Africa. The Bureau sought to
make the best of federation by pressing for the economic development
of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and the continual improvement of
the African population within federation. It was also determined
to urge the United Kingdom Government to continue to fulfil its
responsibility for the northern territories even though the federal
constitution was in operation, and take full advantage of any
Federal Constitution Review Conference to advance the Africans'
political position.^
The Scottish Dimension
A more positive aspect of the Fabian Colonial Bureau's campaign
against imposition, was ite close collaboration with the efforts of
the Edinburgh World Church Group. As early as 11 February 1952,
Marjorie Nicholson proposed to the Reverend W D Cattanach, Secretary
of the Edinburgh World Church Group, that his group and the Fabian
-310-
Colonial Bureau co-operate closely in their campaign against the
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imposition of federation. ' Dr Kenneth Little in Edinburgh and
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John Hatch in Glasgow, members of the Bureau's Advisory Committee,
were to be its contacts with Cattanach's group, and to cement this
relationship the former became the Edinburgh World Church Group's
Chairman. ^ By this means some efforts were made to co-ordinate
the various anti-federation campaigns within Scotland.
On 29 February 1932, the Edinburgh World Church Group organised a
public meeting to protest against any attempt to introduce federation
into British central Africa against the wishes of its African popu-
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lations. The evening proved a great success with over 1,100 people
crowding into the Assembly Hall to hear Banda, Julius Nyerere, Hatch,
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Cattanach and Mackenzie propound the case against federation.
Mackenzie in particular made a strong impression. He stressed that,
although federation should not be implemented whilst the Africans
remained opposed, this did not mean that the South African threat
should be dismissed or ignored: rather, the very real danger, posed
by the Union and Afrikaner immigration, should be faced squarely to
counter its use in support of the imposition of federation. Mackenzie
insisted that immigration from South Africa into British central
Africa could be controlled as effectively on a territorial as on a
federal basis and that any claims to the contrary should be
challenged.
The following day a conference on the proposed federation of central
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Africa was held in Glasgow under the auspices of the Iona Community.
The preponderance of those who attended were church people, but in
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addition, around 7G Trade Union and Co-operative delegates were
present. The conference unanimously agreed on a resolution opposing
the imposition of any federal scheme without African consent, and
expressing grave doubt about certain aspects of the Government's
handling of the closer association negotiations. The resolution was
forwarded to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the leaders of
the Labour and Liberal Parties and to all Scottish MPs. More
importantly, the organisations represented at the conference agreed
to contribute funds to help organise a national camapign against
federation throughout Scotland. In an effort to capitalise on the
success of the meeting, the Edinburgh World Church Group published,
towards the end of March, a leaflet by Mackenzie entitled Spotlight
on Central Africa in which the arguments for opposing federation and
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its imposition were outlined. Apart from organising public meet¬
ings the other main method which che Edinburgh World Church Group
used to pursue their campaign against federation was the Scottish
press, particularly the Scotsman.
The Edinburgh World Church Group co-ordinated a letter-writing
campaign to the Scottish press to coincide with the visit of the
delegation of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian Chiefs to the United
Kingdom. They were encouraged in this by the series of large and
successful meetings they and the Iona Community had held in Scotland
during January and February of 1933. This letter-writing scheme was
organised by Kenneth Little and Kenneth Mackenzie, with the help of
Sinclair Shaw. They had conducted a previous one, during the summer
of 1952, but it had differed somewhat, in that it was primarily a
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debate on the letter page of the Scotsman between Little and Shaw,
on the one side, and John Wallace, Secretary of the United Central
Africa Association London Committee on the other.
Little explained the reasons for expending so much time and energy
on this one newspaper in a letter to Nicholson of 9 July 1952.
I think it is important to put up a good shew
in the Scotsman because we have so far got
"Scotland" behind us, and the Scotsman's
willingness to provide so much space means
that we can pack in the sort of stuff for
which it is usually very difficult to obtain
a public hearingT75
There is good evidence in support of Little's claim that "Scotland"
was opposed to the imposition of federation on British central Africa.
The strength of opposition to federation expressed at the well-
attended public meetings and the weight of opinion which appeared in
the letters pages of the Scottish press, support his thesis. As
we have seen, there was also some interest and financial support from
the Trade Union movement, supplementing the many centres of opposi¬
tion within the churches and universities. This has led one historian
to claim that Scotland's students, professors, workers and clergy
became allied over the common cause of opposing federation in central
Africa.^ Such a claim is, however, a gross exaggeration.
What interest there was in the federation issue, amongst Trade Unions
in Scotland, was confined to their leadership and those with Church
or Iona Community connections and, in the case of the leadership, was
transitory. A further important conference dealing with federation
was held in Glasgow on 6 December 1952,and on this occasion there
~J~J
was negligible Trade Union involvement.' While a well-organised and
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voluble anti-federation lobby spread to cover most of Scotland, the
vast majority of the general public remained indifferent to or
ignorant about British central Africa. Amongst Trade Union members
indeed a certain amount of antagonism existed based on the belief
that the time and effort, spent on campaigning for the rights of
foreigners, and black ones at that, distracted attention from
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important domestic problems. A similar situation existed within
the Labour Party, in that while certain MPs were heavily involved in
the campaigns opposing federation, the issue did not carry much
weight in the party either at Westminster or in the country at
large.
Nonetheless, the situation within Scotland was appreciably different
from the rest of the United Kingdom. Throughout the whole of Britain
the resistance to the Government's plans for federation in central
Africa was concentrated within the Churches and Universities. Given
the much more dominant position of those two institutions within
Scottish society, compared with the rest of the United Kingdom, the
impact of the opposition to federation was necessarily greater north
of the border. This tendency was reinforced by the role of the Iona
Community and the establishment of a nationwide organisation specifi¬
cally opposing federation, the Scottish Council for African Questions,
which had no English or Welsh eguivalent.
The Iona Community had been established in 1938 in an attempt to
create closer contacts between ministers and unemployed men and in
the hope that a mutual lifestyle, based on Christian and social
disciplines, could be produced. After the war the scope of the Iona
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Community was extended into a general attempt by clergymen to
reach the working class. When the Iona Community was brought
within the jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland, in 1951, its
purpose, apart from giving a spiritual and ecumenical lead, was
to emphasise the value of the social gospel and its relevance
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for contemporary problems and political issues.
The Leader of the Iona Community during 1952 and 1953 was the
Reverend Dr George F MacLeod, and its Secretary was the Reverend
T R Morton. Both these men were personally opposed to federation
in central Africa; given the influence of their positions, and
the remit of the Iona Community, it is hardly surprising that
their organisation became heavily involved in the campaign against
federations's imposition. The significance of the Iona Community's
role within the Scottish opposition to federation was that it
broadened the range of people involved beyond the rather narrow
confines of Church and university. Equally important, it provided
those seeking the rejection of federation for central Africa with
a Scotland-wide network of contacts generally sympathetic to their
cause.
Further impetus for the efforts of the Iona Community and the
Edinburgh World Church Group was provided by the position adopted
by the 1952 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. The General
Assembly unanimously agreed that no federal scheme should be adopted
in British central Africa "without the consent and co-operation
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of the Africans." This pronouncement, like the General Assembly
itself, was invested with an exaggerated significance within Scotland,
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a bias attributable to the vacuum created by the lack of any national
forum for political and social debate. Nonetheless, it was still an
important event and, as we shall see, was viewed with considerable
concern by Welensky and the United Central Africa Association London
Committee. Apart from gaining publicity for the case against federa¬
tion, the General Assembly's motion also ensured that opposition in
Scotland would centre on the case against imposing federation against
the wishes of the African people, rather than on any flaws contained
in the scheme itself, or in the concept of federation for central
Africa.
It was the lona Community, however, which provided the opponents
of federation with an already established organisation to further
their cause. However as 1952 progressed it was increasingly felt
that this body did not offer a suitable vehicle by which to inten¬
sify the campaign. A national body specifically concerned with the
federation issue and the United Kingdom's policy towards its
African Colonies was required. The Iona Community, it was accepted,
could not and should not attempt, or be tempted, to evolve in this
direction. At a conference on the future of Britain's African
colonies, held in Glasgow on 6 December, at which the main political
parties were represented, the Reverend Dr Neville Davidson, minister
of Glasgow Cathedral and Vice-Convener of the Church of Scotland's
Church and Nation Committee, announced that a Scottish equivalent
to the Africa Bureau was soon to be inaugurated: a Scottish Council
for African Questions.81
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The launch of the Scottish Council for African Questions (SCAQ)
on 5 March 1953, finally provided Scotland with an appropriate
national organisation to pursue the anti-Federation cause.
Based on well-established local committees in Glasgow, Edinburgh
and Aberdeen, and liaising closely with the Africa Bureau, SCAQ
organised a series of public meetings in 1953 protesting against the
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imposition of federation. However, SCAQs emergence came one
year too late.
Having been in the incompatible position of opposing the Government
on a potentially important and contentious issue for one whole year,
it was with relief that the Church of Scotland General Assembly of
1953 abandoned that position. The General Assembly decided that
since the introduction of federation was inevitable, it should not
be opposed any longer, but instead be given a fair chance to succeed.
Accordingly, while regretting that African consent had not been
obtained, the General Assembly called on the African populations of
the three central African Territories to co-operate over the intro¬
duction of federation. In so doing the General Assembly rejected
the arguments of George Macleod and his supporters. They argued
that the Church should not stop protesting and objecting over this
or any other issue simply because it became - or seemed certain to
become - law. In rejecting Macleod's argument the General Assembly
sought to move away from a position opposed to government policy and




It can be argued that established churches inevitably prefer to
reach compromises with the secular authority rather than challenge
them. Whatever the merits of such an argument, by the Spring of
1953 the Church and Nation Committee of the Church of Scotland had
been striving for a whole year to gain some sort of concession on
central Africa from the government, which would enable the Church
in good faith to drop its opposition to federation. Between the
General Assemblies of 1952 and 1953 the Church and Nation Committee,
under its Convener, the Reverend Professor J H S Burleigh, had pressed
Colonial Office officials, Rennie and finally Hopkinson, to amend
the proposed federal constitution to guarantee African rights and
hopes for political advancement.^ However, as we shall see in
the next Chapter, members of the Church and Nation Committee had also
co-operated with the United Central Africa Association's London
Committee in promoting the federation cause.
Although no concessions on the terms of federation were forthcoming
from the Government, Burleigh and another influential figure on the
Church and Nation Committee, the Reverend Dr Urie Baird, were amongst
the strongest advocates for the withdrawal of the Church of Scotland's
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opposition to federation at the 1953 General Assembly.
The Church and Nation Committee in its supplementary report on
Federation to the General Assembly, while expressing concern that
African consent had not been gained, nonetheless invited the Assembly
to urge all concerned to give federation a fair trial now that its
establishment seemed inevitable. The Committee was convinced that
the Church must not say anything which would forment strife or
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encourage unlawful action in central Africa. Burleigh proposed
and Baird seconded the motion that -
The General Assembly note that Central African
Federation seems now inevitable, and, while
deploring that the consent of the Africans
had not been obtained, would yet earnestly call
upon all concerned to give the Federal Scheme a
fair trial in the hope that it may prove bene¬
ficial to the three Territories.87
In persuading the General Assembly to support this motion and reject
the many amendments tabled, Burleigh and Baird claimed that insecurity
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and instability were the real dangers to Central Africa. Thus,
the South African threat was again stressed albeit implicitly, in
pressing the case for central African federation.
The success of the Burleigh/Baird motion removed the Church of
Scotland from a public stand which had been of some embarrassment
to the government and its supporters and, by so doing, completely
undermined SCAQs attempts to establish a popular and uniquely Scottish
opposition to federation; an attempt already weakened by SCAQs




The London Committee of the
United Central Africa Association
While opposition to federation was gaining support north of the
border, events were happening elsewhere which would in the end
undermine this Scottish opposition.
During July and August 1931, Welensky was in London attempting to
persuade the Conservative Opposition to commit itself to the creation
of a federation in British central Africa, and to put pressure on
the Labour Government to implement this policy. Thanks to the good
offices of Lord Altrincham, Welensky and Geoff Beckett were able to
1
have extensive discussions with leading Conservative politicians.
Welensky held talks with Churchill, Salisbury, Swinton, Lennox-Boyd,
Winterton, Harlech, De la Warr and Woolton, all of whom he found most
2
helpful. As a result of his various meetings, Welensky was con¬
fident that the Conservative Party would make great efforts in
support of federation, in the House of Commons at least.^
The more interesting development to emerge from this series of
discussions, however, was the tentative proposal for the formation
of an informal committee in the United Kingdom, to promote the idea
of federation. Winterton, in conversation with Harlech, in late
July or early August, and then in a letter to Welensky dated 4 August
1951, formally suggested that such a committee be established and
proposed that its membership include Harlech, Altrineham, De la
Warr, Lennox-Boyd and Winterton himself. Although it was not until
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the later part of May 1952 that the London Committee of the United
Central Africa Association was actually established, it is clear that
Welensky's interest was roused by Winterton's suggestion in 1951.^
From that point on it was only a matter of time before such a body
was formed.
Furthermore it can be surmised that the specific plans' and prepara¬
tions for the launch of the London Committee were set in motion by
Welensky during April and May 1952 as a direct response to the emer¬
gence and activity of such bodies such as the Africa Bureau and Racial
Unity and their concentration, in conjunction with the Fabian Colonial
Bureau, on opposing the introduction of federation. Welensky and his
associates felt that such agencies as the Royal Empire Society and
the Royal African Society had failed to produce a counter-balancing
response to what they regarded as the biassed anti-federation views
of the well-established Fabian Colonial Bureau and Anti-Slavery
Society, and their recently-formed allies.^ It was intended that
the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association fill
■»
this perceived gap and not allow the claims of the Africa Bureau and
its many allies, to go unchallenged.^
It was hoped that the London Committee would be regarded as a non¬
party organisation and not as a specifically pro-federation lobby
group. For the most part it was not perceived as such, but, as we
shall see, this did prevent it from opposing strongly the arguments
of the groups opposed to federation, with some measure of success.
Throughout the time it was in operation the London Committee main¬
tained close ties not only with the leading Conservative Party poli¬
ticians, but also with that Party's administrative organisation.
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Morecver by appointing an ex-Colonial Office civil servant, John
H Wallace, as its secretary, Welensky hoped to ensure that personal
contacts were established with the officials at the Colonial Office.
Wallace was personally committed to the cause of the white settlers
in British central Africa, as the advice he proferred to his succes¬
sor at the Colonial Office demonstrates: "Remember your Kith and
g
Kin". This sort of attitude was definitely on the wane within the
Colonial Office by 1932, a process that had been accelerated since
the war by the rise of men like Lloyd, Poynton and especially Cohen,
within the Office. It is doubtful, therefore, if Wallace retained
important or influential contacts in a Colonial Office controlled
by Lloyd and Poynton with an African division run by Gorrell-
n 9Barnes.
On the other hand, what is beyond doubt is the strength of support
and help within the Conservative Party and its Central Office for
the United Central Africa Association and its London Committee.
Whether the aid given was official or unofficial, it could not have
occurred without at least the implicit consent or the covert direc¬
tion of senior party figures. The help given to the United Central
Africa Association was channelled through the London Committee and
this was the means by which detailed notes prepared by Terence
Kennedy of the Conservative Party Central Office on the organisa¬
tional framework required for the Southern Rhodesian federal refer-
10
endum, were forwarded to Salisbury. This will be considered in
the next Chapter.
Before we examine further the composition and activities of the
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Londo.n Committee, it must be emphasised that this body was established
and controlled by Welensky. As it was a sub-section of the United
Central Africa Association it might be assumed that Huggins, as
President of the organisation would have had overall responsibility
for the London Committee's operations but this was not the case.
It was Welensky who made the important appointments, provided the
financial backing and it was he to whom the office-bearers of the
London Committee were ultimately responsible. Huggins was, in
fact, opposed to the formation of the London Committee and, once
it was operating, tended to be critical of its efforts, dismissing
11
it as being incapable of influencing British public opinion.
The London Committee of the United Central Africa Association was
formally established around mid-May 1952, with capital of £4,500,
12
under the chairmanship of Prince Yurka Galitzine. Its full-time
secretariat rapidly expanded to a staff of seven headed by Wallace
and including three administrative assistants, P McDonagh, Ross
13
Wilson and B Hutton-Williams. To further boost the impact wnich
the London Committee hoped to make with its pro-federation message,
Gee and Company were hired as public relations consultants. All this
was expensive, but Welensky was happy with the progress made by the
13
London Committee during the initial six weeks of its existence.
From the outset, the two general points which the London Committee
sought to emphasise from public platforms, at private meetings and
in the press were, first, the very great economic benefits federation
would bring to British central Africa and, second, the fact that
widespread support for federation did exist within the African popu¬
lation, but was being intimidated into silence by the threats and
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violence of a small minority of extremist agitators. As we have
seen, this was increasingly the approach adopted by the Conservative
Administration from around October 1932. The argument of endemic
intimidation which prevented African support for federation from
being expressed, was the London Committee's main counter to the
opposing groups' campaign against the imposition of the federal
scheme.
The European settler leadership in central Africa laid great stress
on the African intimidation thesis. In the lead up to the January
1953 conference in London, Huggins stressed to the United Central
Africa Association's London Committee that there existed "a con¬
siderable amount of worth-while African support for the federation
proposals", but that intimidation and fear of reprisals severely
limited the number of public expressions of support.^ It was
this argument that was utilised most forcefully and effectively
against the churches and their associated bodies during 1952, and,
even more strongly, in 1953.
The general attitude of the British churches had been established
in 1951, with the adoption of a resolution by the British Council of
Churches, opposing the imposition of federation without the consent
of the Rhodesias' and Nyasaland's African inhabitants. Although the
British Council of Churches modified its position somewhat in 1952,
it was the 1951 resolution which, broadly speaking, was adopted by
15
the British churches and missionary bodies. Moreover, as the
views of missionaries working in, or recently returned from, central
Africa carried a great deal of weight in the press and with the
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general public, particular efforts were made by the London committee
to influence the missionary organisations. On 25 September 1952,
for example, Wallace and Welensky met with the Reverend L G Greaves,
Assistant Secretary to the Conference of British missionary
Societies, and impressed upon him the full extent of intimidation
in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Welensky and Wallace were
also at some pains to reassure Greaves that the imposition of
federation would not encourage South Africa to initiate moves
16
to incorporate the High Commission Territories.
In seeking to counter the anti-federation views prevalent within
the British churches and missionary organisations, the London
committee was aided by the general pro-federation stance of the
various denominational newspapers. Unlike the non-denominational
British Weekly, which forcefully opposed federation and its
imposition in central Africa, the Church Times, Methodist Recorder
and The Tablet servicing the United Kingdom's three largest
denominations, all either overtly or implicitly supported the
establishment of central African Federation."^
During June and July the London Committee attempted to counter
the flow of anti-federation letters appearing in the British press.
Welensky was especially pleased that, due to the efforts of the
18
London Committee and Sir Marston Logan in particular, the
Scotsman's letter page during July no longer consisted of unanimous
19
criticism of federation. Galitzine, Wallace and the rest of their
associates also began to lobby Members of Parliament in an attempt
to gain more support for federation. Their main priority in this area was
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to foment support for federation within the sections of the Labour
Party generally recognised as being broadly sympathetic to it. In
establishing these contacts, Wallace's influence with Lord Ogmore
must have been useful. When Ogmore had been Parliamentary Secretary
at the Colonial Office, he had been accompanied by Wallace on a six-
week tour of east Africa in April and May 1948. Wallace took some
credit for influencing Ogmore towards the strongly pro-federation
20
position he had adopted by 1951. By mid-August 1952, good rela¬
tions had been established between the London Committee and Gordon
Walker and his "Keep Right" group, to whose numbers it was hoped to
recruit some of the one hundred or so MPs believed to be in some
21
measure sympathetic to the federal cause.
A further strand in the London Committee's strategy was to obtain
public platforms upon which one of their number could proclaim the
advantages of federation. This programme took some time to estab¬
lish, with only a handful of venues found in June, July and August
1952. In some measure this was to be expected, as it took time
for the London Committee to make its presence felt and to build up
a nation-wide list of speakers who could present a good case for
federation and were prepared to do so. It is unclear whether the
London Committee sought people specifically with experience of
central or east Africa, but a high proportion of its speakers did
conform to this pattern.
September saw a healthy increase in the number of engagements
reguiring a speaker from the London Committee and a very creditable
thirty-five speeches at functions or meetings across the whole of
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the United Kingdom was achieved during October. This monthly total
of speaking engagements was, by and large, maintained through to the
end of March 1933. Although local branches of the Overseas League,
United Nations Association and the Young Conservatives featured as
regular venues, the overall majority of these engagements were
addresses to Rotary Clubs. Wallace accepted that Rotary Clubs were
not the ideal venues for their speakers but they did at least have
the advantage of usually being reported in the local Press. He was
particularly disappointed by the response of the Royal Empire Society:
only the Bristol and Oxford branches responded positively to his
overtures.^
23
With the exception of some United Nations Association meetings,
most of these speaking engagements did not involve the competition
and debate provided by the presence of an opposing speaker. The
London Committee made every effort to engage in such public debates
and was highly critical of the many United Nations Association
branches which did not provide them with a platform and only invited
anti-federationists to address their meetings. Indeed so incensed
did members cf the London Committee become about what they perceived
to be the anti-federation bias of the United Nations Association
that they complained about it to Ministers and to the United Nations
24
Association president, Lord Cecil. Racial Unity, by contrast, did
organise a large public meeting in London on 17 October, to which
Wallace was invited to present the case in favour of federation in
23
opposition to Dr Banda.
However the London Committee was rarely invited to provide speakers
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for the large conferences and public meetings organised by the
numerous bodies involved in the anti-federation campaign. Whenever
possible on these occasions, however, Wallace and anyone else who
was available from the London Committee, would attend to offer
opposing arguments or, failing that, to ask awkward guestions from
the floor. To this end Wallace and Stephen Joelson attended the
two-day conference on federation organised by the United Nations
Association and the Council for Education in World Citizenship on
10 and 11 October 1952. At this conference they enjoyed the
assistance of Stanley Evans, MP of Cordon Walker's "Keep Right"
group who made a powerful speech in favour of federation from the
26
floor. Similarly Wallace was among the audience at a public meet¬
ing on federation, held under the auspices of the Africa Bureau on
9 October.^
Support from the press was mixed but the London Committee could rely
totally on East Africa and Rhodesia whose editor, F Stephen Joelson,
was an influential figure in their counsels. The close and regular
correspondence between Joelson and Welensky served two purposes.
First, it enabled Welensky to influence the coverage of the federa¬
tion debate and the reporting of the central African political situa¬
tion in the British Press. Joelson's monthly journal, although
enjoying only a very modest circulation, was a very respected and
influential newspaper in the specialised area it covered. Whilst
Joelson was definitely not Welensky's puppet, he, nevertheless,
received a great deal of information from Welensky and sought to
accommodate his wishes whenever possible. Moreover, as a member of
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the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association and a
firm supporter of Welensky, Joelson was consciously involved in a
public relations campaign in which he ensured that the East Africa
and Rhodesia played a leading part. Second, the Joelson-Welensky
correspondence provided the latter with a second, more independent,
view of the work and achievements of the London Committee to that
provided by the reports Welensky received from Wallace and
Galitzine.
With regard to the national press, the London Committee felt that
only the Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Daily Mail, Daily Express
and Sunday Times had adopted, from the beginning, a consistently
favourable position on federation for British central Africa.
The Times, Daily Mirror and Daily Herald had all been, at various
times, too critical or unhelpfully questioning, while the Manchester
Guardian and the Observer had, in the London Committee's view, been,
from the start, forthright in their opposition to the federal scheme
and its imposition. Viewed from a more detached perspective, how¬
ever, it is difficult to see the role of The Times as anything other
than a strong, if not uncritical, supporter of the case for a central
African Federation. As for the provincial newspapers, the members
of the London Committee were content with the support for the federal
cause that emanated from the Yorkshire Post, Newcastle Journal and
Aberdeen Press and Journal. The Scotsman, by contrast, was viewed as
a focal point of the fierce Scottish resistance to federation.^
In their campaign to promote, within the United Kingdom, the cause
of central African federation, the London Committee gained the
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committed support of John Connell, a leader writer on London's
2<?
Evening News. Although Connell proved to be a great asset, the
London Committee generally recognised that the efforts of such
anti-federation correspondents as Hugh Latimer, Basil Davidson, and
Colin Legum, more than compensated the cause of their opponents.^
Nonetheless, as 1933 progressed and the implementation of federation
increasingly appeared to be a foregone conclusion, many of the news¬
papers which had been ambivalent in their position on federation and
had reserved judgment, came out firmly in its support. Although the
Economist and News Chronicle, amongst others, were primarily endorsing
the inevitable, Wallace's intensive lobbying of the editorial staff
of the national and large provincial newspapers may also have contri-
31
buted to the swing in support of federation.
The London Committee expended a great deal of time and energy in
seeking to win over as much of the British press as possible. It was
greatly concerned, however, by what is considered to be the strong
anti-federation bias of the BBC. The London Committee, while eager
for as much broadcasting exposure of both central Africa and the
case for federation as possible, took exception to a number of
aspects in the BBCs coverage. Its main complaint was what it saw
as a preponderance of anti-federation participants in discussions
and talk-shows broadcast on the issue. A major series of seven
talks on the BBC under the title of Partnership in Africa was con¬
sidered by the London Committee to be anti-federation propaganda,
since all but the first address were by people opposed to federation."^
To add insult to injury, the BBC used as impartial experts on the
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federation debate, individuals whom the London Committee considered
to be arch opponents of federation, such as Kenneth Kirkwood,
Arthur Lewis and Colin Legum.
By the latter part, of 1952, the London Committee was seeking to make
senior BBC management aware of their complaints of bias. In early
December, Altrincharn wrote to the Governor of the BBC, Sir Alexander
Cadogan,"^ complaining about the persistent anti-federation slant to
the BBCs reporting on, and programmes about., the federation issue.
What is unclear about Altriricham's initiative is whether he inter¬
vened as an individual, in his capacity as a senior Conservative
Party figure, or as Vice-President of the United Central Africa
Association. Whichever it was he had enough status to be granted
a meeting a few days later with the Corporation's Director-General,
35
Sir Ian Jacob. During their discussion Altrincham attacked the
tone and content of the BBCs programmes and reporting on Africa in
general, as well as on the specific issue of federation.^
Although the United Central Africa Association's London Corrimittee do
not appear to have protested further to the BBC, fellow supporters
of federation did so only two months later. Early in 1953, the
matter of biased reporting and broadcasting against federation was
raised with Jacob once again, this time by the Chairman of the
Joint East and Central Africa Board, Archer E Baldwin.^ As we
shall see, this was one very minor action in support of federation
made by business concerns with interests in central Africa.
It was not only in lobbying the BBC that one of the United Central
Africa Association's British-based Vice-Presidents proved to be of
-331-
service to the London Committee. In February 1933 the Africa
Bureau announced plans for a campaign of prayers and protest against
the passage of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Enabling
Bill, on the grounds that it would be imposing a federal constitution
against the wishes of the African majority. By March, the Africa
Bureau's protest plan was attracting a great deal of attention and
appeared to be going to be a very well-supported venture. In an
attempt to undermine the Africa Bureau's prayers and protest campaign,
the United Central Africa Association's London Committee requested
that Leopold Amery approach the Arcnbishop of Canterbury, Dr Geoffrey
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Fisher, to ask if he could take action against the campaign.
As a result of Amery's approach, Dr Fisher took the opportunity of
addressing the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge in London
on 10 March, to attack the ethical basis of the Africa Bureau's cam-
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paign. The Archbishop of Canterbury argued that the church should
not, indeed could not, take sides over the federation issue. Fie
stressed that it was perfectly possible to be either for or against
federation,either for or against its imposition, and still be a good
and true Christian. Therefore, it was unacceptable, Fisher argued,
for it to be even suggested that Christians be called upon to
pray against federation, as this would inevitably imply that to
40
support federation was unchristian and even evil. While the Arch¬
bishop of Canterbury's intervention had a strongly negative impact
on the Africa Bureau's campaign in England, the London Committee were
41
concerned about his negligible influence north of the border.
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Such was the London Committee's disquiet about the extent of
opposition to federation in Scotland, that from the end of the
conference on federation in January the majority of its resources
had been concentrated on the public opinion battle north of the
border. According to Wallace it was not only members of the London
Committee who were worried about the situation in Scotland. In a
letter to Welensky of 12 February 1953, he claimed that Government
Departments and Ministers were "perturbed at the flood of anti-
42
federation letters which has appeared in the Scottish press".
Wallace's views may have been out of fashion in the Colonial Office
and thus his opinion of little consequence to it, but nonetheless,
he probably still had reliable sources of information within the
Department. It is therefore fairly safe to assume that Government
Ministers and Departments were indeed concerned by the extent of
the opposition encountered by their proposals for central Africa,
within Scotland. They were also being kept fully informed about
any action the London Committee of the United Central Africa
43
Association was taking to counter this opposition.
From the latter part of 1952, through to mid-1953, the United Central
Africa Association's London Committee believed that the anti-federation
44
campaign in Scotland was intensifying. This conviction was con¬
firmed during the early part of 1953 by their realisation that the
Scottish Council for African Questions was proving to be amongst
the most active opponents of the imposition of federation.^ As we
have seen, SCAQs anti-federation campaign was severely undermined
by the 1953 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland's decision
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not to continue to oppose the imposition of federation. As we
shall see, the United Central Africa Association's London Committee
lobbied vigorously to achieve that very result.
The United Central Africa Association's London Committee's lobbying
strategy was aimed partly at Scottish public opinion, but mainly
at influential people within its society and within the Church in
particular. The Commissioners comprising the General Assembly of
the Church of Scotland are intentionally changed almost completely
from year to year but the membership of its important committees is
much more stable.Partly as a consequence, the annual reports of
these committees carry considerable weight in the General Assembly's
debates on matters pertinent to any particular committee. On the
federation issue the two relevant committees were the Church and
Nation Committee, and the Foreign Missions Committee. Accordingly,
the United Central Africa Association's London Committee attempted
to convince key figures on these two Church committees that con¬
tinued opposition to the introduction of federation served no useful
purpose, but rather aggravated an already difficult situation.
During October 1932, Sir Marston Logan lobbied Dr J W C Dougall,
Secretary to the Foreign Missions Committee, while Wallace concen¬
trated his efforts on the Reverend Dr M Urie Baird, Secretary to the
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Church and Nation's sub-committee on Commonwealth Subjects.
As a result of these efforts, Wallace was confident that the Church
of Scotland, at the 1953 General Assembly, could be persuaded to
drop its insistence that African consent was an essential pre¬
requisite for federation, and instead accept the imposition of
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federation as inevitable, thus curtailing its efforts tc seeking
the best possible terms under the federal scheme for central Africa's
48
African inhabitants. Logan and Wallace's October success was
followed up by Rennie at the turn of the year in a pro-federation
campaign visit to Scotland. Wallace believed his visit did a lot
of good, by influencing popular perceptions of the proposed federa¬
tion and by converting at least two members of the Church and Nation
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Committee to the federation cause.
In February 1933 the United Central Africa Association's London
Committee sought to capitalise on its earlier successes by making
a further effort to try to influence opinion in Scotland's Church
and media on the federation issue. The London Committee's
assistant Secretary, B Hutton-Williams, met with Mr Fraser, the
Scotsman's news editor, Mr Dinwiddie, the head of BBC Scotland,
and the Convener of the Church and Nation Committee, the Reverend
Professor J H S Burleigh. In his talk with Fraser, Hutton-Williams
stressed the concern felt within the United Central Africa Associa¬
tion's London Committee and, more importantly, within Whitehall, at
the amount of "ill-informed emotional comment" appearing in the
Scotsman's correspondence columns.^' Having only recently left the
Colonial Office and retaining close links with it, Hutton-Williams
could convincingly represent its views. It is interesting to note
that shortly after this meeting, in early March, the Scotsman closed
32
its letters page to the federation topic.
Hutton-Williams did not record what Fraser's reaction was to his
arguments but on Dinwiddie there is no such reticence.
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Dinwiddie himself is 100% pro-Federation
and exceedingly well-informed, but owing
to his official position as head of the
BBC in Scotland, he cannot declare himself
openly . . . [Nonetheless] He is already
assisting unofficially ... I feel sure
that if he is approached further co-operation
may be obtained.53
Further encouragement for the pro-federation cause in Scotland came
from Burleigh. He felt Rennie's visit had made a good impression
and reported that a small nucleus of the Church and Nation Committee
were in favour of federation, but cautioned that he had to "tread
most delicately" in attempting to steer his committee and wider
opinion within the Church towards accepting the imposition of
federation. As it was, because recent public statements by the
Church and Nation Committee had neglected to clearly oppose federa-
, . 54
tion:
. . . there was an element in the General Assembly
which looked upon the Church and Nation Committee
with some disfavour. He pointed out that the
Foreign Missions Committee, which was an older
committee of the Assembly, had all along been
anti-Federation and that the Scottish Missionary
concept, of which the Foreign Mission Committee
felt themselves to be the guardian, had con¬
ditioned over many years the views of some of
the senior members of the Assembly. ... He
thought the Scottish Nationalists were coming
out against Federation, and that the Church and
Nation Committee had to move very carefully.
He said however, that he would make it his
business to sound out the more reliable elements
within the Church and Nation Committee with a
view to trying to crystallise pro-federation
feeling.55
As we have already seen Burleigh and Baird played important parts
in the 1953 General Assembly's decision to desist from opposing the
introduction of federation. What is now clear is that Burleigh had
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been attempting to steer the Church of Scotland towards such a
decision for some time before the Assembly convened in May and that
he had the United Central Africa Association's London Committee's
co-operation and support in achieving this aim.
As well as seeking to encourage supporters of federation in
influential positions, such as Burleigh and Dinwiddie, to counter
the Scottish anti-federation campaign, the London Committee attempted
to persuade opponents of federation that continued opposition to the
scheme would only bring about turmoil in central Africa. This was
the thrust of the argument utilised by Burleigh and Baird at the 1933
General Assembly and endorsed by it. A few weeks earlier two
influential figures associated with the anti-federation cause,
Hemingford and Attlee, made public statements in Parliament. They
independently announced their acceptance that the establishment of
federation was certain and arqued that as a consequence opposition
to its introduction should cease and everyone should work to ensure
its success, especially for the qood of the African populations of
the three Territories."^
On 18 May, the day before the General Assembly convened, a letter
appeared in the Scotsman under Lord Tweedsmuir's name reminding the
Church's commissioners of Attlee and Hemingford's appeal and arguing
that it should be heeded by the General Assembly. More importantly
on the same day the Scotsman not only reported the Church and Nation
Committee's supplementary report on federation at great length, it
also strongly endorsed the views of that committee.^ When the
Church and Nation Committee presented its report to the General
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Assembly the following week, the Scotsman again gave wide coverage
and editorial support to the Church and Nation Committee's supple-
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mentary report. The Report's reception at the General Assembly
was undoubtedly influenced by this and earlier support for the Church
and Nation Committee's position on federation.
As we have seen already, Burleigh and Baird had collaborated with the
United Central Africa Association's London Committee in seeking to
overturn the Church of Scotland's opposition to federation and
Hutton-Williams of the London Committee had also attempted to
influence the Scotsman on this issue. Moreover, the arguments
presented to Parliament by Attlee and Hemingford did no more than
reiterate an earlier appeal by Lord Milverton, the Chairman of the
39
United Central Africa Association's London Committee. His argu¬
ment was much the same as that adopted by Attlee, Hemingford, the
Church and Nation Committee, and the editor of the Scotsman. After
Milverton employed it, this line of argument was reproduced in
numerous letters to the press and anti-federation organisations.
These letters, which had been written by the London Committee, but
not acknowledged as such, were sent under the names of various
supporters of the Committee.^ Lord Tweedsrnuir's letter to the
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Scotsman was just one more of these missives.
The London Committee expended a great deal of time and effort
attempting to bolster public support for the introduction of
federation and persuading various individuals and organisations to
discontinue opposing federation. As it became more probable that
federation would be imposed in central Africa over and against the
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opposition of its African inhabitants, so the London Committee's
approach to its task changed and'its degree of success grew. As
has been shown, during 1952 and 1953 the London Committee had stressed
that only the widespread use of intimidation and threats of reprisals
by African nationalists, especially Congress, prevented the public
expression of widespread African support for federation. The London
Committee also sought to mobilise and co-ordinate the many supporters
of federation within the United Kingdom. However, it was only from
April 1953 onwards, with saturation point reached on appeals to erst¬
while opponents to accept the inevitable and help to ensure federa¬
tion's success, that opposition to the introduction of federation
notably diminished in the United Kingdom.
Nonetheless, it is debatable how much credit should be assigned to
the London Committee for ensuring that opposition to the imposition
of federation did not become as widely held as to dissuade the
Government from introducing federation. What is clear is that
without the London Committee's efforts, the anti-federation bodies
would have enjoyed a free rein in government circles. While it is
unclear if this would have made much difference overall, it would
probably have been critical in the Scottish context. Without the
London Committee's efforts there would have been every possibility
of the 1953 General Assembly following George Macleod's lead
and endorsing the 1952 Assembly's resolution opposing any federal
scheme which failed to gain the support of a majority of Nyasaland
and the Rhodesias African inhabitants. Such an outcome would have
transferred SCAQs prospects of creating and maintaining within
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Scotland a popular opposition to federation.
In conclusion, it is interesting to note that Welensky wound up
the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association in
August 1933. He did so not because its staff and members were
keen to discontinue their activities, butbecause all available
Northern Rhodesian finances were required to launch and support




Tension and Distrust between the Rhodesias
within the United Central Africa Association
While the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association
was promoting central African federation within the United Kingdom
and attempting to defuse the impact of the anti-federation campaign,
its parent body in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was preparing for the
Southern Rhodesian referendum on the proposed federal scheme. As we
liave seen, the European population of Southern Rhodesia and its
political leaders wanted an amalgamated central Africa, or a Greater
Rhodesia. Those amongst them who were prepared to settle for federa¬
tion remained convinced that it was the second best option but hoped
that it might still eventually lead to amalgamation. This unwilling¬
ness to abandon the dream of an amalgamated central Africa served to
heighten the unease and distrust between Southern Rhodesian settlers
and their white northern neighbours. Southern Rhodesians found it
difficult to comprehend why the European populations in Nyasaland
and Northern Rhodesia were resistant to an amalgamated central Africa
and Southern Rhodesia's inevitably dominant role within it. This
attitude struck many white Northern Rhodesians and Nyasalanders as
being high-handed if not downright arrogant, and ensured constant
tension between Southern Rhodesia and her northern neighbours.
This tension was specially evident during the campaign in favour of
the federation proposals, in the Southern Rhodesian referendum in
1953.
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Huggins and Welensky set up the United Central Africa Association
as their vehicle to campaign in favour of federation at the Southern
Rhodesian referendum, and present federation in the best possible
light in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. There were a number of
reasons why it was deemed prudent to establish a new body to organise
the campaign in favour of federation, but perhaps the strongest
was the United Party Government's determination to prevent the
federation issue and referendum from dividing Southern Rhodesia
along party lines. Another advantage to the pro-federation side in
using a non-party-political body, based in all three territories,
to campaign on the issue, was that it enabled Welensky to work
assiduously for federation and provide financial backing, without
becoming openly associated with the Southern Rhodesian governing
party. It also made it that much harder for accusations, that
Welensky was interfering in Southern Rhodesia's internal affairs,
to be proven. A further factor encouraging the formation of the
non-party-political United Central Africa Association was the
marked unpopularity of the Southern Rhodesian Government. The United
Central Africa Association side-stepped this and also provided a
rallying point for the large numbers of basically pro-federation
1
supporters of the Rhodesia and Labour parties. With the creation
of this single issue body, it was much more difficult for the anti-
federation lobby to widen the referendum into a test of the
government's record in office, rather than discuss the merits of the
specific federation proposals on offer. Finally, the United Central
Africa Association provided the foundation for the Federal Party,
formed immediately after Federation. Huggins and Welensky, on
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numerous occasions during the referendum campaign, rejected claims
made by their opponents that this was the purpose behind the forma¬
tion of the United Central Africa Association but two such astute
politicians would not have overlooked the advantages of establish¬
ing and operating a central Africa-wide political organisation well
before the federal state actually came into being.
The Federation campaign in Southern Rhodesia was also complicated
by the sheer number and breadth of issues and views being channelled
into a simple 'yes' or 'no' decision on a specific set of proposals.
Within Southern Rhodesia, the opponents of federation consisted of
hardline advocates of amalgamation and those who favoured a
greater Rhodesia which might include all or part of Northern
Rhodesia, or even extend beyond that territory. There were those
who favoured linking with Northern Rhodesia but were reluctant to
be associated with Nyasaland as well, those who felt Southern
Rhodesia should pursue dominion status on its own, while still
others favoured Southern Rhodesia's entry into the Union. Finally,
an influential group favoured federation but opposed the terms on
offer, arguing that by rejecting these Southern Rhodesia would force
the British Government into putting forward a scheme more favourable
to Southern Rhodesia and her interests.
The pro-federation side also represented an alliance of views
between the minimalists and the maximalists. On the one hand were
those who saw the central African federation as being the end goal:
on the other hand were those who considered it to be no more than a
stepping stone on the route towards a much greater white-ruled
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federation in central and east Africa. This picture was further
complicated by the presence within the United Central Africa
Association of a body of opinion which felt that the proposals on
offer could be improved. While most of those who held this view
were prepared to accept Federation on less than ideal terms, others
were clearly tempted by the arguments of those advocating a rejection
of the terms available in order to force better ones.
Naturally, with these various positions being represented in each
camp, tensions and disputes were rife within the opposing factions.
As we shall see, many guestions can be raised about the commitment,
and degree of support for federation, within the Southern Rhodesian
United Central Africa Association.
On 3 March 1952, David Stirling led a delegation from the Capricorn
Africa Society (CAS) to see Huggins to discuss the possibility of
its amalgamation with the United Central Africa Association. At this
meeting it was agreed that the CAS would merge with the United Central
2
Africa Association under the latter's name. The new organisation
was formally launched on 3 April 1952,^ with Huggins as its President
and Welensky amongst its Vice-Presidents.^ The United Central Africa
Association had been in existence since 1948,^ so planning, organising
and fund-raising had been under way for some time before the union
with the CAS.^ However, it was only from April 1952, and the United
Central Africa Association's re-launch in conjunction with the CAS
that Huggins and Welensky moved from behind-the-scenes support of the
United Central Africa Association and formally assumed the leader¬
ship of the Association.
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The United Central Africa Associations of Southern Rhodesia, Northern
Rhodesia and Nyasaland were all autonomous and responsible for their
own organisation and finance, but answerable to a co-ordinating
body, the National Executive Committee, on which each Association
was represented. The United Central Africa Association in Southern
Rhodesia was initially organised into four regions - Manicaland,
Mashonaland, Midlands, and Matabeleland - and Salisbury. The Chair¬
men and Deputy Chairmen of these five areas made up the Southern
Rhodesian Executive Committee, chaired initially by Stanley Cooke,
which provided co-ordination at national level and fed into the
National Executive Committee covering central Africa as a whole.
To begin with the United Central Africa Association in Southern
Rhodesia was primarily concerned with a registration drive for the
forthcoming referendum, stressing the importance of federation for
Southern Rhodesia and gaining maximum pro-federation publicity. Later
on the United Central Africa Association attempted to influence
United Kingdom public opinion on federation by organising a letter-
writing campaign in support of federation, to British newspapers,
stressing how widespread the problem of African intimidation by mem¬
bers of Congress was, and forwarding to Ross Wilson of the United
Central Africa Association's London Committee all printed examples
that could be found of pro-federation statements by Africans.^
Similar methods were employed by the United Central Africa Association
in Africa to generate public support for federation within the
Rhodesias and Nyasaland's white populations, and they wrote as many
letters and articles as possible to central African newspapers, under
-345-
various names, re-stating the arguments in favour of federation.
Although Stirling had secured Huggins' agreement to the United
Central Africa Association campaigning in support of the federation
proposals amongst the African as well as the European populations,
this aspect of the Association's work was never considered important
within Southern Rhodesia. Whatever he said in his meeting with
Stirling, Huggins was of this opinion and informed Welensky in early
July 1952 that finance for the United Central Africa Association
should be concentrated on the Southern Rhodesian referendum campaign,
rather than on trying to persuade Africans to look favourably on
federation.^
The Capricorn Africa Society/United Central Africa Association union
provided even more divisions within the Association. From the outset
there were tensions between those who sought greater federation, with
Bechuanaland and/or east Africa, and those who favoured closer
association only with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The former
group tended to be concentrated within the ranks of the Capricorn
Africa Society who had become part of the United Central Africa
Association. The friction between the Capricornists and non-
Capricornists within the United Central Africa Association was
exacerbated by the preponderance of younger, more recent immigrants
amongst the former, and older, long-established settlers within the
latter grouping.
The Capricornists numbered Raymond Byrne amongst its ranks, and he
became the United Central Africa Association's Organising Secretary
in March 1952. He was firmly in favour of the creation of a
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greater Federation, uniting central and east Africa, but was pre¬
pared to abide by the strategy vigorously advocated to him by
Welensky, that moves towards closer union with east Africa must, of
10
necessity, await the establishment of the central Africa federation.
By June, however, Byrne had been forced out of office amid accusa¬
tions of incompetence, a casualty of the friction and in-fighting
between the two competing factions within the United Central Africa
Association. The prime mover behind his departure was the United
Central Africa Association's Treasurer, Cecil D Dryden, but Byrne's
position was also undermined by the high degree of personal and
professional animosity that existed between him and the General
Secretary of the United Central Africa Assocation, A F Hopkinson.
Dryden was highly critical of Byrne's performance and successfully
engineered his replacement by Rex Reynolds, a reporter on the
Rand Daily Mail. Dryden!s two main protagonists in this in-fight
were Dr D Fowler and R M Cleveland, Deputy Chairman of the United
Central Africa Association who represented the Capricornist wing
of the United Central Africa Association and who resigned,
disillusioned, in June 1932.
Initially at least, Welensky appears to have attempted to remain
aloof from the internal bickering of the Southern Rhodesian branch
of the United Central Africa Association, but he was greatly con¬
cerned by the resulting administrative chaos and organisational
ineffectiveness. This concern was shared by many other Northern
Rhodesian United Central African Association members, who were
particularly disturbed by the departures of Byrne and Cleveland.
As Welensky was responsible for financing the whole of the United
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Central Africa Association, the longer the disruption of the Southern
Rhodesian branch continued, the more his adopted position of non¬
interference became untenable, and the more pressure he came under
from elements within Northern Rhodesia to impose some sort of order
in the south. Nonetheless, Welensky was able to withstand this
pressure during the middle of 1952, because the Southern Rhodesian
branch of the United Central Africa Association was seen to be taking
action to end the disputes and commence, in earnest, fund raising
and campaigning.
In early July the United Central Africa Association in Southern
Rhodesia was completely re-organised with the formation of a manage¬
ment committee under Dryden's chairmanship. Dryden had met with
Cleveland and Fowler to hammer out a working relationship and as a
result the latter two agreed to serve on the new committee. These
events were important in reducing criticism from the north. Also
important was the presence of Sir Ellis Robins and Ralph Palmer on
the management committee, which seemed to indicate that the United
Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia was finally going
to embark on a concerted fund raising drive in concert with the
business community. Such expectations, however, were not fulfilled.
By the end of September 1952, widespread dissatisfaction existed over
the performance of the United Central Africa Association in Southern
Rhodesia and of Hopkinson in particular. While Hopkinson took the
brunt of the criticism, and was replaced by H D Sutherns as General
11
Secretary when his contract expired on the last day of September,
Stirling and Huggins were also roundly criticised, albeit implicitly
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for the most part, especially for failing to provide adequate
12
leadership. Northern Rhodesian United Central Africa Associa¬
tion members were also unhappy with the slow progress of integration
of the United Central Africa Association and the Capricorn Africa
Society, and the lack of any serious attempts to gain African support
13
for Federation. Efforts were made to persuade Welensky to try to
convince Huggins of the need both for changes and for greater involve-
14
ment on his part. Whether as a result of these approaches or not,
Welensky did indeed meet with Hugqins and urged him most strongly to
13
take an active lead in the campaign for federation. Welensky
claimed that the changes to the Southern Rhodesian branch of the
United Central Africa Association instigated by Huggins in October
16
1932, arose as a result of their meeting earlier in the month.
Apart from Sutherns replacing Hopkinson as General Secretary, these
changes consisted of the establishment of a co-ordinating committee
under the chairmanship of T P Cochran. He explained at a meeting of
the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association's Finance
Committee on 24- October, that Huggins was concerned at the slow
rate of progress made by the United Central Africa Association and
wanted representatives from the newly formed co-ordinating committee
to attend every meeting of all the various sub-committees of the
association "and take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that
17
decisions arrived at were put into effect." Huggins outlined these
tactics when he wrote to Welensky in October 1952, explaining the




When Cochran outlined Huggins' plans to the Southern Rhodesian
United Central Africa Association's Standing Committee on 7 November
1952, however, they were criticised as being too unwieldy. Instead
an alternative solution, proposed by Sutherns, was agreed, that the
Chairmen of all Southern Rhodesia's sub-committees should meet with
the Co-ordinating Committee once a week to sort out problems, initiate
and follow up action. These weekly meetings, held on Friday mornings,
were attended by: Stanley Cooke (National Executive Committee
Chairman), T P Cochran (Standing and Co-ordinating Committees
Chairman), Sir Ellis Robins (Policy Committee Chairman), C D Dryden
(Publicity and Finance Committees Chairman), S W Sandford (Organisa¬
tion Committee Chairman), Mrs M E Rosin (Women's Central Committee
Chairman) Sir Harold Cartmel-Robinson (Inter-territory Liaison
Committee Chairman), plus the remaining two members of the
Co-ordinating Committee: J M Caldicott and Ralph Palmer.
In addition to this attempt to give some shape and impetus to the
Southern Rhodesia branch of the United Central Africa Association,
its organisation on the ground was also re-organised. The number
of branches was reduced to three - Salisbury, Bulawayo and Umtali -
and P J S Mackay was employed to tour Southern Rhodesia establishing
local committees or sub-branches covering the whole territory and
using, wherever possible, town Mayors and Chairmen of town
19
Management Boards as their Conveners. Mackay made rapid progress
in this exercise and was able to report to the Organisation Committee
on 19 November 1952, that nineteen local committees of the United




Huggiris' initiatives brought rapid improvements in local organisation
but on the central issue of discontent with the performance of the
United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia, namely fund
raising, or rather the lack of it,.the picture remained far from
satisfactory. The complaints, moreover, were not only confined to
Northern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Internal Affairs,
Julian Greenfield, was also critical. Even after Huggins' re-organisa¬
tion of the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia,
Greenfield wanted further changes arid the association re-launched
as the "United Rhodesia Association". He considered that Huggins
was neither very competent nor really interested in the internal
21
workings of organisation. Moreover, the widespread feeling
within the upper reaches of the United Central Africa Association
itself was that the organisation in Southern Rhodesia was still
22
far from satisfactory. Welensky, too, remained unhappy with the
organisation of the United Central Africa Association in Southern
Rhodesia and unimpressed that Huggins, while agreeing with his pro-
23
posais for specific changes, had not acted on them. However,
he was not prepared to adopt the strategy suggested to him by
N H Wilson, namely of stopping all financial support from Northern
Rhodesia for Southern Rhodesia's United Central Africa Association
until it started producing results on both the fund raising and
campaigning fronts. Wilson described the Southern Rhodesian United
Central Africa Association's fund raising efforts to date as "a
complete fiasco", accused it of " ridiculous extravagance" and argued
that this would continue to be the case so long as Welensky and the
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Northern Rhodesian branch of the Association continued to pay its
K-n 24bills.
From its formation the United Central Africa Association had been
financed by the mining companies based in Northern Rhodesia,
principally BSAC,Anglo-American Group and Rhodesia Selection Trust
Group. However, this finance did not usually go directly to the
25
United Central Africa Association but instead went via Welensky.
Welensky therefore controlled the supply of funds from the mining
companies of Northern Rhodesia, which meant in effect that he con¬
trolled the whole of the United Central Africa Association's
finances, as donations from other sources proved very disappointing.
It was this lack of financial support from sources other than
Northern Rhodesia's mining companies and the perception in the north
that the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia was
making rio concerted effort to raise donations from elsewhere, that
caused a great deal of resentment and ill-will. Welensky himself
was not completely free from these feelings and they coloured Northern
Rhodesian attitudes to a number of problems which arose within the
United Central Africa Association.
The mining interests in central Africa had, in the initial post-war
period, been strong supporters of amalgamation but had slowly come
to realise, with Welensky, that amalgamation was not attainable,
whereas federation was. Sir Dougal Malcolm, Chairman of the British
South Africa Company, at a meeting with Welensky on 26 July 1951,
urged him to make a concerted effort to gain an amalgamated central
Africa. Welensky, however, stuck resolutely to his position that
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it was better to push for the achievable target of federation
than hold out for the ideal, but unobtainable, solution of
2 6
amalgamation. By the latter part of 1952, these same mining
interests had not only come to favour the establishment of a central
African Federation and responsible government for Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia, but were actively lobbying leading figures
27
in the Conservative Party to bring it. about. The Anglo-American
Corporation, moreover, was, by this stage, keen for federation
28
to be brought about with African support.
The reasons for the mining companies' financial and political
support for Welensky and federation are easy to understand. With
decolonisation occurring or being actively considered for an
increasing number of Britain's overseas possessions, including
Ghana and Nigeria in Africa itself, the mining companies were
eager to secure long-term political stability, under trustworthy
political leadership, for the whole of central Africa. The mining
companies knew and respected Welensky from the bargaining surrounding
the 1949 agreement on the future ownership of Northern Rhodesia's
29
mineral royalties. The creation of a Federation of the Rhodesias
and Nyasaland in which Welensky held a position of political power-
second only to Huggins appeared to meet their requirements,
particularly if a certain measure of African support was also
forthcoming. The donation of many thousands of pounds to the
United Central africa Association through Welensky during 1952 and 1953,
would have been seen as a small price for the Northern Rhodesian mining
concerns to pay to ensure the future security of investments which ran into
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millions of pounds. Some measure of the extent of these invest¬
ments can be gained from the level of funding involved in just one
of the mines in Northern Rhodesia. In December 1952, it was
reported that the Rhokana Corporation was investing eleven million
pounds over five years in its new Bancroft mine, near the Belgian
Congo border.^ Profits too were considerable and the Anglo-American
Corporation made over twelve million pounds from its Rhokana mine
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alone in the financial year 1951-52. However, as it became
increasingly apparent that the United Central Africa Association
was almost completely dependent upon the Northern Rhodesian mining
interests for its funding, these interests were not above using
the goodwill of Welensky, thus obtained, to aid their efforts to
. , .32
gain tax concessions.
It is difficult to determine exactly how many thousands of pounds
companies, with mining interests in Northern Rhodesia, donated to
the United Central Africa Association via Welensky. Some estimate
of the amounts involved can be gained from the fact that the London
Committee of the United Central Africa Association cost Welensky's
backers a total of at least £12,000 before its secretariat was
finally dissolved at the end of August 1953, while the Southern
Rhodesian United Central Africa Association Committees and sub¬
committees spent a minimum of £18,000, and possibly significantly
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more, during just six months between November 1952 and April 1953.
However the point to be borne in mind is that Northern Rhodesia's
mining companies were the only significant source of funding for
the whole of the United Central Africa Association.
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In a letter to Godfrey Pelletier on 16 October 1952, Welensky
complained about the poor fund-raising efforts of the Southern
Rhodesian United Central Africa Association committees and states
that it is money raised in Northern Rhodesia which is financing the
United Central Africa Association throughout Central Africa, and
also the London Committee.Indeed, in that same month, Welensky
was forced to ask John Wallace to introduce economies in the running
of the London Committee as a direct result of the serious drain on
resources incurred in financing the Southern Rhodesian referendum
campaign which suffered from the lack of fund raising within Southern
Rhodesia.The Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Associa¬
tion raised next to nothing; it was Northern Rhodesian money that
financed the Southern Rhodesian referendum campaign in favour of
federation. At the same time however the anti-federation group was
able to obtain funding within Southern Rhodesia. This state of
affairs was clearly recognised within Northern Rhodesia and fuelled
feelings of dissatisfaction with Southern Rhodesia's approach to
federation and her attitudes towards her northern neighbours.
The unresolved problem, that Southern Rhodesian white inhabitants
wanted something different from federation than did their fellow
whites in Nyasaland and, especially Northern Rhodesia, was as clearly
exposed in this context as it was around the negotiating table.
Indeed, so concerned did Welensky become at the damage being done to
intra-Rhodesian relations by Southern Rhodesia's lack of financial
support for federation, that he arranged for a donation of over
£1,000 to be made directly from Prain's Rhodesia Section Trust Group
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to the Southern Rhodesian branch of the United Central Africa
Association. Even with this artificial boost to their fund-raising
efforts the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association had
only just managed to raise a total of £3,000 by the end of October
1952,"^ a figure roundly criticised as desultory in certain guarters
of Northern Rhodesian's settler population, who were unaware that the
real figure was considerably lower.
As Neil H Wilson pointed out to Welensky in a letter of 29 September
1952, the level of Southern Rhodesia's commitment to federation
could be gauged by comparing the £20,000 raised by Southern Rhodesia's
white population of only 23,000 for the referendum on responsible
government or incorporation by South Africa, with the paltry £3,000
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raised so far by a population nearly five times as large. Privately
Welensky shared Wilson's view of the Southern Rhodesian attitude,
describing Southern Rhodesia's financial contribution to the federa¬
tion referendum campaign as being "miserable" in a personal letter
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to Wallace on 2 May 1953. In an earlier letter, Welensky had
informed Wallace that not only had Northern Rhodesia's fund raising,
primarily from the mining companies, financed, almost unaided, all
three campaigns - London, Southern and Northern Rhodesia - but at
Welensky's instigation several large donations from Northern Rhodesian
interests had been made directly to the Southern Rhodesian branch
of the United Central Africa Association in an attempt to make it
appear that "the Southern Rhodesian side had made some real contri¬
bution financially to the campaign".^
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Southern Rhodesia's poor fund-raising efforts were closely allied to
indifferent administration. In Northern Rhodesia, by comparison,
Jim Phillips had established local United Central Africa Association
committees in every town on the Copperbelt, with the exception of
Chingola, by early September 1952, and F S Owen provided effective
41
support to Welensky's fund-raising efforts. By the end of September,
Abrahams was proposing to Welensky that Phillips should be moved to
Southern Rhodesia to lead and revamp the administration of their
42
United Central Africa Association, and before the end of the year
Welensky had been convinced of the need to instal Phillips in
Salisbury to attempt to make the Southern Rhodesian United Central
Africa Association more effective. Phillips took up his new post
at the start of 1953, but continued to be paid by the Northern
Rhodesian branch of the Association, yet another example of the United
Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia being subsidised by
its northern eguivalent.^
As we have seen there was considerable unease within Northern
Rhodesia at the prospect of entering a federation with their larger
southern neighbour. This unease was in no way diminished by the
shared experience of campaigning for a supposedly mutually agreed
goal under the framework of the United Central Africa Association.
Concern amongst Northern Rhodesian settlers was further heightened
when they were faced with the prospect of federating with a territory
carrying a national debt of £111 million. Welensky defended Southern
Rhodesia's financial situation by arguing that it represented crucial
long-term investment in the development of her railways, electrical,
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steel and construction industries. Be that as it may, Northern
Rhodesia was lending money to its neighbour for her to finance her
national debt, was single-handedly financing the Central African
Airways Corporation for at least part of 1953, and lent Southern
Rhodesia a further £5 million for the Rhodes centenary celebrations.
The Times concurred with the opinion that the Southern Rhodesian
economy was in poor shape.^ Southern Rhodesia's inability and/or
unwillingness to finance its own pro-federation referendum campaign
raised the possibility in some minds that Northern Rhodesia would
similarly be reguired to pay Southern Rhodesia's national debt after
federation.
Apart from the tension and increased friction arising from Southern
Rhodesia's almost complete lack of success in fund raising for the
United Central Africa Association, there were at least three other
areas in which irritation and dispute arose between the settler
populations of the two Rhodesias in the immediate pre-federation
period.
One oft-repeated complaint amongst Northern Rhodesian whites, of
their southern neighbours, concerned the level of ignorance in
Southern Rhodesia of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the
pervasive attitude of condescension amongst Southern Rhodesian
settlers towards the northern territories and their settler popula-
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tions. Resentment amongst Northern Rhodesian whites provoked by
this attitude of white Southern Rhodesians, created the generally
soured atmosphere within which all the other issues and disputes took
place.
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A second major dispute between the Rhodesias occurred over which
site, Kafue or Kariba, offered greater advantages for supplying
hydro-electric power to the two territories. This disagreement,
dating back to at least 1947, carried on well into the life of the
Federation itself, but erupted into full blown conflict between the
Rhodesias on two occasions in the run up to the establishment of
the central African federation. In July 1951, the Hydro-Electric
Power Commission, set up by the CAC to resolve the dispute, reported
in support of the Kariba option and caused a storm of protest from
within Northern Rhodesia as a result. Then, in May 1953, Welensky,
with the unanimous support of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative
Council, visited Johannesburg to confer with Sir Ernest Oppenheimer
over possible funding for a hydro-electric scheme at the Kafue river
site and provoked protests from Southern Rhodesia.^
This disagreement, while being a constant low-level irritant to
intra-Rhodesian relations, was not directly linked to the federation
issue. It is thus of only passing interest in an examination of the
disputes between the white Rhodesias, thrown up in their pursuit of
closer association in central Africa. A disagreement that was far
more central to the Rhodesias' search for agreement on the terms of
federation concerned the United Central Africa Association's campaign
strategy in the run up to the January 1953 London Conference on central
African federation and the Southern Rhodesian referendum on 9 April,
on acceptance or rejection of the terms agreed at the conference.
At the root of this dispute was the Southern Rhodesian insistence,
at the January Conference, on further concessions towards their
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ideai of amalgamation. This conflicted with general acceptance by
Northern Rhodesia of the terms already on offer, based on its
conviction that the British Government was not prepared to go much
further in meeting Southern Rhodesian demands. However, Cartmel-
Robinson informed Welensky in October 1952, that the widespread
impression within Southern Rhodesia and within its branch of the
United Central Africa Association was:
"that the United Kingdom regards federation
of such importance that it would go to any
lengths in concessions, if Southern Rhodesia
were firm enough in its demands."48
Accordingly the electorate of Southern Rhodesia expected concessions
from the United Kingdom Government to the Southern Rhodesian position
at the January conference.
This impression had been fostered,albeit unknowingly, by Hopkinson
during his tour of central Africa in July and August 1952. Hopkinson's
intention during the tour had been to leave those he met in no doubt
- but without ever actually explicitly saying so - that the Govern¬
ment intended to push federation through despite continued opposition
from the Labour Party and others in the United Kingdom, and Congress
in central Africa. In particular he was determined to convince the
African inhabitants of the three territories that no campaign of
strikes and non-co-operation would affect the government's decision
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to carry through federation. Welensky fully agreed with Hopkinson's
aims and concurred with him that doubts should not be raised about
the British Government's will to proceed. However, he also sought
to convince the British Minister that he was faced with, and was
trying to counter, the widespread impression in Southern Rhodesia
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that the United Kingdom Government were so committed to Federation
that Southern Rhodesia could successfully demand "much greater
concessions at the January conference than they originally could
have hoped for".^
This view had widespread support within the Southern Rhodesian
branch of the United Central Africa Association and was advocated
most forcibly by the Association's deputy chairman, T P M Cochran,
in a speech that became known as the Cathedral Hall or Midlands
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speech, in early September 1952. Cochran argued that although
Federation was essential, Southern Rhodesia should press for better
terms, including a majority in the Federal Assembly, at the January
conference in London. As we have seen a Southern Rhodesian majority
in the Federal Assembly was completely unacceptable to Northern
Rhodesia and Cochran's public support for a further attempt to
achieve it was viewed with anger and alarm in Northern Rhodesian
5?
United Central Africa Association circles.
N H Wilson supported by C Boyd-White, J Hugill, Dr Fowler and
A Stokes, all of the United Central Africa Association, wrote to
Huggins immediately after Cochran's Cathedral Hall speech complain¬
ing about its content and demanding that Huggins bring Cochran into
line with the United Central Africa Association policy.This
demand presented a number of problems for Huggins, not least of
which was that there was no clear United Central Africa Association
position on changes to the proposed Federation. The United Central
Africa Association was created to press for federation, and to
achieve the best possible deal for the settlers of central Africa,
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but these goals sidestepped the difficulty that what was considered
desirable in Southern Rhodesia was frequently at odds with Northern
Rhodesian objectives. Indeed, Welensky had identified one of the
problems of the United Central Africa Association's campaign for a
central African federation, as being the diversity of views
expressed by Association members on what the federation should entail
and what amendments should be sought to the federation proposals at
the January conference.Cartmel-Robinson was also unhappy at the
large disparities in what various United Central Africa Association
members were propounding as being the Association's preferred terms
for federation,
Huggins was also very aware that if the United Central Africa
Association was to continue to be regarded as a non-party organisa¬
tion, it was essential that Cochran, as Chairman of the Rhodesia
Party,^ should continue to hold an influential position within the
Association. Cochran had won the backing of a majority of his
party's delegates for federation at the Rhodesia Party's congress at
Gwelo on 18 July,"^ but Huggins realised that such support could all
too easily be dissipated if Cochran took offence at any public
reprimand over his Cathedral Hall speech, dropped his support for
federation and resigned from the United Central Africa Association.
Nevertheless, the strength of feeling, amongst Northern Rhodesian
elements within the United Central Africa Association, aroused by
Cochran's speech, made it imperative that some action be undertaken,
otherwise there was a distinct possibility that the United Central
Africa Association would split in two. At a Special Committee meeting
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in late September 1932, Huggins admonished Cochran for his Cathedral
Hall speech. Cochran undertook not to repeat his call for the
United Central Africa Association to press for a Southern Rhodesian
majority in the Federal Assembly and to publish a correction of his
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Cathedral Hall speech to that effect.
Huggins had gone as far as he felt he could to bring Cochran more
into line with the views of the United Central Africa Association's
Northern Rhodesian wing but some influential Northern Rhooesian
Association members remained far from satisfied. Abrahams felt
that the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia was
being used as a vehicle to further certain political careers, while
other Association members were actually seeking to sabotage the
campaign for federation through their membership of the United
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Central Africa Association. Neil Wilson was more specific in
his complaints, informing Welensky that: "I cannot see Federation
making any progress at all until Cochran is removed.
As we have seen, Huggins was not prepared to dispense with Cochran's
services, but the need for tighter control over what was set out as
the United Central Africa Association's position on federation and
possible concessions at the January conference, had been brought
home to the Association's leadership. Cartmel-Robinson argued that,
while the United Central Africa Association was pledged to attempt
to gain better terms for Southern Rhodesia at the January conference,
clear limits should be spelt out concerning the range of concessions
61
being sought by the Association. By the middle of October 1952,
the National Executive Council of the United Central Africa Association
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was convinced that the range of views emanating from the United
Centra] Africa Association on suggested changes to the federation
proposals was "doing considerable damage to both the Association
and the cause of Federation.
Accordingly, the United Central Africa Association's National
Executive Council issued a memorandum to all Association members
making public speeches, which laid out the United Central Africa
Association position on possible amendments to the federation pro¬
posals.^ The memorandum emphasised that, while the United Central
Africa Association was pressing for certain amendments, no major
alterations to the existing federation proposals could be expected.
Amalagamation had been ruled out by the opposition of the Northern
Rhodesian, Nyasaland and United Kingdom Governments. Any variation
from the official position contained in the memorandum was to be
clearly identified as a personal view and accompanied with the
assurance that it was perfectly feasible for members of the audience
to support federation while disagreeing with the personal view being
espoused. The memorandum also stressed that the advantages of
federation over amalgamation must be clearly explained.
In the following month, November, further action was taken to ensure
that the United Central Africa Association expressed a more uniform
view on potential amendments to the federation proposals. The Organ¬
ising Committee drew up a list of approved speakers from the Associa-
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tion's membership. By then Hopkinson had also advised Welensky
on how to counter the common misapprehension that the United Kingdom
Government was so committed to the creation of a Central Africa
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federation that it would make substantial concessions to Southern
Rhodesia to secure federation at the January conference. Hopkinson
advised Welensky to argue that the present United Kingdom Government
"is 100% behind this scheme" and no other,.stressing that Southern
Rhodesian hopes of a more centrally controlled Federation emerging
65
from the January conference were therefore illusory.
An extension of the idea that concessions could be won at the
January conference had also begun to gather ground amongst Southern
Rhodesians during 1932. This was that by rejecting the federation
terms currently on offer at the April referendum the Southern
Rhodesian electorate would force the British Government to return
with terms more acceptable to them. This line of reasoning was
generally confined to the two organisations,.one formed and one about
to be formed, to counter the United Central Africa Association and
oppose federation, namely, Sir Ernest Guest's Rhodesia League^ and
R 0 Stockil's Rhodesia Association.^ Among the arguments Welensky
employed to oppose this was one pointing out that if the Labour Party
won power in the United Kingdom it would most certainly not make
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further offers of any description if Southern Rhodesia had rejected
the previous terms.
In the end Welensky and Huggins not only obtained the result they
wished for in the April referendum, but also managed to maintain the
federation issue as a non-party matter. However, to ensure the
latter outcome it was deemed prudent for Huggins to resign from the
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Presidency of the United Central Africa Association and announce
the abandonment of any attempts at forming a federation party.
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He did so just a few days before the Rhodesia Party's emergency
congress on Federation in early February 1953.^ The Rhodesia
Party duly refrained from voting to oppose the offer of federation
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at its emergency congress and the Rhodesia Association was
hurriedly formed. However, as we have noted, the structure of the
United Central African Association remained as a basis for the





On 4 September 1953, Lord Llewellin was sworn in as the first
Governor-General of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and
on 18 December Sir Godfrey Huggins formed its first government,
as a result of the Federal Party's victory in the general elections
of 15 December 1953. This was the culmination of eighty years of
fluctuating pressure from various quarters for the creation of some
sort of united central Africa.
The whole question of closer association in central Africa
revolved around the British Government's indecision on how to
neutralise most effectively the danger of Afrikaner nationalism.
Over the years British Government policy for the containment of
Afrikanerdom vacillated between supporting the creation of an
external balance in the form of a central African bloc and the
pursuit of a solution internal to South Africa which ensured the
political emasculation of extreme Afrikaner nationalism. If the
latter goal were achieved, the United Kingdom was prepared to concede
British central Africa to South Africa, indeed would have been keen
to do so, as such an expansion of the Union's white population would
serve as extra insurance for its continued loyalty to Britain and
Empire. Thus British imperial interests dictated that its policy
towards the central African Territories would be directed by the
need to create either an external or an internal solution to the
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problem of Afrikaner nationalism.
There were, however, other considerations, aside from those of
the United Kingdom. Part of the explanation of why neither the
external nor internal solutions were implemented before 1933 was
that the countries involved had incompatible goals. South Africa's
ambitions of northward expansion were compatible with Britain's
internal solution, while Southern Rhodesia's ambitions for the
formation of a 'greater Rhodesia' to rival the Union to its south
were, in effect, Britain's external solution. Furthermore, Northern
Rhodesia tended to be wary of moves towards closer association in
central Africa because of its fear of being dominated by Southern
Rhodesia in any such grouping, while the Nyasaland administration
was strongly opposed to joining any union in central Africa and
favoured linking with east Africa if some form of closer associa¬
tion was necessary.
In the immediate post-war period, as Britain gave increasingly
serious consideration to the possibility of African majority rule
for a growing number of her colonies, so the appeal of entering a
settler-controlled central African Federation grew among the
settlers of those Colonies not as an end in itself but as a means
of avoiding the alternative of African rule. Accordingly, in the
early 1950s, leading settlers in Kenya, Bechuanaland and, to a lesser
extent, Tanganyika made unsuccessful attempts to engineer the
inclusion of their respective colonies in the proposed Federation of
the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Similarly, the settler populations
of the three territories which formed the central African Federation
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did so because their respective primary goals were denied to them
and Federation represented an apparently viable compromise solu¬
tion. Northern Rhodesia, denied representative government, settled
for Federation, while Nyasaland, denied closer links with east
Africa, found the prospect of entering Federation less distasteful
than delaying its formation and producing widespread civil disorder
and the undermining of the Government's authority. However, while
Southern Rhodesian whites, unable to achieve amalgamation, appeared
to settle for Federation, they in fact saw it as no more than a step
towards their ultimate goal, which remained amalgamation.
One factor leading to the Federation's failure was that the Govern¬
ments and settlers of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, from the
beginning, recognised that there was a fundamental lack of support
for Federation in Southern Rhodesia where the white population con¬
tinued to hope to attain amalgamation. Accordingly, Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia were distrustful of any initiatives emanating
from Salisbury as being moves to bring that end nearer.
Within the United Kingdom the post-war political consensus in
favour of creating a Central African Federation broke down over the
issue of whether or not the opposition of the African populations
in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to closer association with
Southern Rhodesia should be allowed to effectively veto the scheme.
Although a large minority of Labour MPs either shared the Conserva¬
tive Party view that it should not, or were indifferent to the issue,
Jim Griffiths ensured that Federation became a contentious party
political issue by winning the support of the majority of the
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Parliamentary Labour Party for a position opposed to the intro¬
duction of a federal Scheme while African opposition remained
overwhelming.
This was also the position adopted by various special interest
organisations, within the United Kingdom, which either adopted
the issue of Federation or were formed specifically to campaign
and lobby against its imposition over African opposition. To
counter these organisations, Roy Welensky formed the London
Committee of the United Central Africa Association which liaised
closely with the Conservative Party and the Colonial Office,
especially in its lobbying of senior Church of Scotland figures
in 1932 and 1953. Thus, in the United Kingdom, as in central Africa,
Federation was formed against a background of dispute and discord.
Differences in motivation and intention are also discernible
between the three men primarily responsible for the establishment
of the Federation - Andrew Coher. at the Colonial Office, Herbert
Baxter at the Commonwealth Relations Office, and Roy Welensky in
central Africa. Cohen and Baxter were motivated to pursue closer
association in central Africa by the fear of South African expan¬
sion, but differed over the degree of central control which should
be exercised in the resulting Federation. In contract, Welensky
was seeking to create a white settler dominated state based in,
but not restricted to, central Africa and made use of South
Africa's territorial ambitions, and the horror with which they
were viewed in Whitehall and Westminster, to help him towards
this goal.
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In conclusion, what must be stressed is that the Federation of
the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was a compromise, but a compromise
which left its three constituent territories both dissatisfied
with the end product and suspicious of the ambitions of their
fellow members. Denied their true goals, the governments of the
three central African Territories joined together in Federation
because the probable conseguences of not doing so were unacceptable
to them. The one feeling common to all three territories was that
of resentment; Nyasaland's resentment was at being forced by
London and circumstance to join the Federation; Southern Rhodesia's
resentment was at having to settle, even if only temporarily, for
less than amalgamation; and Northern Rhodesia's resentment was
with Southern Rhodesia's attitude towards the northern territories
and its patent understanding of Federation as a step towards
amalgamation. No-one in central Africa, white or African, wanted
Federation but as we have seen, no other compromise seemed accept¬
able to the majority of the interest groups involved.
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APPENDIX I
CONFERENCES ON THE CLOSER ASSOCIATION
OF THE
CENTRAL AFRICAN TERRITORIES
I. LIST OF DELEGATES AND ADVISERS: 18-23 SEPTEMBER, 1951. CO 1015/59
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The Rt. Hon. Mr. P.C. Gordon Walker, M.P., Seoretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations.
Mr. G.H. Baxter, C.M.G., C.I.E., Assistant Under-Seoretary, Commonwealth
Relations Office.
Mr. J.S. Gandee, M.B.E., Principal, Commonwealth Relations Office.
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Mr. I.M.R. Maclennan, C.M.G., United Kingdom High Commissioner to Southern
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The Rt. Hon. Sir Godfrey Uuggins , P.C., C.H., K.C.M.G., F.R.C.S., M.P.,
Prime Minister.
The Hon. E.C.F. Whitehead, O.B.E., M.P., Minister of Finanae.
The Hon, P.B. Fletcher, M.P., Minister of Native Affairs.
The Hon. J.M. Greenfield, K.C., M.P., Minister of Justice and Internal
Affairs.
Mr. R.O. Stockil, M.P., Rhodesia Party delegate. Leader of the Opposition.
The Hon. L.J.W, Keller, C.B.E., M.P., Labour Party Delegate.
Mr. A.R.W. Stumbles, Rhodesia Party Delegate.
Mr. W.H. Eastwood, O.B.E., M.P., Labour Party Delegate.
Sir Archibald James, Rhodesia Party Adviser.
The Hon. H.H. Davies, Labour Party Adviser.
Mr. A.H. Strachan, C.B.E., Secretary to the Treasury.
Mr. L. Powys-Jones, Secretary for Native Affairs.
Mr. T.G. Gisborne, Secretary to the Cabinet.
Mr. A.D. Evans, M.B.E., Assistant Secretary, Internal Affairs.
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Mr. C. Kumbikano, Representative, Afrioan Proteotorate Counoil,
Conference Secretariat.
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Mr. N.A. Gibbon, M.B.E., Deputy Chief Seoretary, Central Afrioan Counc
Mr. G.B.S.O. Clarke, Under Seoretary to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet.
Mr. W.F. Nicholas, Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Secretariat.
Mr. K.J. Knaggs, Clerk of Councils, Northern Rhodesia.
Commander J.P.P. Miohell, Assistant Secretary, Central Afrioan Council
II. LIST OF DELEGATES AND ADVISERS: 23 APRIL-5 MAY, 1952.
CAB 129/52
United Kingdom
The Most Hon. the Marquess ofSalisbury,
ICG.
The Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, D.S.O.,
M.C., M P.
The Rt. Hon. A. T. Lennox-Boyd, M P.
Mr. J. G. Foster. Q C , M P
Sir Percivale Liesching,G CM G .K.C.B
Mr. G. H. Baxter, C M G . CI E.
Mr. W. L. Gorell Bames, C M G.
Mr. J. B. Williams, C M G
Mr. E. Melville. C.M.G
Mr. J. P. Gibson, C.B.E
Mr. H. T. Bourdillon
Mr. J. E. Mamham, M.C
Mr. R. S. Hudson, C.M.G
Mr. R. L. D. Jasper
Secretary of Slate for Commonwealth
Relations.
Secretary of State for the Colonics.
Minister of State for Colonial Affairs.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Relations.
Permanent Under-Secretary of State,
Commonwealth Relations Office.
Assistant Under-Secretary of Slate.
Commonwealth Relations Office.
Assistant Under-Secretary of Stale,
Colonial Office.
Assistant Under-Secretary of State,
Colonial Office.




Assistant Secretary, Colonial Office.
Assistant Secretary, Colonial Office





The Rt. Hon. Sir Godfrey Hugginj, C.H.,
K.C.M.G., M P.
The Hon. E. C. F. Whitehead, C.M.G.,
O.B.E., M.P.
The Hon. J. M. Greenfield. Q.C.. M P.
The Hon. P. B. Fletcher, M.P
Mr. R. O. Stockil, M P
Mr. W. H. Eastwood, M.P
Mr. IC. M. Goodenough, C.M.G., M.C.
Mr. A. H. Strachan. C.B.E
Mr. T. G. Gisbome
Mr. J. B. Ross
Mr. A. D. Evans, M.B.E.
Mr. J. N. N. Nkomo
Mr. J. Z. Savanhu
Prime Minister.
Minister of Finance.
Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice.
Minister of Native Aflairs.
Leader of the Opposition.
Rhodesia Labour Party Representative.
High Commissioner in London.
Secretary to the Treasury.
Secretary to the Cabinet.
Deputy High Commissioner in London.




Sir Gilbert Rennie, K.C.M.G., M.C. ...
Mr. E. L G. Unsworth. Q.C
Mr. k. P. Bush. O.B.E.
Mr. R. A. Nicholson
Mr. R. Wdensky, C.M.G., M.L.C. ...
Mr. G. B. Beckett, C.M.G., M.L.C. ...
LL-Cot. E. M. Wilson, M.B.E., M.L.C.
Mr. J. S. Moffat, O.B.E., M.L.C. ...
Governor.
Attorney General.
Secretary for Native Affairs.
Economic Secretary.
Chairman of the Unofficial Members'
Association.
Member for Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
Member for Health and Local Govern¬
ment.




Sir Geoffrey Colby, K.C.M.G. .
Mr. V. Fox-Strangways
Mr. M. P. Barrow, C.B.E.
Mr. G. G. S. J. Hadlow, O.B.E.
Mr. J. Marshall, O B E., M C.
Mr. K. Ommaney Shelford
Central African Council
Mr. H. N. Party
Governor.
Secretary for African Affaire.
Senior Unofficial Member of Legis¬
lative Council.
Unofficial Member of Legislative
Council.
Unofficial Member of the Economic
Development Committee.




Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, K.C.M.G.
Mr. 1. C. McPetrie.
Mr. T. H. ftrrott.
Conference Adviser
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The draft federal scheme prepared by the conference, held in
London between 23 April and 5 May, 1952 (Cmd 8575), divided
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Electricity Supply and Distrib¬
ution
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The final division of powers saw the following Territorial
functions transferred either to the Federal government or into
a 'concurrent list', for which both Federal and Territorial
governments had responsibility, but with federal law prevailing
in any cases of inconsistency.
Income tax
European agriculture in Southern Rhodesia* the northern
territories wei e free to hand it over to the
concurrent list, and Northern Rhodesia soon did
Veterinary services in Southern Rhodesia (the same
provision was made as for European agriculture
in the two northern territories)
Co-operatives (except where a majority of the members
were African)
Marketing
Health
Town planning
European police forces
Prisons
Roads
